

THE MIDDLE EAST

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Journal

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Factory

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
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The cover photograph is of the interior of an Egyptian textile mill.

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**HIS HOLINESS
ATHENAGORAS I
PATRIARCH OF ISTANBUL**

THE
MIDDLE
EAST *Journal*

VOLUME 11

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NUMBER 4

THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF AN EGYPTIAN
FACTORY

William Morris Carson

AL-QAHIRA Spinning and Weaving Company was founded in 1927. Since its opening—with a complete, second-hand plant bought in England—the factory has been reconditioned and rebuilt until it is now the most modern industrial enterprise in Egypt. The mill produces more than 20 per cent of all cotton cloth manufactured in the country and is the economic keystone of its larger, parent holding-company, al-Qahira Bank. Al-Qahira Bank controls more than thirty separate enterprises, but few produce as much profit as al-Qahira Spinning and Weaving Company. The mill supports many of the less profitable enterprises of the holding company, and it would be politically impossible to maintain the mill's high rate of profit without the burden of the less successful enterprises.

Protectionism is nothing new in the history of industrial development. Autarchy has long been a term in the politicians vocabulary, but al-Qahira Spinning and Weaving Company is a special case in point. Talaat Pasha, the guiding force in the founding of the mill, and its first general manager, had been a director of the Egyptian State Railways, a segment of the general Egyptian bureaucracy. In the name of nationalism and of the political elimination of the British from Egypt, he was able to

◆ WILLIAM MORRIS CARSON spent the years 1951-1953 in Egypt doing graduate studies under grants from The Ford Foundation and *The Middle East Institute*. A fictitious name for the mill and pseudonyms for persons have been used in order to protect confidences. The author wishes particularly to express his gratitude for help from Mr. Paul S. Lunt, then Labor Attaché at the American Embassy in Cairo. The Ford Foundation is not the author, owner, publisher or proprietor of this work and is not to be understood as approving by virtue of its grant any of the statements made or opinions expressed therein.

gather native capital to found the mill. He drew his support from the Egyptian politicians. He was able to gain this support because the mill's success would be a demonstration of the Egyptian's ability to rule himself without British tutelage. The removal of British tutelage would in turn open up the positions in the higher reaches of the civil service to the more ambitious members of the Egyptian middle class. The move gained additional support from the large landowners and from the monarchy, who were equally eager to expand their respective areas of political control.

Egypt, as a major cotton producer, had a strong argument for the founding of a local textile industry. Though the move was politically unpalatable to the British who controlled Egypt, it was not an easy demand to resist when couched in economic terms. An Egypt protected as an exclusive market for the products of Lancashire was not acceptable to the other powers of the world. Britain's unilateral grant of limited self-government to Egypt in the early Twenties also made it difficult openly to frustrate Talaat Pasha's plan for a local textile industry. Though certainly the British authorities gave no extraordinary concessions to the mill, this was not altogether their fault. The capitulations, dating from the days of Turkish suzerainty over Egypt, forbade any unilateral raising of tariffs, or other protective measures. It is important to realize that the last vestiges of the capitulations were not removed until after the second World War.

Therefore, when the struggle of Egyptians was transferred or, rather, expanded to the realm of the economic, there was little that the local British authorities could do to help or hinder the development of local industry. Additionally, at the time of the founding of the mill, there was a world depression in textiles, and therefore little resistance was offered by British industrial interests to the founding of a minimally profitable type of industry. The businessmen of Lancashire were only too happy to get rid of obsolescent machinery not then in use and for which there was virtually no demand. Add to this the belief held by Egypt's indirect rulers that the mill would fail in any event and one has, in sum, most of the reasons for its successful founding.

After the mill opened its doors in 1927 it grew rapidly. The original, imported second-hand plant was for spinning only, but after a short period of operation it was decided that economies could be achieved by setting up weaving facilities. Once the weaving mill was in operation, further economies were assertedly possible if a finishing plant was added. Al-Qahira mill grew by these progressive and unintegrated steps, until it included a total textile process from spinning to dyeing. The shortages arising out of the second World War and the demands of the Eighth Army for its operations on the Western desert led to the addi-

tion of a medical cotton plant and a complete wool mill. The physical and economic fortunes of the mill kept exact pace with the growing power of the Egyptian nationalists. As the strength of the monarchy and the nationalists grew in relation to, and at the expense of, the British, so the fortunes of al-Qahira mill waxed and waned. But, because of its symbolic importance to the nationalist movement in Egypt, the mill was never allowed to go completely under. At its point of lowest ebb during the Depression, the mill was so close to bankruptcy that it had to pay its workers in kind. The zenith of the mill's financial strength was achieved during the second World War, when a large cash surplus was built up through cost-plus war contracts. A portion of the profits from the war were allocated to re-equipment of the mill with newest and most efficient textile machinery that money could buy. Al-Qahira Mill today is one of the most modern in the world.

The shape and development of the mill; its internal organization and the relation of the mill to the larger national state, have all followed general political developments in Egypt. As a unit of power in the struggle between native nationalists and the British, the mill became a training ground for the technologists of government. The plant was ordered in such a way as to allow for interchangeability of managerial personnel between factory and government. The management of the mill was obligated to dedicate a large part of their time to general political activity directed toward the reduction of British influence in Egypt. This took the form of active demonstrations against British rule, and also led to al-Qahira's being used as a reservoir for political talent. The protégés of major political leaders in the country could always find a job there. This whole period shaped al-Qahira as a unit of power and prestige in the broader political system; a stopping-off place, vocationally, on the way to Cairo. On the reverse of the coin, no general manager of al-Qahira could long remain in control of the mill if he did not have his connections with government in Cairo. Al-Qahira, its managerial personnel and its policy, always accurately reflected the current political relationships in the government. A man's vocational future in the mill was dependent on his political affiliations as much as on his technological capacity.

It was not only al-Qahira's national and historical background which shaped its organization and decided who was to rule the mill. But, equally important in the mill's day-to-day operations was the local setting. The relationship between Cairo, the officers of the mill, and population of the town in which the mill was located determined the course of the mill's activities in the present, whether the mill was peaceful or discontented, whether contracted commitments could be met or not. For, if the rulers

of any institution such as al-Qahira are an important means of understanding its operation, so are the ruled. The necessity of control of the workers of al-Qahira gives flesh and blood to an enterprise which otherwise only appears as a charter of organization.

Al-Qahira Mill was located in Gharbiya province of the Nile Delta, a primarily agricultural region. The area is so densely settled that no one village is out of sight of a neighbor. The Delta land of deep alluvial soil has suffered badly from the introduction of perennial irrigation. Because of excessive use of water and because of low-lying land, the water table has been rising over the years. With the higher water table has come salting up of land, producing a situation in Gharbiya whereby more old cultivated land goes out of use than there is new land made available. This adds to the already existing population pressure in the province.

The Delta smallholder has been hardest hit by this salting up process, since he cannot afford the expensive measures for leaching away excess salinity in the soil. The land, particularly near al-Qahira Mill, has tended to gravitate into the hands of a few. Characteristically, the peasant landholder of Egypt lives up to the level of his income, and a little beyond, by mortgaging next year's income to provide for the current year's expenses. The Great Depression saw major amounts of land changing hands because of these debts, in addition to what was already taking place owing to soil salinity. Also, the population increase greatly lowered the land-man ratio in the Delta, making the family-supporting agricultural unit an increasing rarity. All of these trends were of great importance in the founding of a textile mill; their consequence was an increase in landlessness.

Landlessness had widely ramifying vocational effects for the inhabitants of the Delta villages. The number of families able to maintain themselves solely by the pursuit of agriculture decreased. Even remaining in the village as a renter, or as a daily-paid agricultural worker, no longer sufficed for the support of a family. Where, before, the members of an average family had been totally involved in farming, it became the practice to send some members off the land in order to aid in the support of those who remained in the village. The circle of villages surrounding Balad al-Akbar, the town where al-Qahira Mill was located, was shifting to this vocational practice. This provided the mill with a ready-made labor force with strong local and legal ties.

Balad al-Akbar, al-Qahira Mill's urban center, was, prior to the establishment of the mill, an agricultural trading center and a major center for the production of handwoven cotton textiles. Lying almost at sea-level, the area of Balad al-Akbar was very humid the year around. This humidity, a theoretical requisite for the spinning of cotton yarns, was

an argument used by the founder, Talaat Pasha, for the location of the mill. In this day of air-conditioning it is no longer a valid argument; it was a doubtful argument even in the late Twenties. The disadvantages of locating a major industrial enterprise in a place like Balad al-Akbar is evident from the geographical location. First, the Alexandrine coast is just as humid as the Balad al-Akbar area, and has many more of the facilities deemed vital to industry. Balad al-Akbar was a two-hour train journey from the main trunk railroad line running from Cairo to Alexandria. All the goods produced at al-Qahira had to be transshipped once they arrived at Tanta, the point where the branch line from Balad al-Akbar met the main line from Cairo. Second, Balad al-Akbar had not sufficient power, water or sewage facilities to meet the needs of the original small mill. All these supporting facilities had to be built at considerable cost by the organizers of the mill. Third, there was no trained labor force at Balad al-Akbar. Quite literally, the labor force which mans the mill today had to be created out of a non-industrial, if not anti-industrial, peasantry. The hand-loom textile workers of Balad al-Akbar opposed the mill and refused to work in it. Last, it was extremely difficult to lure a cadre of trained textile workers from the major cities of Egypt, and from abroad, to a small rural town like Balad al-Akbar. The company had to expend considerable amounts of capital to retain the services of the highly trained administrative and production employees. Schools, hospitals, swimming pools, clubs and housing all had to be provided to satisfy the urban taste. Initially, it was easier to import skilled foreigners on contract than to lure Egyptians away from urban centers. The latter choice was the immediately more expensive one, but considering the context of Balad al-Akbar, the cheapest course in the long run.

The founder of al-Qahira Mill was aware of these complications, but had little other choice. First, he had to be able to purchase a large tract of land at a reasonable price. In any of Egypt's major population centers this was impossible. As soon as word got around about a tentative location for the mill, the owners of the real estate put the price sky-high. And the fact that an urban area always had *owners* rather than an owner, made the purchase of a suitable site a nightmare of negotiation. Only in the countryside could a *single-owner* land area of sufficient size be located. The price problem was resolved by purchasing the land from a personal friend of Talaat's at more than the going price for land in the Balad al-Akbar area, but cheaper than a comparable site in Cairo or Alexandria.

Another consideration, which bulked largest in the mind of al-Qahira's founder, was political. In the late Twenties the two great cities, and even the provincial capitals, were disturbed by a three-sided struggle

for power between the middle class, the monarchy, and the British. Vocational position in the city always depended on connections with one of the major political groups. The urban poor, who would have supplied the workers in Cairo or Alexandria, were almost totally sympathetic to, and participants in the activities of, the *Wafd* Party. The *sturm und drang* of urban political action meant that a good deal of the attention of the workers was directed to the political scene and less to their machines. Also, the fact that the urban workers had a party at their backs made supervision difficult. Inevitably, the workers were members of one group and the supervision, if not foreign and identified with the occupier, belonged to another. Work disputes became national issues and vice-versa. Even the industrial plants of Cairo and Alexandria were located on the periphery of the city; or, if located in the center of the city, management preferred to recruit new arrivals from the villages. Given the Egyptian political situation, it was cheaper to hire illiterate and untrained peasants than to hire the literate, trained and demanding urbanite.

On the other hand, the emigrant peasant with his primary associational ties to the village, had little interest in urban politics. Because of the exploitative control of the villages by the city, the peasant was suspicious of the trained, literate urbanite. Initially, at least, the mill supervisor, who even in Balad al-Akbar was a city product, was worlds away from the peasant. It was not only almost impossible for the supervisor to organize his workers for political ends with respect to national politics, but the unremitting hostility of the peasant for the supervisor made the worker difficult to control even for the technological purposes of the mill. Talaat Pasha thus chose Balad al-Akbar, accepting a theoretical loss in efficiency in return for political peace; and, as well, repaired a few national, political fences through purchasing land from a member of his own group with considerable influence in Cairo.

This does not mean that al-Qahira Mill has never had labor troubles. The mill has had serious disturbances about every six years. By "serious" is meant, for instance, an attempt to murder the General Manager, which took place in 1937. But the *strikes*, or whatever one wishes to call them, were always the consequence of some measure taken by the management of the mill which menaced the protective associations of the worker linking him to the village. The managerial employees, always ready to exploit such an unstable situation, had, in the past, directly or indirectly, encouraged and participated in these upheavals. The managerial employees, split along lines of education and social background, which corresponded closely to who controlled what office in the mill, attempted to span the gulfs in the Egyptian class structure by use of the workers against those either competing against them, or holding higher office.

Because Balad al-Akbar was geographically isolated from the turbulent elements of both Cairo and Alexandria, the disturbances were easily crushed. The only changes in the relationships among the office-holding groups in the mill, and in turn in their relationships with the workers, have come about after major changes in Cairo. The recent army *coup d'état* saw a General Manager forced out of office in favor of a new man of the government. And before him, 'Abd al-Hamid Pasha, whose ties were to the *Wafd* Party, was replaced by Sayf Bey, who sided with the King. But, nonetheless, all these changeovers were relatively peaceful because of the management's ability to keep the politically unaffiliated workers in line, or to suppress easily such outbursts as did occur. Whereas management could call upon the coercive resources of the capital, the workers had no such powerful allies. Rebellious managerial employees—a smaller but better organized group—were at the mercy of their enemies, politically speaking, in and out of the mill. The revolts of the managerial employees generally followed a changeover on the national scene, when hopes for a better job or the tenure of a currently held position, took a turn for the political worse. The lapse in time before the changeover took place was the occasion when these disturbances took place. The newcomers, with their assumed call upon the power of the central government, had little trouble in righting the imbalance in their own favor.

The city of Balad al-Akbar ecologically reflected this basic situation. Having grown to a population of 180,000, from being a small market and craft center, it was divided into two distinct social worlds—the world of the factory and the world of the traditional town. A large, dry irrigation canal served as the territorial divider between the two kinds of people. Each had its police station, its own shops and coffee houses, but over-all political control of Balad al-Akbar was vested in the traditional sector of the city, whose spokesman was the largest agricultural landowner in the area, Ahmad Haddad Pasha. Ahmad Haddad Pasha had been the Senator in Parliament for the Balad al-Akbar area for a number of years. The political latecomers of the mill had tried to seize complete control of the city, but failed. The traditional sector contained more votes and its leader was in a better bargaining position in Cairo than the General Manager of the mill. Until the army *coup d'état* the most influential group in the country was the landowners. But the General Manager and Ahmad Haddad always cooperated if the mill was disturbed. Their overall interests were the same when it came to control of the workers and employees in the mill.

All the better shops, coffee houses, barbers and bakeries were located in the traditional sector of the city and thus fell under the control of

Ahmad Haddad Pasha. The monthly-paid employees of the mill, roughly those who could read and write and were politically involved, went to the traditional side of the city to shop and to talk. The workers, on the other hand, limited by their small incomes, stayed on the factory side of the canal where the less expensive—and also less well thought of—establishments were located. Most of the workers' leisure time was spent in the midst of their families on the factory side of the city. Some were fortunate enough to have space in the relatively cheap factory housing; others lived in the sprawling industrial slum of Abu Qada.

It was more difficult for the workers than for the employees to escape round-the-clock supervision by the mill. Only a very small minority associated with other than their fellow workers. Leisure time spent outside the family was passed in the company of a circle of friends also from the factory side of the city. At the center of the circle of friends were fellow villagers, often relatives from the same village, who passed the time together drinking coffee, playing backgammon, praying or walking to and from the mill. These groups were founded on the assumption of economic self-help in addition to leisure time activities. The members loaned each other money, kept each other well informed on conditions within the mill and concerned themselves with national politics insofar as national politics affected their livelihood or their job tenure. The workers simply could not afford, economically, to cross the irrigation canal and patronize the traditional groups in the city. Then, too, once he crossed the canal his rights in the village were lost, and the status gamble was too great for most of the workers.

The point of going across the canal was to gain access to participation in a national political structure from which one might ultimately garner rewards. On the far side of the canal one could, theoretically, join one of any number of associations. One could seek out the company of Senator Ahmad Haddad, that is, if one had sufficient education and felt free to wear a western-style suit. There was also the *Sunniyin*, a ritualistic Muslim brotherhood, that tied together all the petty merchants of the city. One obtained access to the *Sunniyin* by being born in Balad al-Akbar of parents also from the city, and by marrying into one of the *Sunniyin* families. Either of the two cases were socially remote for the average worker. Ahmad Haddad was unlikely to accept the company of anyone who was not already a person of influence in terms of land and connections in Cairo. The worker was about as likely to gain the friendship of Ahmad Haddad as a truck driver is to be accepted as a member of the Racquet Club. Even the employees of the mill were chary of having other than most informal kind of relationships with the political moguls of the city. If the General Manager of the mill found out that

one of his managerial employees was associating with a group politically antagonistic to the mill, the job possibilities of the employee would have been beclouded, if not ended altogether.

To join the *Sunniyin*, the worker had to be literate in addition to having an establishable kin connection by descent or marriage with another member of the order. As has been cited before, most of the workers at Balad al-Akbar were of village origin and illiterate. Most workers were also burdened with extensive families which reduced the possibilities of their being able to afford the time, or the money, for the necessary education, not to mention their unwillingness to cut free from the village social security system with its exclusive demands.

Another possibility associationally existed for the worker to bridge the canal, and that was the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood, in principle and in practice, in Balad al-Akbar, was a subversive organization directed against the traditional political command of the city by Senator Ahmad Haddad. Led by middle management employees, cut off from rising higher in the hierarchy by their *petit bourgeois* birth and limited high school, or vocational school, education, the Brotherhood was organized to seize power nationally in order to distribute local political rewards.

The Brotherhood had the strength and prestige of a national political organization and was favored by the General Manager of the mill. The General Manager saw in them a way of reducing the influence of Senator Ahmad Haddad and acquiring local political control as well as enhanced national political control. Organizationally, the Brotherhood made a concerted attempt to recruit the workers of the mill, to lure them to their headquarters on the "right" side of the canal. But the Brotherhood only succeeded in acquiring a following among the managerial employees. Again, the social requisite for the workers to be useful as political participants in the Brotherhood was their breaking away from the village mould. Though the workers always spoke admiringly of the activities of the Brotherhood, few actually joined the organization. Joining the Brotherhood required a lengthy initiation period spent in becoming literate and gaining a thorough knowledge of the Brotherhood's interpretation of the meaning of Islam. Again, becoming a member of an urban organization implied giving up village connections, and, in this case, the additional risk of gambling on an organization's political future.

The managerial employees from assistant on up the line spent their leisure time across the canal. This, despite the fact that the company had built an elaborate and costly employees' club on the factory side of the canal. It was seldom used by any of the employees of the mill except those who were at the very top of the rank hierarchy. Most of the time the club was nearly empty. The company housing furnished to the

monthly-paid, managerial employees was geographically removed on the far side of the factory and away from the canal. If the nature of the housing was an attempt to keep the employees in their own backyard, it was a failure for several reasons. First of all, and despite the cooperative store provided for the employees, some shopping had to be done across the canal. Then too, the only place an employee could spend his free time without direct company supervision was across the canal. Last, the only way to counterbalance the unstated power of the General Manager was through association with one of the groups across the canal with national political connections.

If an employee was an antagonist of the General Manager, he spent his time across the canal in the company, perhaps, of the followers of the prior General Manager. He might be a member of the Brotherhood but he was seldom a member of the *Sunniyin*. A few, at great risk, managed to gain access to the company of Senator Ahmad Haddad. The *Sunniyin* was not a national political organization, but was focused on local control, and therefore could do little to protect the position of an insecure employee.

What was most relevant about the location of the employees' associational activities, and the kind of activities, was the fact that they were beyond the direct control of the General Manager. This explained the attempt by Sayf Bey, a former general manager, to take over the formal political offices controlling the metropolitan area of Balad al-Akbar. The authority of any person in the mill was defined by the technological organization of textile production. On the other hand, a person's *power*, his ability to command was based on his associations and ultimately on his ability to employ the rewards and punishments of a national political machine. The loyalties that underlay command were the product of the mutual rewards and punishments that the employers and workers of the mill could mete out to each other. A man's group of membership at al-Qahira aside from the office he enjoyed in the mill determined the patterns that he was expected to follow. It described the circle of his life, gave him historical precedents for meeting the current problems of maintaining himself in the mill, and laid out the limitations on his action for the future.

SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Harry J. Psomiades

THE rapid rise of Soviet power following the close of the Second World War brought to an end almost three decades of Soviet inertia in the Middle East. Russia once again became the *bête noire* of Middle East politics. Russian troops occupied northern Iran; Turkey was put under pressure to cede territory and a privileged status in the Straits to Russia; Greece was embroiled in a Communist civil war and the Arab East subjected to increasing Soviet influence. Although Turkey, Greece and Iran, with American aid, have succeeded in resisting their northern neighbor, Soviet influence has continued to play an important role in Middle East politics and has won in the attempt to establish a foothold in the Arab East.

Unlike the peripheral states, where there has been a clear recognition of the Soviet threat and a determined will to resist Soviet expansion, the Arab East has remained, in general, oblivious of, or indifferent to, the Russian danger. Western imperialism has been the whipping boy of Arab politics, and the Soviet leaders, like the Czars before them, have sought to capitalize on this fact. To the Muslim Arab world, they have offered themselves as a deterrent to Western imperialism; to the Christian Arab East, they have sought, notwithstanding their atheist ideology, to present themselves as the protectors of the Orthodox and Eastern churches. It is this latter and little-known aspect of Soviet foreign policy and Middle East politics which will be discussed here.

Leadership in the Orthodox World, 1923-1945

The influence and well-being of the Eastern Orthodox churches in the Middle East were seriously undermined by the fall of the Ottoman and Czarist Russian Empires following World War I. The guardians of Orthodoxy there—the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Russian church—found themselves struggling for their very existence, the latter against the repressive religious tenets of Bolshevism, the former against the new conditions posed by the Kemalist movement and the Lausanne settlement. The two-headed Eagle on the Kremlin was re-

◆ HARRY J. PSOMIADES is a graduate of The School of International Affairs and of The Near and Middle East Institute, Columbia University, and is currently in the Middle East preparing his doctoral dissertation. The study resulting in this article was made under a fellowship granted by The Ford Foundation. The Ford Foundation is not the author, owner, publisher or proprietor of this work and is not to be understood as approving by virtue of its grant any of the statements made or the views expressed therein.

placed by the hammer and sickle; the *Phanar* was engulfed in uncertainty and fear.

The story of the violent persecution and martyrdom of the Russian church at the hands of the Bolsheviks is well known. After a decade of fierce resistance to the Soviet regime, the Church in Russia was compelled to reach an unhappy compromise with the Soviet government. But it was not until the German invasion of Russia in June, 1941 that the pressure against the Church was partially removed. The loyalty of the Church and its active cooperation with the Soviet government in resisting the Nazi invader were rewarded with greater privileges to the Church, and in September, 1943, with permission to elect the Metropolitan Sergii to the long-vacated Patriarchal Throne. By 1944 the Russian church received Soviet permission to re-establish its influence in the Orthodox world, and since the historical objective of the Moscow Patriarchate—primacy in the Orthodox world—coincided with the political aims of the Soviet state, the extension and consolidation of its influence and control over the Orthodox countries and minorities by means of ecclesiastical relations, the Soviet government was prepared to support the Church at home and abroad.¹

On the other hand, the position of the Oecumenical Patriarchate had also improved. At the Lausanne Conference (Nov. 20, 1922-Feb. 4, 1923; April 23-July 24, 1923) the Oecumenical Patriarchate was subjected to the severest re-examination. The Turkish delegate demanded that the Oecumenical Patriarchate be removed from Constantinople and endeavored to make its abolition a condition for the retention of Greek population in that city.² He insisted that the Patriarchate had always carried on political activity in Turkey and would continue to do so. If the Allies would not agree to the Turkish proposal, his delegation threatened to withdraw its acceptance of the solutions proposed for all the other questions submitted to the sub-commission.³ The West and the Orthodox countries took an equally strong stand. Lord Curzon was most emphatic on this point. "There seems to me to be no reasons why the Patriarch should not continue to exercise his spiritual and ecclesiastical prerogative without enjoying any sort of political and administrative authority at all. On the other hand, if these spiritual and ecclesiastical prerogatives were to be destroyed and the seat of the Patriarchate removed from Constantinople, a shock would be delivered to the conscience of the whole civilized world."⁴ After a great deal of diplomatic maneu-

1. Spinka, Mathew, *The Church in Soviet Russia*, New York, 1956, p. 121.

2. *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace*, London: HMSO, 1923, Turkey, No. 1 (Cmd 1814, 1923) pp. 317-18.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 336-37.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 319.

vering, Ismet Pasha (Inönü), the chief Turkish delegate at Lausanne, finally gave a reluctant verbal promise that the Turkish government would retain the Oecumenical Patriarchate. However, in the final Treaty and the Conventions annexed there were no clauses providing for the rights and privileges of the Oecumenical Patriarchate. The Treaty of Lausanne, in effect, left the future of the Patriarchate in complete uncertainty, and left it largely to the discretion of the Turkish government to interfere with the liberty of the Patriarch and the free exercise of his oecumenical function.⁵

As a result of the Lausanne settlement, the *Phanar* was stripped of its secular functions and was compelled to return to the pre-Ottoman—and more typically Orthodox—conception of the primacy of the Oecumenical Patriarchate; one of honor rather than direct jurisdiction. Presently, the Oecumenical Patriarchate has jurisdiction over 95,000 Orthodox Christians in Turkey; about one million in the Dodecanese Islands and Crete; 150,000 in Central and Western Europe; 1,300,000 in North and South America and 85,000 Orthodox Christians in Australia and New Zealand. Northern Greece, with a population of four million, also comes under the canonical and spiritual jurisdiction of the Oecumenical Patriarchate. In addition, the Oecumenical Patriarchate is *primus inter pares* of the Patriarchs and presiding Bishops of the other Orthodox churches whose entire membership is about 200 million. Since Lausanne, the Patriarchate has become more "Oecumenical," in the original geographical meaning of the word. It has spread its jurisdictional influence to many areas of the world as a result of the movements of large numbers of Orthodox peoples into non-Orthodox countries. Between 1922 and 1931 the Patriarch appointed representatives to newly created posts in Western and Central Europe, the Americas, Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, the *Phanar* cooperated fully with the Balkan and Near Eastern churches and showed deep concern and sympathy for the persecuted Church of Russia. Notwithstanding its sincere concern for the Russian church, the Oecumenical Patriarchate became at a very early date the religious center of those churches formerly under Russian jurisdiction who wished to avoid Bolshevik influence in Russia. It recognized and, at the request of the churches concerned, allowed to come under its jurisdiction the churches of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Church of the Russian émigrés in Western Europe and elsewhere.

5. Articles 40 and 41 of the Lausanne Treaty provide for the non-Muslim minorities (in Turkey) the right to establish their own religious, social and educational institutions. The fate of the Oecumenical Patriarch as Archbishop of Constantinople is directly connected with that of the Greek minority in Turkey.

Internally, the Oecumenical Patriarchate has been dealing with a hostile Turkish government which pictures the *Phanar* as an agent of Greek imperialism. It is extremely unfortunate for the Oecumenical Patriarchate that its activity is greatly influenced by the political relations between Ankara and Athens. From 1923 until 1925, the period of very poor relations between Greece and Turkey, two of the three Patriarchs, Meletios I (1921-1923) and Constantine VI (1924-1925), were expelled from Turkey by the Ankara government. But with the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations in 1930, the Turkish government began to make some unofficial concessions to the Patriarchate and the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul in matters of ecclesiastical dress and procedure, church construction, schools and welfare societies. Considerable progress was made at the *Phanar* during the reign of Photios II (1929-1936)—the period of the Balkan Conferences and Entente—Maximos V (1946-1948) and the first seven years of Athenagoras I (1948-)—the period marking the acute struggle against the Soviet Union and the formation of the anti-Soviet alliances, NATO and the now defunct Balkan Pact. With the exception of the strange anti-Christian and anti-Jewish *varlık vergisi*, a levy designed to make all war profiteers help pay for Turkey's vast defense efforts (1941-1943), but which was unfairly and severely administered to non-Muslims, the future of the Patriarchate based on Greek-Turkish friendship seemed assured.

The Soviets and the Orthodox Church in the Middle East, 1945-1957

The first major effort of the Russian church to extend its influence in the Orthodox world since Czarist times was at the *Sobor* which was held January 31-February 2, 1945 to elect Metropolitan Alexii to succeed the deceased Patriarch Sergii. The *Sobor* afforded the opportunity of personal contact with the various representatives of the Orthodox churches and was followed by an exchange of visits by Russian churchmen to the Balkans and the Near East. In 1945 and 1946 Russian church delegations visited Communist Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria.

The outstanding visit was that of Patriarch Alexii to the troubled Orthodox churches of the Near East. The Patriarchate of Antioch was a prime target of Soviet religious-political designs. In May, 1945, Patriarch Alexii flew in a Soviet plane via Teheran to Baghdad and Beirut and had a long conference with the Patriarch of Antioch. The head of the Antiochene church is Alexander III, "Patriarch of Antioch, the City of God, of Cilicia, of Iberia, of Syria, of Arabia and all the Orient." His communicants, mostly Arab, number about 300,000 and reside mostly in Syria and Lebanon and, in fewer numbers, in Iraq. In addition, he has about 100,000 communicants living in the Diaspora, mostly in the West-

ern Hemisphere. Internal disputes and external dangers have plagued the Patriarchate of Antioch. The lack of money for church and school construction and maintenance, for the religious education and training of the clergy and laity and the inability of the church to provide welfare measures for its poverty-stricken members made it extremely vulnerable to the well-organized and-financed projects of Western Christian missionaries, especially in Lebanon.⁶ Internally, the church has been divided by the elections of two Patriarchs. Upon the death of Mgr. Arsène Haddad (in January 1933), Mgr. Alexander Tahhan, who had been elected Patriarch (in February 1931) with the support of the Greek Patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria and Jerusalem, became the undisputed head of the Antiochene See. Taking advantage of the disorganization and the plight of the Patriarchate of Antioch and of the extreme nationalist feelings of the Orthodox Arab Christians, the Soviets had little difficulty in beginning to establish a foothold in the Arab Near East.

After the visit of Patriarch Alexii with the Patriarch of Antioch, the two drove to Jerusalem, where they were cordially received by the Patriarch of that city and by many of the Russian clergy living there. Earlier, in May, 1944, many of the Russian clergy in the Holy City accepted the authority of the Moscow church, which assumed official administration of Russian ecclesiastical property under their jurisdiction.⁷

The problems which plagued the Patriarchate of Jerusalem were the struggle between the Arab and Greek clergy, Catholic and Protestant encroachment upon the Holy Places held by the Patriarchate and the financial needs of the Church. The struggle between the two church factions was intensified when Britain took over the Palestine Mandate. Arab clergymen claimed that, by virtue of the fact that the overwhelming majority of the 60,000 members of the Church of Jerusalem were Arabs, they ought to be given the opportunity to become members of the Holy Synod of the Church and to partake in the election of the Patriarch. The position of the Holy Synod—formed by an exclusive brotherhood of Greek clergy—is that the property and investments of the Church belong not solely to the Arab Christian community but to world Orthodoxy.

Financially, the Church has been in bad straits. During the Czarist period, much of the financial support of the Patriarchate was derived

6. The Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem suffered heavily by the withdrawal of Czarist Russian financial and political influence in the Middle East. Before World War I the Russian Church had assiduously cultivated the Orthodox Christian communities in the Levant by richly endowing many educational, religious and welfare institutions among them.

7. *New York Times*, May 9, 1944.

from the Russian government, from pilgrims and from the private donations of the Russian royal house. When this support was withdrawn after the Bolshevik revolution, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem was compelled to sell much of its property. It is still unable properly to maintain the Holy Places, the hospices, schools and churches which it has retained and is furthermore under increasing pressure from the Western churches to give up some of its property to them, especially those with biblical significance.

Another problem which came later was the dispersion of the Palestine Orthodox Christians from their homeland. The Arab-Israeli war has uprooted many of the Palestine Christians who unhappily find themselves in Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. These refugees are easy prey for the Communist agitator—they blame the West for their unfortunate fate.

After his stay in Jerusalem—where he was not too successful with the Greek clergy—Patriarch Alexii went to Egypt, where he was received by the Egyptian government and the Patriarch of Alexandria. While in Egypt he accepted the local Russian Orthodox community into communion with the Moscow Patriarchate and, as subsequent events were to prove, had some success with the Greek Patriarch of Alexandria.

The head of the Alexandrian Church is Christopher II, Pope and Patriarch of Alexandria, of Egypt and all Africa. His communicants number about 100,000, in Egypt and in the rest of Africa. Three quarters of them are Greek, and the higher clergy are mostly Greek. Financially, the Alexandrian Church has been well-off, thanks to the flourishing Greek communities in Egypt and south of the Sahara. The primary problems of the Patriarchate have been of a juridical and political nature; the laws of church organization and administration are subject to immediate change and to interference by the Egyptian government. The Greek element, the economic and numerical mainstay of the Patriarchate, is subject to the rapidly changing political situation in the country. Indeed, the whole Orthodox community is constantly subject to Arab Muslim pressure. It is with this situation in mind that the Greek government was one of the first to recognize the Egyptian declaration of the sovereignty of King Faruq in the Sudan and that Greek pilots helped to operate the Suez Canal during the recent crisis.

Patriarch Alexii omitted Constantinople and the Church of Greece from his itinerary, even though its representatives had attended the Moscow *Sobor*. As events were to prove, this omission and the failure to send salutations to these churches were no accident. In the same year most of the churches behind the Iron Curtain which had had ties with Constantinople were either absorbed by the Russian church or placed under its jurisdiction.

In an obvious effort to gain primacy among the Orthodox churches, Patriarch Alexii called a conference in 1947 to prepare for an Oecumenical Council to re-examine the Orthodox canons and voice the Orthodox position on various social, political and economic problems. When the Russian church assumed this initiative, clearly the prerogative of the Oecumenical Patriarchate, the latter vigorously protested and the plan was dropped.⁸ That same year a series of articles appeared in the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarch* by S. Troitchky and other Russian churchmen who accused the Church of Constantinople of disregarding the canons regulating interchurch relationships and attacked the Patriarch of Constantinople for his activity among the Russian Orthodox in the Diaspora.⁹

The political implications of these controversies were evident when, on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the autocephaly of the Russian church (July 8-18, 1948), a series of resolutions supporting Soviet foreign policy were adopted. The Conference was the beginning of the anti-Western Peace Movement, in which the Orthodox churches behind the Iron Curtain played a major role. "The Western capitalist and imperialist world presents the danger of a new war of untold horrors. . . . We deeply grieve over the fact that instead of hearing the voice of peace and Christian love from the stronghold of Catholicism—the Vatican—and from the nest of Protestantism—America—we hear words of blessing invoked in favor of a new war and hymns of praise to the atom bomb and other similar inventions intended for the extermination of human lives."¹⁰ Representatives of Constantinople and the churches of Greece and Cyprus, although present, did not take part in the deliberations nor in the signing of the conclusions. Jerusalem sent no delegates at all, while the churches of Antioch and Alexandria, although they went along with the proceedings, later refuted some of the harsher anti-Western expressions of the Conference.

Current Trends

During this period of Russian church activity, the Patriarchal throne of Constantinople was occupied by the able Maximos V (1946-1948)—a man who has been unfairly accused by many Western writers as a Communist sympathizer. As a result of a serious mental illness, which

8. The last Oecumenical Council was held in 787 A. D. The Oecumenical Patriarchate tried to call such a council in the 1920's but postponed it because of the unsettled conditions in the Orthodox world. Cf., Spinka, Mathew, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-38. Also *Orthodoxia* (The official journal of the Oecumenical Patriarchate) Vol. KB, No. 5-6, May-June 1947, pp. 160-61.

9. E. F. Kathigitou, *Ex Atormis Enos Artbron: Tom Katbigiton K. S. Troitchky epi tou Dikaismatos Exousias tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheion epi tis Diasporas*, Istanbul, Adelphon Tsitouri, 1948, p. 33.

10. *Actes de la Conférence de l'Eglise Orthodoxe, 8-18, July 1948, Moscow, 1950, Vol. II, p. 468.*

has now been cured, he was unable to supply the necessary leadership at this critical moment, and during the latter period of his reign could not exercise his functions at all. Because of the growing Russian threat and the need for energetic leadership, Maximos V tendered his resignation and helped pave the way for the election of Mgr. Athenagoras, Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America, to the Patriarchal throne. The American, Greek and Turkish governments, thoroughly aware of the impending Soviet danger, gave their wholehearted support to the new candidate. The Soviets, on the other hand, were unhappy about the change of events at the *Phanar*. "In order to spread their influence in the Near East, the American warmongers have tried to secure for themselves a further religious center—the Constantinople Patriarchy. At the end of 1949, Athenagoras, Archbishop of New York, a man known for his pro-fascist sympathies and connections with the ruling circles of the U.S.A., Greece and Turkey, was elected Patriarch of Constantinople under pressure from the U.S.A."¹¹ The reply that Athenagoras received from the Russian Patriarch, after sending the latter a long and friendly letter announcing his investiture, was brief and cool. He expressed the hope that there would be friendly relations between them and that they "might jointly solve all misunderstood questions which, unfortunately, have not been settled."¹² The official *Journal of the Moscow Patriarch* continued its attacks upon the Oecumenical Patriarchate, declaring that Moscow was the real center of Orthodoxy and that the title "Oecumenical" borne by Athenagoras was superficial.

Despite pressure from Moscow, the Oecumenical Patriarchate has succeeded in maintaining the leadership of the Orthodox churches outside the Iron Curtain. After Patriarch Alexii's trip to the Middle Eastern Patriarchates, the *Phanar* sent its own representatives into the area in order to discuss their problems and to prevent Soviet penetration into their churches. The *Phanar* was not wholly successful, since the general conditions of their churches were such that it would have been extremely difficult for them to have refused an offer of assistance from the Soviets. The visits did at least, however, maintain their friendship and respect. With the exception of Antioch, the Middle East churches, led by the Oecumenical Patriarchate, refused to support the anti-Western deliberations of the Russian church and especially its anti-Western Peace Movement and, along with the Antiochene church, have actively participated in the various meetings of the World Council of Churches—a prime target of the churches behind the Iron Curtain.

11. Shun, M., "American Imperialism and Church Organization," *Navka i Bizn*, Dec. 1950, pp. 44-45, from *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, N. Y., Vol. III, No. 1, Feb. 17, 1951, p. 26.

12. Curtiss, John S., *The Russian Church and the Soviet Union*, Boston, 1953, p. 315.

Although the Patriarchate of Antioch is receiving heavy Soviet subsidies and has participated in some of the Soviet sponsored anti-Western programs, it too has maintained close ties with the Oecumenical Patriarchate and the other free churches. The aged Antiochene Patriarch Alexander III has, on more than one occasion, supported the Oecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek churches and theological schools in the Eastern Mediterranean played a major role in the celebration of the golden anniversary of Patriarch Alexander III as a clergyman (1903-1954) and of his silver anniversary as Patriarch (1931-1956). The Greek- and Russian-trained Patriarch of Antioch, in his effort to strengthen his Church, appears to be trying to maintain a dangerous balance between the Soviets and the West.

In Jerusalem some of the Orthodox Christians have received small Soviet subsidies but the Patriarchate itself, with strong backing from the *Phanar*, has refused to accept badly-needed aid from the Russian church. A group in the United States was organized for the purpose of raising money for the Patriarchate of Jerusalem several years ago but failed to make an appreciable donation. The situation there is still precarious.

At Alexandria, Patriarch Christopher II, although not endorsing the anti-Western statements of the Russian church, has maintained the closest contact with the Russians among the Greek clergy. He has made several trips to Russia and appears to be soliciting Soviet support for his Patriarchate. As Pope, as well as Patriarch, of Egypt and all Africa, Mgr. Christopher has been able canonically to dissolve the Holy Synod and, with the approval of the Egyptian government, rules the Patriarchate by himself. With the recent turn of events in Egypt he has been compelled to take a more anti-Western stand in accordance with the policy of the Egyptian government, but is still an ardent supporter of the Oecumenical Patriarchate. The *Phanar* has also maintained closest relations with the churches of Greece and Cyprus. Both churches have faithfully followed the example of the Oecumenical Patriarchate in its relations with the Church of Russia. The Communist civil war in Greece and Communist activity in Cyprus have turned these churches away from Russia. In the Cyprus issue, Archbishop Makarios has refused to call for Soviet support in his struggle with the British and Turks.

In addition, the Oecumenical Patriarchate has played an important role with the non-Eastern Orthodox, Oriental Christian churches of the Middle East. The *Phanar* is on intimate terms with the Monophysite Armenian and Coptic churches. The Monophysite Coptic Church of Ethiopia sends most of its candidates for the clergy to the Orthodox theological schools at Istanbul and Athens. These churches have about 1,600,000 members in the Middle East, excluding Armenia, and another

five million (Coptic) in Ethiopia. Close contact is also maintained with the Syrian and Chaldean rite churches which have an additional million members, mostly in India. These churches, because of their similarities in tradition, theology, worship and everyday problems, form a community of common interests in which the Oecumenical Patriarchate is a major figure. The political importance of these churches and Patriarchates should not be underestimated. They are still endowed with many of the secular rights and privileges which they enjoyed under the Ottoman *millet* system and wield political influence in proportion to the number of their memberships.

Conclusion

In examining the relationship of the Church of Russia with the Oecumenical Patriarchate and the other Middle Eastern churches, it would be wrong to describe them as habitually antagonistic; on most non-political issues there is usually a consensus of agreement. It would also be a gross exaggeration to ascribe the antagonism solely to the alignment of the Russian church to the Soviet Government—the natural competition between the Church of Russia, which possesses the largest number of Orthodox believers, and the Church of Constantinople, which possesses the traditional place of honor in the Orthodox world, antedates the Soviet regime.

It is obvious, however, that, like the Czars before them, the Soviet leaders are using the Church as a cover for Russian expansion. Since the interest of the U.S.S.R. would be furthered by a flourishing church, the Soviet government has lavished favors on the Church which, in turn, has been compelled to oblige the Government by supporting it and its foreign policy.¹³ On the other hand, while the Russian church has been favored by the Soviet government, the center of opposition to the Soviet church policy in the Middle East—the Oecumenical Patriarchate—has been subjected to a very painful trial by the bitter quarrel between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus. The low point was the Istanbul riots of September 6 and 7, 1955, which threatened to remove the Oecumenical Patriarchate and the Greek minority from Turkey. Ever since then the Turkish press and Turkish public opinion have been demanding their withdrawal from Turkish territory. The present situation of the Oecumenical Patriarchate is extremely precarious and it has been a general rumor among the non-Muslim minorities in Istanbul that the Soviets have been instrumental in tempering the Turkish attitude toward the *Phanar*. The dissolution or weakening of the Oecumenical Patriarchate would act

13. Curtiss, John S., *op. cit.*, pp. 324-25.

as a catalyst to Communist penetration in the free Orthodox world. Without a strong Oecumenical Patriarchate, the Orthodox and other independent Oriental churches in the Middle East would be compelled to turn more and more to the Soviet Union. Unlike the other minority churches in the Middle East, they do not have friendly and strong powers to aid them in time of need. Strangely enough, we of the United States have neglected the advantages that these indigenous Christian churches could have for our activities in the Middle East, and have so antagonized them through our Catholic and Protestant missionary work that, to many, the West symbolizes an attempt to destroy the Orthodox faith, whereas Russia appears as the champion of Orthodoxy.

As Charles Malik, the Orthodox Foreign Minister of Lebanon, has often stated, the West has too often ignored the positive contributions that the Orthodox and other independent Oriental churches can make for peace in the Middle East. The key to a pro-Western movement in the Orthodox church is the Oecumenical Patriarchate and its decline, at a time when the Russian church is being strongly supported by the Soviet state, can only have a negative effect on Turkey and the West.

PAKISTAN AND MODERN ISLAMIC-NATIONALIST THEORY

Leonard Binder

Part I

ONE of the strangest of the political phenomena of recent years has been the emergence of the independent state of Pakistan in the very midst of the post-war upsurge of non-European nationalisms. Pakistan is not a nation-state, and yet it was created, and its politics are dominated, by the same social classes which elsewhere in Asia and the Middle East have proliferated political exemplars of the European prototype. It is easy enough to explain that religion continues to determine "community" south of the Mediterranean and east of Suez, but this persistent cultural feature has been obscured by the imported concept of nationality. Where religion and nationality coincide the problem is not great, and there is common ground on which the westernized middle classes and the traditional religious leaders may meet. For the westernized Muslims of India, however, the rationale of political separatism was much more complex. The loose and somewhat inconsistent theory which supported the idea of Pakistan was a late development; the product of complex political and social circumstances.

Three major factors contributed to this unique addition to modern political thought: the variety of efforts at Islamic reform; the impact of Hindu nationalism; and the increasing democratization of the government of British India. In describing the contributions of each of these factors, chronology will be subordinated to the logical association of ideas. Because of the length of the exposition it has been deemed convenient to break the essay at the discussion of the Khilafat movement, the failure of which posed the problem of Indian Islam in its starkest reality. The concluding portion of this essay will appear in the next issue of the JOURNAL.

I. NATIONALISM AND THE PIOUS SULTAN

Pakistan was brought into existence through the efforts of the westernized Muslim middle class of India. It was they who said that Pakistan would be an Islamic State, though it has no basis in the classical exposition of the Shari'a. It was they who claimed that the Muslims of India

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were a nation though there is no justification for this claim in any objective theory of modern nationalism.¹ Both Islamic Law and nationalist theory were to be satisfied by the fructiferous middle class mind, and the Islamic-nationalist theory which was the result was to provide the constitutional orientation of the Muslim League government of Pakistan.²

Classical Islamic political theory cannot recognize the existence of an Islamic nation that is not identical with the entire community of believing Muslims. The unity of all believers has always been a part of Islamic theory, but Classical theory alone insisted upon political unity.³

The traditional Islam which is espoused by the 'ulama to this day is an outgrowth of the situation brought about by the end of the Abbasid Caliphate. From 1258 onward the legitimacy of Islamic government could no longer be based upon its form, but only upon its performance. The 'ulama are practical idealists, for centuries they have accepted various forms of government and varying political divisions within the Islamic Community.⁴ On the other hand none of these forms or divisions was ever endowed with Islamic justification. The 'ulama ignored ibn Khaldun's view that behind the proliferation of petty Muslim kingdoms was the hand of God rather than the sin of man. They ignored somewhat less the Platonic "community of utility" expounded by al-Farabi and the "Philosophers," but that was vague enough to be comparatively harmless.⁵ Community of utility is a term which may be applied to any existing State without giving it theological sanction. It might be applied to Pakistan once it is in existence. Or it might not if Pakistan were found to be economically, politically, or geographically unworkable.

Defining a state as a community of utility lends it no special Islamic character.⁶ It merely becomes a potential political support for the Islamic way of life. To receive religious sanction such a government must uphold the Shari'a as interpreted by the 'ulama.⁷ The determining factor in the question of whether or not a government will be "Islamic" is not its constitution, but the "piety," i.e., lawful administration of the ruler.⁸ This theory may be loosely referred to as the "pious-Sultan theory." An appropriate historical example of the application of this theory to an actual ruler is the general approval by the 'ulama of the government of Aurangzeb-i-Alamgir, the last great Mughal ruler.⁹

Apparently there is nothing in this theory which prevents its application to a Muslim nation-state in anticipation of its good behavior, nor is there anything which prevents its being appropriated by the westernized middle classes to justify their own nationalism. Why did this not happen? Our answers to this question will explain the elements which eventually did go into the Islamic-nationalist theory of the modernists.

The attitudes and behavior of the 'ulama and those of the modernists are partly interdependent, but there are aspects of the traditional orientation of the 'ulama which created an inner momentum antagonistic to nationalism. It was not merely the universality and egalitarianism of Islam which militated against nationalism, but also certain traditional ways of thinking about Islamic polity which had made their way into the more realistic political philosophies from Byzantine and Sassanian origins. These ways of thinking existed alongside of classical theory, and persisted through the breakup of the Islamic empire to take on some practical aspect under the Ottoman and Mughal empires. The common element in classical and Ottoman or Mughal thought was the stubborn conception of a centralized, and really universal, empire ruling over the entire civilized world in cooperation with a well organized religious institution.¹⁰ The population of this empire is divided and organized into a host of unified interest, kinship, and functional groups each knowing and fulfilling its proper place in the worldly scheme of things. Within this static framework of order and stability, so much desired after centuries of disorder, invasion, and war, the 'ulama would minister to the spiritual needs of the Muslims. It is true that this universal empire was never universal, but to the extent that heterodox Persia was interposed between the Ottoman and Mughal empires they were as universal as practicable.¹¹ No conflict between the two empires could arise to dispel the notion of orthodox unity. Even before the Mughal dynasty was brought to a close the number of contacts between India and the Ottoman empire had increased to the point where it was not difficult to fix the locus of Islamic unity in Constantinople. As a consequence of the existence of this conception of the universal Islamic empire, and particularly as a result of the association of this conception with practical rather than theoretical Islamic politics, we can denote a glide of tradition toward the classical theory of the Caliphate. The effect of this tendency was apparent in the part the Indian 'ulama played in the Khilafat movement.

On the other side the westernized middle classes did not avail themselves of the versatility of the "pious-Sultan" theory because they did not know of its existence, because of their preference for classical over traditional Islam, and because they no longer needed it when the time for a nationalist theory arrived.

The average educated middle class Muslim was totally ignorant of the legal works in which might be found some odd references to the Caliphate interspersed between discussions of the nature of prophecy and the timing of prayers.¹² Islamic law was the private preserve of the 'ulama, and even the Aligarh graduate learned little more than a few points about

prayer, marriage, and inheritance law.¹³ They certainly never learned about the Caliphate of the "pious Sultan."

Their ignorance was not due to their English education, for they would have remained ignorant of Islamic law in any case. But their English education did open a path for a different notion of the Caliphate. This was the classical Caliphate as presented by a few outstanding Muslim apologists from the works of Western orientalists.¹⁴ They could not know, nor hardly appreciate, the complex legal tradition which the 'ulama had built up to protect Islam from political depredation.

II. REFORM

The degraded state of Muslims was a point on which the 'ulama and the modernists agreed, but their explanations were different. As might be expected the 'ulama found the decline in piety and the growth of un-Islamic behavior the reason for the material decline of the Muslims.¹⁵ The apologists found the reason in the refusal of the Muslims to accept western ways and western education. The apologists blamed the 'ulama for their opposition to the study of English, to the acceptance of civil service positions under the British, and for their insistence upon non-fraternization with the British.¹⁶ As a consequence of these views the modernist movement in Indian Islam began and continued in opposition to the 'ulama. Even had they known of the existence of the "pious-Sultan" theory, the modernists would have considered it a devious subterfuge to gloss over the decline of Muslim political institutions from the ideal.

Wilfred Smith has shown that one of the principal contributions of the modernist movement was its idealization of the early history of Islam, and he emphasized this view by calling it the "Movement in Favor of Islamic Culture of the Past."¹⁷ Now a common historical tradition is acknowledged to be one of the primary elements in forming a nation, or in rationalizing a nationalist claim, and this was certainly the beginning of such a structure in Muslim India. On the other hand we must note a general tendency to avoid discussion of the Mughal heritage, and a concentration upon the earliest period of Islamic history which is the heritage of all Muslims.¹⁸ The concentration upon the earliest period came to explain the present low state of Muslims by reason of the failure to uphold the high ideals of the first Muslims.¹⁹ The plea for reform which is at least implicit in the writings of the Romantics was to be similarly implicit in Islamic-nationalist theory.

From the demand for the reform of Muslim education to Islamic-nationalism was a long and devious way. In the meantime the reform

movement itself was to provide the basic elements, Islamic and western, for the full elaboration of nationalist theory without reference to traditional Islam.

The demand for social reform within the Muslim Community of India arose out of the apologetic movement and its accompanying approval of westernization. The continuing goal of Sir Saiyid Ahmad was to make the Muslims better liked and better favored by the British.²⁰ Sir Saiyid Ahmad's beginnings were romanticized in the works of Saiyid Amir Ali, of Muhammad Ali and their followers.²¹ It was soon apparent that the idealized Islam of the Romantics differed greatly in fact from that practiced in India, and even more in spirit from that preached by the 'ulama. Sir Saiyid made great efforts to show the 'ulama that his views were not contrary to Islamic tenets, but to no avail.²² The Romantics were even more estranged from the 'ulama, and soon accused them of obscurantism and the perversion of Islam.²³ For their part the 'ulama decided that "modernism" was the most dangerous heresy of the day, and they fought it vigorously.

In this struggle the 'ulama used all of their power and prestige as the knowers and qualified interpreters of the law. Indeed, the essential function of the 'ulama is to find out and apply the God-given law of Islam. In the course of history, and throughout a long succession of impious Sultans this function was largely diverted to that of preserving Islamic law and thereby maintaining the Islamic way of life of the Muslim Community. The Romantics not only threatened to alter the Islamic way of life, but even presumed so far as to interpret the law of Islam themselves.²⁴

It must be remembered that the romantic movement was an extension of the apologetic movement, and as such it was primarily oriented toward the criticisms of Islam made by western observers. Principal among these criticisms was the accusation that "Islam imposes a code, hard, fast and imperative in every detail, which however well it may have suited Arabia thirteen centuries ago, is quite unfitted for the varying requirements of other times and places."²⁵ If this criticism were correct and the views of the 'ulama and the "corrupted" practice of Indian Muslims really representative of Islam, then the whole structure of the social and ethical principles of Islam built by the apologists must collapse.

Saiyid Ahmad's answer was to ask the 'ulama to "change not their dogmas, but their policy, so that independence of mind and political liberation should no longer be counted as symptoms of heterodoxy."²⁶ The word symptoms is putting it mildly for he was damned to perdition by the 'ulama for his pains. The Romantics, led by Saiyid Amir Ali, openly blamed the 'ulama for Muslim stagnation. To do this they had to go be-

hind the rulings of the 'ulama and attack them upon their own ground, that is upon the ground of legal theory.

The doctrine of *taqlid*²⁷ was singled out by Amir Ali for particular attack: "it is the common belief that since the four Imams no doctor has arisen qualified to interpret the laws of the Prophet. No account is taken of the altered circumstances in which Moslems are now placed. . . . They mixed up the temporary with the permanent, and the universal with the particular . . . not a few were the servants of sovereigns and despots."²⁸ Amir Ali went on to urge that the spirit be regarded above the letter, and this was to be rediscovered in the Qur'an and not the law books which flooded the Islamic world in later centuries.²⁹

The effect of *taqlid* is to restrict the exercise of independent judgment in the interpretation of the sources of Islamic law. The exercise of such judgment is called *ijtihad*, and this was defended by the Ahmadi, Muhammad Ali, who pointed out that even the founders of the four orthodox schools of law did not lay down the restriction of *ijtihad*.³⁰ He went on to say that decisions based upon reasoning in one generation may be rejected in the next.³¹ And he concluded that Muslim Communities may not only make laws for themselves but they *must* apply their own judgment to changed conditions.³²

The emphasis on *ijtihad* is an example of the way in which western individualism, perhaps bourgeois individualism, was being assimilated into modern Islam. Its absence was attributed to ignorance, its proper exercise was to be based on understanding the "spirit" of the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet. But can a religious system continue to exist with no fixed doctrine, and where every individual may interpret its spirit as he likes? Is this the way in which religious reform ought to take place? How are the new interpretations to be fixed?

The answer to these questions lies in the legal doctrine of *ijma'*. *Ijma'* means agreement, and in its traditional usage in legal theory a consensus on a specific interpretation of the Shari'a which is so narrowly short of unanimity as to invoke the authority of the tradition of the Prophet: "My people will never agree in error"; and at the same time eliminate the working of the contrary tradition: "Disagreement among my people is a blessing." The persons whose opinions are constitutive of an *ijma'* are variously the companions of the Prophet, all the jurists of a particular age, all the jurists of a particular school of law, or the four schools of law collectively taken. *Taqlid* may be applied only to the *ijtihad* of the decisions of the founder of a school, and these decisions are binding only upon that school. An *ijma'* if universal settles a question of law for all schools, and precludes the exercise of *ijtihad* on the question so settled.

The restriction of *ijma'* to that of the companions of the Prophet, thereby reducing the number of questions so settled, was actually a device to permit the *ijtihad* of reforming 'ulama.³³ For the modernists the problem was to abrogate previous *ijma'* and yet permit the same process of fixation to function in the modern age. This was done by applying the notion of a need to adapt Islamic practice to changing times. It was accordingly held that an *ijma'* could be abrogated by a later one which then became valid in terms of its own time and place. *Ijma'* was further considered to be the product of the views of all Muslims and not merely those with special legal qualifications.³⁴

This is in broad outline the new legal theory which the modernists brought forward. No part of this theory is really new or revolutionary. What was new was the spirit in which it was intended that Islam be reinterpreted. In point of fact little in the way of concrete reinterpretation was offered; the important point was that there should be no restriction upon the manifestation of the true spirit of Islam in the modern age.

The individualism of *ijtihad* was to be used as the Islamic basis of democracy. The doctrine of *ijma'* demonstrated the existence of an Islamic basis for majority rule. The combined operation of these two would bring into reality the true spirit of Islam, a spirit in complete accord with the requirements and values of the twentieth century, a spirit which would be reflected in the achievements of the Muslims themselves. Here, unknowingly, were laid down the basic elements of Islamic-nationalism.

III. HINDU NATIONALISM

The second factor which encouraged and gave direction to Islamic-nationalism was the increasing Hindu-ization of the nationalism of the Congress. The origins of this tendency may be traced back into pre-British India to the time of Kabir and Nanak.³⁵ Against these, and similar deliberate attempts to establish a common religious ground between Islam and Hinduism we find a new emphasis on orthodoxy arising. Such an emphasis is, of course, a prelude to reform in the sense that the orthodox position must be restated in terms of the new circumstances and the new dangers. One of the principal features on the Islamic side was the emphasis on the unity of interest of all Muslims;³⁶ while on the Hindu side it was in part represented by a new emphasis upon the restrictions of caste.³⁷ The British arrived on the scene while both these movements were in progress.

While the Muslim response to British imperialism was generally negative, that of many Hindus was positive, and this single fact is the dominant feature of the entire development of two rival nationalisms in In-

dia.³⁸ The response of the Hindus seems the more natural in the light of almost universal colonial experience, while the subsequent alteration of the Muslim attitude seems to have been artificially delayed by the anomaly of the continued existence of the Mughal Sultanate despite actual British government through the East India Company. The result of this arbitrary sequence was, perhaps inevitably, that westernizing Muslims should copy westernizing Hindus. A further result was that the orthodox revival in Islam should continue longer and stronger than that in Hinduism.³⁹ Among the Hindus the movement continued powerful only in the Marhatta strongholds where it was the Hindus and not the Muslims who delivered their authority over to the British.⁴⁰ As Poona was to the Hindus, so was Delhi the center of the orthodox revival of Islam.

The nature of the "positive" response to British imperialism was, as we have mentioned, the same for both Muslims and Hindus. The first phase is the defense of the eastern religion against the attacks of Christian Missionaries. This is done by a re-rationalization of the basic tenets of the religion in terms of values acceptable to the West. In a word, by a partial Christianization of Hinduism or Islam. In Hinduism with its more flexible doctrinal system there was perhaps a more conscious attempt to "assimilate" Christian principles.⁴¹ The result of this modern apologetic tendency is the alienation of the powerful forces of the orthodox revival. New religious organizations are formed, and they have their parallel in other non-religious organizations of the middle classes.⁴² At this point western scholarship comes to the aid of the modernizing apologists by uncovering and often translating basic religious works which had hitherto been the private heritage of the Brahman or the 'alim.⁴³ English education is then sufficient to permit a reading of the "original sources," while the intelligence of, say, an official of the Government of India is sufficient to permit their sensible interpretation. By the time these religious positions were well formulated among the Hindus, the Hindu middle classes had become conscious of their interests.⁴⁴ Democracy and nationalism as expressed by eminent Britons of the nineteenth century began to take on real meaning in terms of the divergence of Hindu and British interests. This stage is best exemplified by the founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885.⁴⁵ Despite the political uneasiness which this represents, the outward form of "positive" response is maintained. Loyalty to Britain is asserted and re-asserted; gratitude for all the British have done for India is profuse and not much less genuine for being much more formal. The break came with the partition of Bengal.

When this first real conflict with Britain arose the Congress was suddenly found to be split between moderates and extremists. The extremists were mainly from Bengal, but they found support among the orthodox-

revivalists of Poone and the Deccan.⁴⁶ The historical tradition of the south was adopted by the extremists, modified by the modernizers, and developed into an unrelenting theory of Indian nationalism by the political activists.⁴⁷ Some emphasis must here be placed upon the fact that the partition of Bengal, which more than any other issue determined the nature of the Indian National Congress, was one on which Hindu and Muslim interests were definitely divided.⁴⁸

The combination of the Bengal nationalists and the orthodox-revivalists of the Deccan was vigorous enough to win its points in the 1906 Congress, but not strong enough to wrest the leadership of the Congress from the moderates.⁴⁹ The struggle between the two factions continued throughout the second decade of the twentieth century, and the results of this struggle produced a profound change in the nationalist attitude of the Congress. Nor should it be forgotten that it was during this same decade that the "right of self determination" for nations was admitted as a principle of international policy.

The most striking change in a fundamental attitude of the Congress was in regard to the Hindu religion. This change is not so evident from explicit statements of policy as from the methods used and the explanations given for the implementation of that policy. The coalition between religious conservatives and political extremists, whose religious knowledge was both meagre and at the same time greatly influenced by western values, led to yet newer attempts at a restatement of Hindu religion. In this case apologetic became aggressive, and western values were in many cases rejected.⁵⁰ The need for social reform was minimized,⁵¹ and the glory of past achievements exaggerated. As the orthodox-revival became more useful in terms of the political aspirations of the extremists, so did orthodox ideas become more highly valued. On the other hand one could not expect of these westernized Bengalis, these "extremists," the religious spirit born of conservative traditionalism. Their Hinduism was almost as new as their attempt at orthodoxy. Their product was a neo-orthodoxy akin to fundamentalism.

The Hinduism which the Congress extremists supported was not that of India in the 20th century, for they had rejected that as backward and superstitious in their school days.⁵² Their Hinduism was a reconstruction of an imaginary past ideal that had been corrupted.⁵³ And so the religious and the nationalist urge combined in new interest in history. Out of this interest there arose the gradual popularization of the national historical myth of Hindu India. In broad outline this nationalist historical tradition stressed the high civilization and relative prosperity of Ancient India.⁵⁴ More striking than this expected feature was the tremendous emphasis placed upon the assimilative capacity of the Hindus.⁵⁵ The Muslim in-

vasions were taken as a challenge to this assimilative capacity, characterized as they were by destruction and murder or proselytization.⁵⁶ The struggle between Hindu and Muslim ends with the Mughals who are appropriated for Hindu purposes for their tolerance and association of certain caste-Hindus with their government.⁵⁷ The contributions of the Mughals to the Indian nation was a wide political and territorial unity, administrative uniformity, the development of a common vernacular, the encouragement of common arts, literature and social manners, the *revival* of monotheism and mysticism, and improvements in the "arts of war and civilization."⁵⁸ It is of course Akbar who is most praised for these worthy accomplishments.⁵⁹ One has the feeling this is at least as much due to his attempt to establish a common religion for all his subjects as for his very real political and military accomplishments.⁶⁰ In any case the Mughals are credited with a degree of religious tolerance which permitted a "religious rapprochement"⁶¹ or in less careful, if more popular, terminology, the Hinduization of Islam. With the accession of Aurangzeb all of this changed. Aurangzeb was intolerant; he reinstituted the subject tax upon the Hindus; he stressed the Islamic nature of his government; he encouraged the 'ulama and he destroyed temples. Mrs. Besant calls him "Aurangzeb, the destroyer."⁶² Perhaps Aurangzeb's greatest sin was in attempting to strengthen his direct control of the Deccan principalities. In this he was opposed by Shivaji, a Mahratta noble. Shivaji's purpose was "the building of a nation."⁶³ The tradition goes on to claim that the Mahratta Confederacy wrested the control of most of India from the Mughals, and so it was from the Hindus and not the Muslims that the British took over control of India.⁶⁴

These two tendencies, that is toward fundamentalism in religion and the Hinduization of the national historical myth were made possible in large measure by the historical and religious work of Europeans. The role of Europeans in the popularization of non-European nationalist histories is rather well known, but somewhat less well known is their part in the development of non-Christian fundamentalist movements through their translations and loving expositions of the ancient sources of exotic doctrines in a context of modern Christian values. Mrs. Besant, president of the Theosophical Society, went further and took the lead of a political movement based on these two tendencies, and aimed at securing home rule for India.⁶⁵ The Home Rule movement was not to be opposed to the Congress, but its radicalism did keep the Congress from becoming too moderate, until Gandhi arrived on the scene and carried these twin tendencies to their logical extreme in the method of non-violent non-cooperation.⁶⁶

The use of these methods, and the heightened religio-spiritual atmos-

phere which Gandhi brought to the Congress were his greatest political achievements and the guarantee of continued Congress success. More striking than his ability to lead the Congress in this direction was his ability to pledge the 'ulama to the use of non-violent non-cooperation rather than jihad in the attempt to achieve the ends of the Khilafat movement.⁶⁷ We need not wonder then that some Muslims, at least, felt after the failure of the Khilafat movement that they had been seduced religiously into performing some sort of Hindu rite, and politically into alienating the British guarantors of their political rights.⁶⁸

On the Muslim side the categories and tendencies were basically the same, but modified in their development by the different position of the Muslims at the time of the British conquest and later by their numerical inferiority to the Hindus and, as will be discussed below, the apparent relentlessness of the democratic advance of India. The dominant feature for the superficial observer remains that the Hindus were copied by the Muslims.

The orthodox-revival of Islam met no organized resistance until the time of the Aligarh movement. Originally it was related to the Mughal political breakdown after Aurangzeb, and after the British conquest it received added strength from a mutation of the original Arabian Wahhabi movement. In India this movement identified by the same name, is better understood in relation to the orthodox revival and the decline of Muslim political power rather than as a genuine fundamentalist movement.⁶⁹ One of the outstanding features of this Indian Wahhabi movement was its emphasis on jihad.⁷⁰

The "positive" response of the Muslims was delayed until after the Mutiny of 1857 and the end of nominal Muslim Rule in India. Sir Saiyid Ahmad set out to reconcile Muslim and Briton and while he was partly successful he became the target of orthodox attack. Out of his loyalist Aligarh movement there developed a more radical tendency which sought the political rights of Muslims and began to assert the superiority of Muslim culture. The historical bases for these assertions were found in the early history of Islam, while the Mughal period in India, already appropriated by the Hindus, was largely ignored. The ending of the partition of Bengal in 1911 was a political issue that had within it the possibility of uniting political radicals and the orthodox-revivalists, but because the Congress since 1905 had almost a monopoly of opposition to the British, and a great deal more power than the 'ulama, there was instead a coalition between the Muslim League and the Congress in the Lucknow Pact⁷¹ (1916). These same circumstances determined that the Congress act as mid-wife at the birth of Islamic-fundamentalism in the Khilafat movement.⁷²

The Khilafat movement in India had as its goal the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Its origins may be traced back to the Pan-Islamic preaching of Jamal al-din al-Afghani, but more immediately to the sympathetic attitude of India's Muslims during the Ottoman trials of the Balkan war.⁷³ To some extent the movement was a sublimation of the educated repressions which resulted from the knowledge that Muslims would no longer rule in India.⁷⁴ A further need was supplied by the provision of a supra-territorial justification of the distinctive organization and cohesiveness of Islamic society in India. The movement was essentially anti-nationalist as regards Islam,⁷⁵ but permissive of nationalism in India. In the context of Hindu-Muslim relations, the movement was "non-political," though not as regards Indo-British relations. One of its possible results was the de-politicization of the Muslims of India. And this may be one of the reasons why Gandhi and the Congress encouraged the movement,⁷⁶ while Jinnah and the Muslim League refused to go along with it.⁷⁷ The fact that the 'ulama joined this movement is somewhat surprising, and bears explanation.

The 'ulama did support the Khilafat movement, primarily because they feared that the holy places were to be placed under Christian political influence. They also understood that many Muslims would come under a similar influence, and they knew from their own experience what that had meant in India. These practical considerations determined the tendency of the 'ulama, while the doctrinal aspects of the issue followed closely along. The necessity of a sympathetic political power to ensure the proper religious organization of the community is a recurring feature of traditional theory.⁷⁸ It also lies at the basis of the classical theory which finds this organization legitimized by the existence of the Caliphate.⁷⁹ Traditional theory turned this system upside down and would have had the 'ulama legitimize the "Caliphate" of a good Sultan if he ruled in accordance with the Shari'a. The consequence of this post-Abbasid development of Islamic political theory was the authorization of the use of the term Khalifa for almost any Muslim ruler, including the Mughals.⁸⁰ If the 'ulama identified the Ottoman Sultan with the Caliph of classical theory, it was not because there had been no change in Islamic thought, but rather because Islamic legal theory cannot admit change. The dissolution of the Mughal Sultanate left a gap to be filled, while the simultaneous revival of the classical theory after its rediscovery by Western scholars gave the appearance of being the established Islamic theory. When confronted by the Romantics with al-Mawardi's doctrines the 'ulama were bound to regard the Sultan of Turkey as the Caliph of all Islam.

The failure of the Khilafat movement was not only a tremendous

disappointment to the Romantics and the 'ulama, but it also seriously undermined the theoretical, and hence the rational, basis of their political activity. The result was confusion, inefficiency and even inactivity. After a period of quiet the 'ulama again supported the Congress against the British and the westernized Muslim middle class.⁸¹ The Romantics too lapsed into comparative inactivity, and then burst forth in a new aggressive movement bordering on nationalism. The Khilafat movement had succeeded in arousing the Muslim population to some extent, and while Gandhi was pleased with this development,⁸² it seems to have prepared them for even more irrational attempts to cure the intellectual malaise of the Muslim middle class of India.

To sum up the results of the Khilafat movement and its failure, which concern us here, we may say that it well nigh destroyed the strongest anti-nationalist Islamic theory (i.e. of the classical Caliphate); but it also discredited the "pious-Sultan" theory of the Caliphate; and finally it caused romantic notions of Islam to become more widespread among Indian Muslims. In a sense then it prepared the way for a local Islamic nationalism, although the sense in which it did so was negative. The need was not yet for a theory of nationalism, though forces were already at work which would make of it a necessity.

NOTES

1. For a fairly detailed discussion of Pakistan in terms of objective theory see Ambedkar, *Pakistan*, Bombay, 1946, pp. 11-21, and Prasad, *India Divided*, Bombay, 1946, p. 76.

2. The theory which it is the purpose of this essay to explain is not the product of a single pen. It is the result of the agglomeration of a number of ideas, and only emerged as a rational whole after partition.

3. With rare exception; see al-Baghdadi, *Usul al-Din*, Istanbul, 1928, p. 284, line 11.

4. Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 34.

5. al-Farabi, *Ara Abl al-Madina al-Fadbila*, p. 77.

6. Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, *Akblaqi Nasiri*, Third Treatise, Chapter Three: "Classification of Societies and Description of Cities."

7. Henri Laoust, *Essai sur les Doctrines Sociales et Politiques de Taki-D-Din ibn Taimiya*, Le Caire, 1939, pp. 282, 307, 294, 315.

8. ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*, Beirut, 1900, p. 191; Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

9. Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

10. Nizam al-Mulk, *Siasat-Nameh*; See L. Binder "The Political Theory of Nizam al-Mulk," *Iqbal*, Jan., 1956, pp. 27-59; see also Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

11. For an interesting discussion of the significance of the division of the "Iranic" world see A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 2nd ed. 1935, Vol. I, Ci (b) Annex I, esp. pp. 388-402.

12. Maulana Mohamed Ali, *My Life, A Fragment*, Ed. Afzal Iqbal, Lahore, 1942, p. 3.

13. *Ibid.* p. 23.

14. For example: al-Mawardi's exposition of the Caliphate; edited by Enger 1854; utilized by Von Kremer in his *Kulturgeschichte des Orients*; which was translated by Khuda Bakhsh as *The Orient Under the Caliphs*, University of Calcutta, 1920.

15. W. C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, 2nd ed., London, 1946, p. 295.

16. Graham, *Syed Ahmed Khan*, London, 1885, p. 246ff.

17. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

18. "Being pioneers in the field of reconstructing our history we have a wonderful opportunity." *Presidential Address*, I. H. Qureshi, Pakistan History Conference, 1954.

19. Amir Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, London 1946, p. 292.

20. Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 188, p. 237f.

21. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 49f., p. 300.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

23. Amir Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 186, "The reformation of Islam will begin when once it is recognized that divine words rendered into any language retain their divine character. . . ."

(On the question of translating the Qur'an)

25. W. Muir, *Mahomet and Islam*, London, 1895, 3rd ed. p. 246; see also Von Kremer, *Orient Under the Caliphs*, TR. Bakhsh, p. 211; where substantially the same sentiment is expressed concerning a situation obtaining in the year 100 A.H.

26. Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

27. ". . . a want or a deficiency, on the part of a Mohammedan, which is called Takleed (a blind belief in the opinion of others) and which, when exhibited in that of foreigners, is known by the name of partiality, bias, prejudice, or bigotry." Sir Saiyid Ahmad Khan, *A Series of Essays on the Life of Mohammad*, preface, p. xi.

28. Amir Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

30. Mohammad Ali, *The Religion of Islam*, Lahore, 1950, p. 112.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

33. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, London, 1934, p. 144.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

35. Tara Chand, *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, Allahabad, 1954, (written in 1922, see preface) p. 148, on Kabir. "His teaching was of so independent a character that both Hindus and Muslims . . . tried to suppress him. . . ."; J. C. Archer, *The Sikhs*, Princeton, 1946, p. 42, 54, p. 56 where Archer indicates the degree to which Nanak's movement was dependent upon Kabir, p. 84.

36. Qadari, *A Moslem's Inner Voice*, Lahore, reverse of flyleaf: quotation from the Mujaddid Alf-i-Thani "He who claims to believe in Islam . . . but allies himself with the unbelievers . . . is a cursed man. . . ."

37. L. S. S. O'Malley, *India's Social Heritage*, Oxford, 1934, p. 21.

38. W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Muslims*, Calcutta, 1945, 3rd ed., originally published in 1871 and 1876, p. 138 ff.

39. *Ibid.*, *passim*.

40. Yusuf Ali, *The Making of India*, London, 1925, p. 174.

41. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 342, p. 397.

42. B. P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, Madras, 1935, p. 13, p. 16.

43. Hunter, *op. cit.*, pp. 188, 189.

44. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

45. Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

46. T. K. Shahani, *Gopal Krishna Gokhale*, Bombay, 1929, p. 187.

47. See B. C. Pal, *Swadeshi and Swaraj*, Calcutta, 1954, p. 73: "The Sivaji celebrations were first started in Calcutta!"

48. Muhammad Ali, *My Life*, p. 37.

49. R. P. Masani, *Dadabhai Naoroji*, London, 1939, p. 495-7, Shahani, *op. cit.*, p. 180.
50. Nehru, *Autobiography*, London, 1953, p. 157.
51. Reform was still a watchword of the nationalist movement, but only in the sense of going back to romanticized original practices.
52. Beni Prasad, *India's Hindu-Muslim Questions*, London, 1946, p. 23.
53. B. C. Pal, *op. cit.*, p. 75.
54. e.g. A. Besant, *India, A Nation*, Madras, 1930, pp. 21-24.
55. e.g., Ishwar Nath Topa, *Growth and Development of National Thought in India*, (Doctoral Dissertation) p. 23.
56. B. Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 14, Besant, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.
57. B. Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
58. Sochim Sen, *Political Philosophy of Rabindranath*, (sc. Tagore), Calcutta, 1929, p. 88, note 1.
59. Besant, *op. cit.*, p. 28, Described as the greatest Muslim Emperor.
60. Moreland and Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 214.
61. B. Prasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 18.
62. Besant, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
65. Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
66. Ambedkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.
67. Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 41-6.
68. Gandhi, *Young India*, 1924-1926, Viking, New York, 1927, p. 23.
69. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Bari, unpublished thesis, Oxford 1954, a comparison of the two Wahhabi movements.
70. W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Muslims*, Calcutta, 1945, p. 6 et passim.
71. Lal Bahadur, *The Muslim League*, Agra n.d. p. 87f., p. 95. The agreement was based upon an agreed program of constitutional reforms, the lack of which had delayed cooperation from 1912 to 1916.
72. B. P. Sitaramayya, *op. cit.*, p. 274, "The same doubt was expressed in 1920 when the Punjab tragedy and the Khilaphat (sic) wrong were made by him (Gandhi) the issue on which to inaugurate the Non-cooperation movement—not Swaraj."
73. Muhammad Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-40.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
75. The movement strongly opposed Arab nationalism, and many persons in Pakistan retain these feelings today; Khaliquzzaman, *Conception of a Quranic or Islamic State*, p. 7-8.
76. *Congress and the Problem of Minorities*, All India Congress Committee, Allahabad, pp. 50-51, 66, 67.
77. Lal Bahadur, *op. cit.*, p. 166.
78. e.g. al-Ghazzali, *al-Iqtisad fi'l I'tiqad*, Cairo, n.d., p. 105, 1. 12.
79. L. Binder, "al-Ghazzali's Theory of Islamic Government," *The Muslim World*, July 1955, p. 235.
80. Gibb and Bowen, *op. cit.*, pp. 34, 35.
81. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 297.
82. Gandhi, *op. cit.*, pp. 23.

HEBREW IN ISRAEL: TRENDS AND PROBLEMS

Haim Blanc

A FEW years ago, Arthur Koestler bemoaned the futility of trying to make Hebrew the vehicle of a modern culture. "The difficulty," he wrote, "lies in the archaic structure of the language. Metaphorically speaking, the task amounts to the transformation of a Phoenician chariot by fitting it out with borrowed spare parts into a racing motor car." The language "is admirably suited for producing prophetic thunder, but you cannot play a scherzo on a ram's horn."¹ The linguistic innocence hiding behind this façade of fine similes is not too unexpected. More surprising in a writer claiming familiarity with the Israeli scene is the assumption that, in 1949, revived Hebrew was still essentially "Biblical" and that the problem of "modernizing" it was, in the main, still to be tackled.² Since such notions are not uncommon, the following ought perhaps to be made clear:

1. Languages not only change over long stretches of time, sometimes beyond recognition, but have built-in devices for potential change at relatively short notice. It is meaningless to speak of some linguistic systems as "archaic" in and of themselves, or intrinsically "suited" for one type of cultural pursuit rather than for another. One may speak of *cultures* as being more or less in tune with the modern West; each language can, in its own way, readjust itself to meet the cultural needs of its speakers when change occurs. This it does by using its devices for introducing new words, new forms, new combinations and new meanings.³

2. It should be stressed that Hebrew exercised its potentialities for change long before it became a spoken language again. The literary ac-

¹A. Koestler, *Promise and Fulfillment: Palestine, 1917-1949*, London (1949), p. 312.

²On the other hand, even this is not overly surprising if, after several pages of cut-and-dried assertions on the language and its literature, most of them downright erroneous, we pause for reflection at the bland admission (p. 314): "[I] am still incapable of reading a [Hebrew] newspaper, let alone books." Still, enough material is available in English, at least on the past history of Hebrew, to make Koestler's misstatements entirely gratuitous.

³For recent statements of this view of languages as "semi-open" systems, cf. Y. Bar-Hillel, "Some linguistic problems connected with machine translation," in *Philosophy of Science*, 20.3 (July 1953), p. 219; C. F. Hockett in *Language*, 32.3 (July-September 1956), p. 467. This review by Hockett is highly recommended as a survey, by an eminent linguist, of some views of language commonly entertained by non-linguists.

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tivity of post-Biblical times down to the 19th century had, albeit in spurts, already responded to the milieux in which the Jews lived, and altered the language accordingly. With the decision that Hebrew should be used, in speech and writing, to meet all the needs of a 20th century culture, these potentialities were, of course, taxed to the utmost; their release has shaped, and to some extent is still shaping, a language based on the written sources but modified (consciously and unconsciously) according to the needs of its users.

The attempt here is to give some idea of this readjustment process by briefly examining (a) the linguistic position of Hebrew in Israel today and (b) some of the means it has been using for introducing new forms. The words "some idea" are used advisedly; the situation is complex and research in its infancy, and while the specific details cited are based on easily observable data, any overall picture gained from what follows may, to some extent, be oversimplified.

* * *

For the fathers of the movement to revive Hebrew as the national tongue at the turn of the century, Hebrew was a second language and one learned from exclusively written sources at that. Their native linguistic habits and their cultural background were essentially East or Central European. To a large extent, this holds true of what may be called the "linguistic élite" (writers, editors, teachers, orators, actors, members of the Hebrew Language Academy) down to this very day. Speakers to whom Hebrew is native are still in a minority (no more than a third of the population) and belong to the younger and middle generations. Among non-natives, knowledge of Hebrew varies, of course, from excellent to nil; there is a corresponding variety in the extent to which foreign languages are used, either at home or among persons of like linguistic background. It will be recalled that the multilingual character of the country was greatly increased by the mass immigration of 1948-1952, which doubled the state's population, and by the smaller influx now in progress. New immigrants, as well as an indeterminate number of native settlers, tend to go on using their native language at home, though they often find themselves talking Hebrew to their children, and indeed learning the language from them. Special intensive courses to teach Hebrew to adults (the so-called "*ulpanim*") have been set up all over the country; Hebrew is so well-established in many spheres that ignorance of the language is a serious handicap for the cultural, social and economic integration of the immigrants. It is still possible for individuals to live a normal, if somewhat restricted, life within their own linguistic community, and with only the barest essentials of Hebrew for inter-group communication.

However, full participation in activities of a broader scope is next to impossible without Hebrew; this is, of course, especially true in anything connected with the national life of the country (education, government, politics, press, literature, etc.). On the other hand, there are spheres in which full participation is unthinkable without a working knowledge of some other language, usually English; most university courses rely heavily on English reading material, for instance, and in some ways English has in practice become the second language of the country, at least for the younger generation.

In the thirties and forties, when the primacy of Hebrew was still being secured, attitudes hostile to the use of other languages were actively fostered by Hebraist circles. Today, with all serious threats to Hebrew removed, such attitudes have been considerably relaxed. Newspapers appear in most of the immigrant languages, and while the radio's main station is totally in Hebrew (plus a few hours in Arabic), the subsidiary wavelengths carry programs for the immigrants in Yiddish, French, Roumanian, Hungarian, Turkish, Persian, Polish, Judeo-Spanish and Moroccan Arabic. A symptomatic sidelight on the importance of Hebrew may be seen in the fact that complaints directed to the authorities by immigrant groups, as well as by the Arab population, often include a request to step up the teaching of Hebrew in their respective communities.

* * *

For the native, unilingual speaker, there is essentially little difference between Hebrew and any other natural language. The following limitations are, however, placed on this "naturalness": (a) native spoken usage is recent (the oldest native speakers cannot be over 45 or 50), so that even native unilinguals were brought up, and are often still living, in multilingual surroundings, with all that this implies as to non-Hebrew influences, restrictions on communication, and absence of spoken tradition; (b) certain fields of activity are dominated by non-native or non-Hebrew speakers, or are only beginning to be introduced into the national life of the country, so that terminology for them is faulty, or lacking, or not widely understood; (c) in language-conscious circles, it is not educated native usage, but certain aspects of educated non-native usage which hold the highest prestige and social status.

The dominant and most widespread variety of native speech may be called Ashkenazoid⁴ Israeli or General Israeli. There are other varieties,

⁴This term, for want of a better one, is used to denote that this variety of Hebrew shows marked "Ashkenazi" (Central and East European Jewish) influences, due to the background of the original settlers and speakers. As the alternative term "General Israeli" indicates, this variety is today not used exclusively by natives of this particular background.

but this is the one to which the adjective *tsábari*,⁵ approximately "native," is applied in common parlance. Unlike speakers of other varieties, especially non-native ones, speakers of General Israeli do not ordinarily exhibit identifiable signs of their (i.e., their parents') specific linguistic background; the pronunciation and usage of other speakers can usually be so identified, at least in general terms, often by completely untrained observers. In what follows, unless otherwise indicated, reference is usually had to General Israeli Hebrew.

* * *

The phonology (the system of distinctive sound units or "phonemes") has been relatively stabilized. There are five vowels and 23 or 24 consonants, most of which fall neatly into voiced-unvoiced pairs. Native speakers of "Arabicized" or "Oriental Israeli" varieties have two additional consonants, the typically "Semitic" (more accurately, "Arabic") pharyngeal spirants; these are occasionally sounded by other speakers as well. No trace remains of the Semitic "emphatics," of which even Biblical Hebrew had only two: the emphatic *t* is today a plain *t*, the emphatic *s* is *ts*. Thus with the exception of the pharyngeal spirants, the stock of phonemes, their distribution, their grouping in vowel and consonant clusters, and their allophones (specific nuances of pronunciation), as well as the intonation and stress systems, are highly reminiscent of certain of the European languages. This is both a result of the linguistic background of the original and still culturally dominant waves of settlers and a factor in the ease with which "international" terms are constantly being introduced. Such term as *stratosféra*, *prestíža*, *televízya*, *komunízm*, *metafízika*, *psixológya*, etc., are, by and large, easily pronounced and assimilated. It is one of the salient features of Israeli Hebrew that hundreds of such "international," or more accurately, "common European" terms have been taken over bodily in the European form; this is a procedure which is much more difficult to adopt in some of the other languages whose cultures are being Westernized, e.g., Arabic, and it will be seen below that it has its limits even in Israeli Hebrew. Hundreds more of such terms have been given a Hebrew "replica translation." It should be noted that whether borrowed or translated, these are often not drawn from any specific European language but from the many lexical and phraseological features which European culture holds in common and which, after B. L. Whorf, we may call "Standard Average European" or SAE. More specifically, the source of these forms is often the sub-variety of SAE which may be called Standard Average East European.

⁵From *tsábar* (also *sábre*), name of a local prickly pear, used colloquially to denote a native of the country. In the transcription used here, *š* is English *sh*, *z* is the middle consonant of English *leisure*, *š* is

Though the phonological system is fairly "closed," i.e., does not admit of easy alterations, and though it is nearly the same for quasi-native as for native speakers (except that for the former the allophones may vary widely according to linguistic background), it is nevertheless subject to a number of external and internal pressures. Bilinguals, especially non-native, often pronounce the corresponding foreign sounds in what they consider to be foreign words; thus educated speakers of German background often sound the German *ü* and soft *ch* as in *ich* in such words as *psüchológia*, *técnika*, *típus*, even though such words are not of German origin, and the last, meaning "type," is an ancient borrowing from Greek. Beyond such not overly common tendencies, "external pressure" is exerted by normativists in their attempts to eliminate certain phonemes and phoneme clusters, to introduce certain phonemes or to spread the distribution of existing ones, e.g., *b* at the end of certain words (radio announcers try to say *góvab*, "height," with audible final *b*, whereas the ordinary pronunciation is *góva*). As "internal pressure" we may adduce such native tendencies to drop the phoneme *b* altogether even in non-final positions, or to reduce to zero many unstressed vowels in rapid speech. The latter tendency and the strong stress as well as a general rapidity of delivery give General Israeli its characteristic quality; such a phrase as *matáy šeatá rotsé*, "whenever you wish," sounds as often as not more like *mtáy šartsé*.

* * *

The morphology (the way in which words are formed and inflected through combinations of grammatical units or "morphemes") is in great part, but no longer exclusively, typically Semitic. Most words are still formed by dovetailing two sets of "discontinuous morphemes," viz. a "root" and an intercalated "pattern"; thus a combination of the root *s-d-r*, conveying the general idea of "order, arrangement," with the pattern *-e-e-*, we get the noun *séder*, "order." With the same root and other patterns, we have, e.g., *sidér*, "he arranged," *mesudár*, "orderly," *bisdír*, "he settled (a dispute, etc.)," *besdér*, "settlement (of a dispute, etc.)," and many others. However, various pressures, largely those connected with the necessity of translating terms from SAE, have resulted in the introduction of prefixes, a type of morpheme virtually unknown to Semitic languages and for which there is but the barest precedent in earlier Hebrew; these have been adapted from, or invented on the base of, existing Hebrew and Aramaic⁶ particles or words, or lifted bodily from SAE, and

Engl. *ch* in *child*, *x* is the final sound of German *Bach*. Stress is marked by an acute accent. An apostrophe marks the glottal catch (the Arabic *hamza*) viz. an audible separation of the syllables.

⁶The Aramaic of the Talmud and of large sections of the liturgical and rabbinic literature is, because of its traditional importance and its similarity to Hebrew, constantly and copiously utilized for borrowings and adaptations.

today form an extremely important and productive part of the language. Most prefixes are so productive that they can be added, as the need arises, to almost any noun or adjective. Thus we have *i*, "un- or dis-" for nouns, *bilti*- for adjectives (*i-séder*, "disorder," *bilti-mesudár*, "disorderly"); *du*- "bi-, di-," as in *du-síax*, "dialogue"; *tlat*-, "tri-," as in *tlat-régel*, "tripod"; *tat*-, "sub-, under-," as in *tat-meymí*, "underwater"; *beyn*, "inter-," as in *beyn-leumí*, "international," etc. Of those borrowed outright from SAE, we may list *pro*- and *anti*-: *pro-araví*, "pro-Arab," *anti-mitsrí*, "anti-Egyptian." One of the reasons the wholesale introduction of prefixes was structurally feasible and easy, even though quite novel, is the partial resemblance such constructions bear to the way Hebrew, as other Semitic languages, uses phrases of closely bound words (the so-called "construct phrases") to form complexes of noun-plus-noun or adjective-plus-noun: *rav-*tsdadim**, "many-sided," literally "many of sides," is such a construct phrase, but *rav-*tsdadí**, (same meaning) is formed with a prefix *rav*- meaning "multi- or poly-." Such structural analogies did not, by and large, obtain for suffixes, which are neither as numerous nor as productive as prefixes. Endings that look like suffixes are, it is true, not uncommon in the ancient stock of the language and are in wide use today as well, e.g., *-i* for making adjectives out of nouns, *-út* for making abstract nouns, *-án* to indicate agent or actor, something like English *-er*. However, these cannot ordinarily simply be stuck onto the end of a word, but are parts of pattern morphemes and are therefore accompanied by concomitant changes in the words to which they are added. From *kélev*, "dog," one gets the adjective *kalbí*, "dog-like"; from *yéled*, "child," *yaldút*, "childhood"; from *yérek*, "greenery," *yarkán*, "greengrocer." About the only innovation along these lines has been the resurrection and widespread use of *-ón*, fem. *-ónet* as a diminutive marker: *yéled*, "child," *yaldón*, "little boy," *yaldónet*, "little girl." True suffixes, viz. appended morphemes, are mostly taken over bodily from SAE (more accurately, from SAEE, cf. above) and, with a few exceptions, usually accompany SAE words: *-izm* for ideologies; *-íst* for "followers of"; *-átsya* for -ation, as in *integrátsya*; *-izátsya* for -ization as in *de-stalinizátsya*; *-ológya*, *-gráfya*, etc., for the sciences. Examples of productive suffixes which may be attached to non-SAE words are *-nik*, as in *kibútsnik*, "member of a *kibúts* (collective settlement)"; *-le* for caritatives, as in *ábale*, "daddy," from *ába*, "father"; *-čik* for diminutives, as in *katánčik*, "tiny," from *katán*, "small"; the use of these is, however, reserved for colloquial style.

A problem arising from such innovations is that one cannot usually form verbs out of words having prefixes or suffixes. One may easily make up *du-kíyúm* for "co-existence" (cf. *kíyúm*, "existence"), but in order to render "to co-exist" one has to use one of a number of possible para-

phrases, which incidentally come easily enough. This is due to the general pattern of verb formation, which (a) inevitably involves the traditional discontinuous morphemes necessary for inflection, (b) uses prefixes and suffixes of its own, and (c) does not ordinarily admit of more than four root consonants, or more accurately, of more than two syllables in the basic form of the verb. However, specially felicitous combinations of more than four consonants occasionally permit the retention of this maximal number of two syllables: *le-talgréf*, "to telegraph," *le-smartét*, "to crumple up" (from *smartút*, "rag"). Theoretically, there is no compelling reason why an extra syllable cannot be added; one occasionally hears this in linguistic improvisations ("nonce-formations"), e.g., *le-bit'am-rekén*, "to become Americanized" and such forms, now only uttered "in quotation marks," may become current if the need arises. On the other hand, it is hard to see how verbs can ever be made out of words with prefixes or suffixes; still, if the need becomes paramount, there can be little doubt that some daring spirit will introduce even this innovation.

The need for making verbs out of nouns or adjectives is quite great, as it has been of late in the European languages, most of which seem to have some equivalent of the magical English *-ize* or *-ify*, which can turn almost anything into a verb. Hebrew today mostly uses the form *Pîél* (or *Kitél*), so called from the pattern *-i-e* for the third person masculine singular of the past tense, added to any root of three consonants (conventionally represented by the consonants *k-t-l*) or of four consonants (*k-t-l-l*). This seems to be the most productive of all verbal forms and the easiest to manage, as it can be used with three, four, and even the occasional five root consonants, and its conjugation is relatively devoid of complications. Furthermore, it has passive and reflexive or intransitive equivalents which are as accommodating and straightforward, and all have easy ways of forming verbal nouns. To illustrate with some recent coinings: to say "to pasteurize," one extracts a root out of "Pasteur," namely *p-s-t-r*, and with the regular change of *p* to *f* in certain combinations, one has *le-fastér*, "to pasteurize," *mefustár*, "pasteurized," *pistúr*, "pasteurization." Recent events in Egypt brought about the term "to Egyptianize," viz. *le-matsér*, and *mitsúr*, "Egyptianization," from the root of *mitsrí*, "Egyptian." Needless to say, Hebrew does not always depend on the existence of an SAE model to coin its verbs; the bureaucratic inexperience of the young state evoked, among other phenomena, much talk of efficiency and inefficiency, and produced not only terms for these concepts, but also a verb *le-yaél*, "to make more efficient," and a noun *yí'ul*, "increasing the efficiency of, streamlining," both of which have no single word equivalent in English.

If a hospital is *bét xolím*, literally "sick house," how would one say

"to hospitalize?" In this case, recourse was had to another root, extracted from an old Latin borrowing reminiscent of the European word, viz. *ušpíz*, "a guest" (Latin *hospes*), now rarely used. The result is *le-ašpéz*, "to hospitalize," *išpúz*, "hospitalization"; these are also used in the more general sense of "accommodating (guests, etc.)." One could not normally extract a single root out of the two words *bét xolím*. Nevertheless, even this procedure is not entirely unknown; some unsung genius, casting about for a term that would render "up-to-date," made an adjective *adkaní* out of the two words *ad kan*, "up to here, till now," and then a verb *le-adkén*, "to bring up-to-date." This happened a very few years ago, and the terms are today accepted completely in some circles, reluctantly in others.

In SAE, nouns in *-ization* usually go, as a matter of course, together with verbs in *-ize*. In Hebrew, such nouns tend to be introduced before verbs and to be taken over bodily, which creates problems when the verb is needed. Thus "internationalization" was, before 1948, a relatively rare newspaper word quite sufficiently rendered by *internatsyonalizátsya*. Now this is as clumsy for Hebrew speech, mainly because of its unusual length, as it no doubt looks to English eyes. When, in 1948, the proposed internationalization of Jerusalem became a matter of general concern, both a more utterable noun and a verb became imperative. This no doubt explains why the otherwise somewhat peculiar *bin'úm* was immediately launched and adopted, and with it the now derivable verb *le-van'ém*. The noun was made up with the adjective *beyn-leumí*, "international" as a starting point; the *y* and the *l* had to be discarded as excess baggage to get a manageable root, with the irregularity of the result barely offset by the fact that the last syllable of *bin'úm* is vaguely reminiscent of *umá*, "nation," thus somehow justifying the truncation of *leumí*, "national." It has already been pointed out how impossible it is to make verbs out of prefixed nouns; this unique example shows that nothing is really impossible in the face of dire necessity.

This form of the verb, viz. *kitél* or *kitlél*, is, it has been noted, extremely prolific. Among nouns, its nominal partner, viz. the type *kitúl* or *kitlúl*, ranks as high, and for similar reasons. Its meaning is transparent, and the way it is formed as well as its "morphophonemic behavior" (the changes in the phonemes due to inflection) are relatively straightforward. At worst, the middle consonant of triconsonantal roots may offer some trouble if it belongs to what may be called the alternating pairs: *b-v*, *k-x*, *p-f*. Traditional grammar requires a specified member of each pair to appear in certain combinations, to the exclusion of the other (we have already noted *pistúr*, "pasteurization," vs. *mefustár*, "pasteurized"); for a number of reasons connected with the gap between the present Gen-

eral Israeli phonological system and the spelling, representing the older phonological system, speakers have a marked tendency not to apply the received rules. Thus, if "mechanization" be derived from *mexoná*, "machine," or from *mexáni*, "mechanical," the spelling indicates that the noun should be *mikún*, with a change from *x* to *k* as middle consonant; however, this is often pronounced *mixún*, without the change. Similarly, *kifúf*, "act of folding," instead of normative *kipúf*; *tifúf*, "drumming," instead of normative *tipúf*; *sivúv*, "a turn, bend," heard side-by-side with normative *sibúv*. One of the salient features of contemporary speech is that it has developed, and to some extent is still developing, morphophonemic alterations of its own, e.g., the alternation between voiced and voiceless consonants, as in the root *s-d-r* (cf. above), which has an alternant *z-d-r*, the forms cited above as *besdér*, *bizdír*, are usually pronounced *bez-dér*, *bizdír*. Such phenomena tend to reshape roots, to create new associations and destroy old ones. It is not that the traditional alternations are being given up altogether, but rather that they no longer follow the same rules. One says *ésev*, "grass," pl. *asabím*, "grasses, weeds," construct plur. *isbéy*, "weeds of," whereas the dictionary gives *ésev*, *ásavim*, *esvéy*. Moreover, among farmers, the ordinary form for "to weed" is *le-aséb*, with its companion noun *isúb*, "weeding," and this *b* (instead of *v*) in word-final position is the kind of phenomenon that makes grammarians turn gray, since it is "absolutely impossible" in terms of traditional grammar; on the other hand, it often gets a complacent grin from those laissez-faire linguists who like "doin' what comes natcherly." The latter are rare in Israel, and it is not impossible that some of these deviations from the classical rules will be checked by normative action. Experience in other languages generally shows that such corrective measures succeed only partially, so that the net result is a complex system of partly "normative" and partly "natural" formations. Israeli Hebrew inevitably tends to present such a complex picture, since its very post-revival growth results from both conscious and unconscious processes.

In the production of new forms as the need arises, the whole gamut of classical sources can, of course, be searched for possible hints or precedents. Individuals and bodies who have these sources at their fingertips may then, and often do, coin words on almost any available pattern; once launched, these may set off a chain reaction of analogical formations and become truly productive. It is not easy to determine in each case why some innovations are, in this sense, successful while others fail; at the very least, it is axiomatic for success that they be in harmony not so much with classical norms as with the more recent Israeli phonological and morphological habits, though this is sometimes forgotten. Adjectives denoting colors are, in the sources, most often built on the

pattern *katól*; since names of colors are relatively few in the sources, their stock was greatly enlarged by coinages on this model. However, the pattern does not seem to be truly productive; the public, though it has adopted some new color names, uses paraphrases or other means for making up its own, e.g., phrases meaning "silver-colored" or "gold-colored" instead of the single adjectives *kasóf* (cf. *késef*, "silver") or *zabóv* (cf. *zabáv*, "gold") proffered by the dictionary. Even the terms *afór*, "gray" and *sagól*, "purple," though in general use, are almost universally pronounced *afúr* and *segól*, indicating fairly conclusively that the pattern *katól* has, for the general public, lost its associative connection with colors. On the other hand, the patterns for the names of diseases, *katélet*, already found in the sources, was consciously applied to form the names of many diseases known to modern medicine, but was also, in some measure, adopted by the public. While *šaxéfet*, "tuberculosis" (built on a root meaning "thin"), *kalévet*, "rabies" (root meaning "dog"), *nazélet*, "cold" (root meaning "to flow, run"), etc., were coined by official bodies, the terms *adémet*, "measles" (root meaning "red") and *adamdémét* for the lighter form or "German measles" (cf. *adamdám*, "reddish, slightly red") seem to be popular inventions.⁷ Unknown wits took over this form with a satiric slant, and in recent years produced some caustic comments on the by-products of statehood by coining names for some parliamentary "diseases": *saxévet*, "red tape" (literally "dragging disease"), *dabéret*, (literally, "talking disease").

In a good many cases, no one knows precisely how, by whom and on what basis a pattern was launched. In recent years, the pattern *katil* has been producing dozens of adjectives indicating possibility, something like English adjectives in *-able*: *šavir*, "breakable," *gamíš*, "flexible," *avír*, "passable, crossable," etc.; Israelis today can see this process now going on under their very noses, and, provided the meaning of the root is unequivocal, creations along this line are immediately understood, though not necessarily adopted, by at least the literate public. In an article that appeared in April 1957, M. Sharet, the former Prime Minister (whose prowess in this field is well-known) seems to have used for the first time the term *ravíax*, "profitable," and this writer was told last year that a certain manuscript was *bilti-dafis*, "unprintable"; the utterer owned up to having coined the word on the spot.⁸ Behind this fertility lies, no

⁷Much unnecessary confusion was created when it was decided that the official word for measles should be *xatsévet* (built on an Arabic root) and that for the lighter form *adémet*, discarding *adamdémét* altogether, and causing even more misunderstanding among doctors, mothers and children than is strictly inevitable. Cf. A. Even-Šolán's Hebrew dictionary (Jerusalem, 5708-5712 [1948-1952]), under each of the three terms mentioned.

⁸Cf. S. Tevéc's fun-poking "Modern Story" in the newspaper *Ha-Aretz* of April 5th, 1957, satirizing the excessive inventiveness of some circles by piling up new-fangled words helter-skelter. The pattern

doubt, the need for translating the many useful SAE terms of this type, as well as the slight ambiguity caused by the traditional Hebrew way of expressing the idea of possibility, viz. by the use of passive forms. Thus *muván* means both "understood" and "understandable," *matsúy* both "found" and "common, i.e., that can be found," *nisbál* both "suffered" and "sufferable, bearable," *nir'é* both "seen" and "visible." These are still used in both meanings; when the more precise rendering of the idea of possibility is needed, moreover, recourse still is had to one of a number of paraphrases, and this will no doubt go on, since not every root can fit easily into the pattern *katil*. It is not clear when or how the process started; as for precedents in the classical tongue, some older adjectives such as *adif*, "better, superior" may have lent themselves to analogical reinterpretations, in this case as "preferable," cf. *le-baadif*, "to prefer." But there are other analogies, and perhaps no analogy at all was needed for the very first coinage, whatever that may have been.

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Some of the trends and problems resulting from the very fact of introducing Hebrew into live, everyday speech have already been touched upon. Two more by-products of this fact may be noted. In the first place, official and semi-official innovating sources have usually, by their very nature, been unable to provide the public with some of the liveliest, most indispensable elements of a living language, namely everything that is connected with the affective and spontaneous: exclamations, oaths, terms of abuse or endearment, street cries, game terms, animal calls. The result: a plethora of borrowings and adaptations from any source that was near at hand. How does one send someone packing? There are, it is true, some staid, recognized formulas, such as inviting a person to go to *azazél*, a dubious place mentioned once in the Bible (Leviticus 16) to which the ancient Israelites used to send the scape-goat loaded with their sins. When in dead earnest, however, a *tsábar* is likely to use a well-known phrase beginning with the Hebrew word for "go" and ending with some more or less adulterated Russian words which, in the original, send the hearer to his mother in highly unprintable terms. This is quite a strong imprecation and is felt as such, even though its users, whatever their background, ordinarily have but the faintest idea of its literal contents. Similar uncomplimentary references to the hearer's father, mother or sister also exist in a more or less recognizable Arabic form, often with greater awareness on the part of the user of their literal intent. Terms used by children in their games, including a score of words for marbles

katil is well represented, often by what seem to be Tevét's own inventions: the noise of the sea is *lamia*, "audible," the air highly *nalím*, "breathable," the heroine *xaviká*, "embraceable," *abivá*, "lovable," *nesiká*, "kissable," etc., etc.

and their sub-species, are also of vernacular Arabic origin. The old clothes man, whatever his linguistic background, cries *álte záxen*, viz. "old things" in Yiddish. The Haifa longshoremen, and seafaring folks in general, use cries common to a number of Mediterranean ports, many of them of Italian origin. One of these, *várda!*, viz. "look out!", perhaps from Italian *guarda* via the form *warda* used in Arabic, is used in Haifa and vicinity as a general warning cry, especially when blasting; in other places, the Arabic cry *barud!*, viz. "powder!", is sounded for the latter purpose. Needless to say, many colloquial words and phrases are made up without the aid of non-Hebrew sources. One would expect such expressions to reflect the specific conditions of the country; the phrase *nim'ásli kmo tsnón*, "it disgusts me like radish" viz. "it's coming out of my ears," seems to be a reminiscence of the drab diet sometimes found in the settlements.

Another result of the colloquialization of Hebrew has been that some terms have been driven out of polite conversation or serious written usage because they have, in everyday parlance, acquired undesirable meanings or connotations. No one today uses the word *yasván* in its dictionary meaning, viz. either "a colonizer" or "one who persistently sits, i.e., studies, etc." (root *y-š-v*, meaning "to settle" in one form and "to sit" in another). The reason is that the term, literally translatable as "a sitter," is now used as a mildly colloquial term for a person's hindquarters.

These are only special cases of the general fundamental fact about Israeli Hebrew, or at least of its native and quasi-native varieties: Hebrew, having gone native, obeys rules of its own. There are things you can and cannot say, or for that matter write, regardless of what you know or think you know of the original meaning of a term, of the etymology of an expression, of classical usage. Though the blending of the various components of the present language (Biblical Hebrew, Mishnaic Hebrew, Aramaic, Medieval and Late Hebrew, loans and loan translations, new creations) is still going on to some extent, the blend has for some time reached a certain degree of stability.⁹ The newcomer to Israel, having learned what he thought was correct Hebrew from a textbook is often shocked to find out that what he thought were synonyms have different meanings or connotations, or that one is not used at all; that there are more words in speech and writing than were thought of by the dictionary; that some grammatical "mistakes" are used without embarrassment by highly educated natives; that some forms are taboo or obsolete; that some kinds of "correct" usage are considered ridiculous;

⁹For an excellent survey tracing this blending in detail in some fifty contemporary idioms, see D. Sadan, *Avnéy Safé* ("Linguistic Milestones"), Tel Aviv, 5716 (1955/6). Cf. also chap. 3 of H. Rosen's *Ha-ivrit Ielánu* ("Our Hebrew"), Tel Aviv, 5716 (1955/6).

and that some of the most expressive as well as the most common idioms are "really" borrowings or translations from a foreign tongue. For the newcomer, it is all part of learning a new language; for the observer, it is one way of coming to the realization that Israeli Hebrew, without breaking its links with either its remote or its immediate cultural background, is not an overhauled Phoenician chariot, but another national tongue of the modern Middle East.

A CRISIS OF COMMUNICATION

During the stage of the Second World War at which considerable numbers of American servicemen were stationed in several Middle Eastern countries, the armed forces of this country issued a series of small handbooks for the use of these troops. They were designed to help the soldier in his day-to-day relationships with the people of the country in which he had, for the time, to stay. In addition to useful phrases in colloquial Arabic, transliterated into our own alphabet, these pamphlets contained good advice, such as the admonition not to take public notice or make comment on Muslim women, the explanation of the sanctity with which Muslims imbued their homes, the general idea that the social customs of others—while they might seem strange—had as much validity for them as our own do for us. This attempt to reduce the friction between two groups, brought into contact by forces outside the control of either, was not universally successful, but it helped somewhat and it was a gesture of good will.

The times of war are, relatively speaking, simple. There is a single goal which far outweighs any other consideration. The times of a "cold war," or even of a long drawn-out *détente*, impose infinitely more subtle and complicated reasonings. No handbook such as those mentioned above will serve the persons who now must deal with these complications. It would be simplistic to suggest that there was a formula. But certainly everyone can agree that there was never greater need for mutual understanding between the West and the Middle East and that it would be wise to engage in the search for more.

Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, in his recently-published *Lieutenant in Algeria*, emphasized the lack of communication between the Muslim Arab and French inhabitants of this most unhappy land. It is precisely because Algeria is an extreme example of the cause of the *malaise* that it is useful to consider the case. There we have, in an exaggerated form, what is basically the problem throughout much of the

Arab East. Europeans who still believe that, in some mystical way, they are superior by nature to the indigenous inhabitants of the country, are those who remain in control. Algerian leaders who believe that victory is ultimately theirs are not willing to listen even to those of their neighbors who counsel a degree of moderation.

It is not only in Frenchmen and in Algeria that this attitude among Westerners persists. Mr. James Morris, in two recent books—*Sultan in Oman* and *Islam Inflamed*—has been more honest than many who think in the same way concerning his contempt and feeling of superiority towards the people of the area with which we deal.

Those who make policy for the Western Powers have no such feelings as do the Algerian *colons* but they have, perhaps quite unconsciously, another attitudinal hurdle to overcome in this search for communication. One who would not think of formulating a course of action involving the destiny of, say, Norway or Iceland without first engaging in consultation with Norwegians and Icelanders, does not think it strange to lay down a course of action which involves Middle Eastern countries without any prior consultation at all. It is the result of this lack of cognition that many in the Middle East continue to cry "imperialism" to those who have no empires.

But it is also well to ask whether many of the leaders of the Middle Eastern countries understand Westerners and their motivations any better than we do those of the ones who, legitimately, complain. And if they have rid themselves of all the vestiges of a colonial attitude. If they continue to look upon their countries as a sort of prize to be won in some gigantic game of chance, then the role of passivity, so distasteful in the imperial past, still exists. It is of the essence that they be not merely the objects of policy, but its initiators, and the whole world may expect responsibility in this new role.

Chronology

July 1 - September 30, 1957

General

1957

July 2: Ahmad Shuqayri, representative for Syria at a number of assembly sessions and in the Security Council of the U.N., was appointed head of the Saudi Arabian delegation to the next General Assembly session with the rank of Minister of State.

Secretary Dulles said he would like to see a revival of the Eric Johnston plan to develop regions in both Israel and Jordan by irrigation from the Jordan river.

July 4: Delegates of the American Jewish Committee received assurances in Morocco and Tunisia that the individual emigration of Jews to Israel would be maintained.

July 6: The British War Office announced that the Royal Navy and troopships would soon resume use of the Suez Canal.

July 7: Egyptian sources said Arab states will declare that Israel has no legal right to the Aqaba Gulf port of Elath and should not be permitted to send ships through the gulf. Arguments state that the gulf has for centuries belonged to Arabs and Israel's seizure does not constitute legality; also that the gulf lies entirely within Arab territory.

July 8: An Israeli government spokesman complained that infiltrators from the Egyptian-held Gaza strip stole irrigation piping from 3 Israeli border farm settlements.

July 10: Dr. 'Izzat Tannus, director of the Palestine Arab Office in New York, denied a report that official representatives of Arab refugees in Palestine had met with Israeli officials.

Saudi Arabia wrote to the President of the U.N. Security Council charging that Israeli ships had passed through Saudi Arabia's territorial waters on June 26 and 27.

July 11: The Agha Khan, head of the Ismaili sect, died after a heart attack in his home near Geneva. He was 79.

July 12: The British Foreign Office denied reports from Cairo that Nehru was acting officially on behalf of the British government in the Indian Prime Minister's efforts to mend relations between Britain and Cairo.

Syria and Israel exchanged accusations, each claiming that the other had touched off border shootings on July 9.

Prince Karim Khan, son of Prince 'Ali Khan, was designated the new Ismaili religious leader, by the will of the late Agha Khan III. Both his father and his

uncle, Prince Sadra-al-din, were by-passed in the selection of the 20-year-old prince.

July 13: The United Nations Emergency Force announced 2 recent attacks on its Israeli-Egyptian border guards: an Indian patrol fired on from the Israeli side on July 12 and a Finnish patrol shot at from the Egyptian side on July 13.

July 16: The Egyptian Suez Canal Authority named Col. Muhammad Yunis as chairman of the board, to succeed the late Dr. Hilmi Badawi. Col. Yunis will continue as managing director of the Authority as well.

Secretary of State Dulles told a news conference that perhaps the U.S. should take a lesser role than in the past in the search for solutions to Arab-Israeli conflict.

July 18: The White House announced that President Eisenhower had recently written a personal reply to King Sa'ud to convey an understanding of the U.S. position on the issue of freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.

July 22: Indonesia announced its decision to withdraw its entire contingent from the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. This is the first country to recall troops from the volunteer force from 10 countries.

Egypt granted permission to a Danish ship, the *Birgitte Toft*, carrying a cargo of rice to pass through the Suez Canal on its way to Israel, but authorities arrested an Israeli sailor who had been taken on as a member of the crew. He was removed to Suez and handed over to the Egyptian Intelligence Office.

July 23: Israel protested both the arrest of the Israeli sailor aboard a Danish freighter and the delaying of the chartered ship.

July 25: Pakistan Prime Minister Suhrawardy, in a radio address from United Nations headquarters, stated that a permanent U.N. police force would help expedite disarmament.

July 29: The Egyptian delegate to the United Nations, according to Egyptian sources, was instructed to deliver a memorandum to Secretary General Hammarskjöld, in compliance with a U.N. request for information on the seizing of an Israeli seaman aboard a Danish freighter in the Suez Canal.

July 30: Egypt blacklisted the *Birgitte Toft*.

Aug. 2: Egypt placed a ban for an indefinite period upon newsmen entering the Gaza Strip.

Aug. 4: An Israeli-chartered Italian cargo ship, after passing through the Suez Canal, was blacklisted and denied the right to take on provisions and supplies by the Egyptian authorities.

Aug. 5: Arab diplomatic sources reported the Soviet Union had agreed to let Syria defer payment for arms bought from the Communist bloc during the past two years.

President Eisenhower submitted a formal report to Congress on operations of the Eisenhower Doctrine, declaring that it had helped to ameliorate conditions in the Middle East.

Aug. 6: The Israeli Foreign Minister expressed shock over Egypt's reported refusal to allow an International Red Cross representative to visit the Israeli seaman arrested July 22.

Secretary Dulles said at a news conference he had received an appeal from the Imam of Oman to intervene to halt British attacks upon the territory of Oman proper.

Aug. 7: U.N. Secretary General Hammarskjöld circulated a report that Israeli opposition had prevented the establishment of a full-time observation post along the Israeli-Syrian border. The acting chief of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization said that Israel felt the proposal was not in conformity with the general armistice agreement and also that it was not needed, since the area is visited twice daily by U.N. military observers.

The International Chamber of Shipping protested against a proposal to pay for clearance of the Suez Canal by levying a surcharge on shipping through the Canal, adding that such a plan was being considered by the U.N.

An Israel-chartered Norwegian cargo vessel bound for Haifa from Capetown with a cargo of fishmeal, jute and tanning chemicals was allowed to go through the Suez Canal.

Aug. 8: The U.N. Secretary General condemned the Arab economic boycott against Israel as a block to United Nations efforts for a settlement in the Middle East.

Aug. 12: Following a request from Israel that the United Nations keep four teams of military observers stationed along the Syrian border for a month, the UNTSO has agreed to the extension, according to an Israeli Foreign Office spokesman.

The Arab League agreed to ask for a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to act on the question of British efforts to put down the revolt in Oman. The decision was reached after the League received approval from Iraq and Libya.

Aug. 14: Arkansas Senator William Fulbright accused Secretary Dulles of acting against expert economic and diplomatic advice in withdrawing the offer to help build the Aswan dam. The results were Nasir's seizure of the Suez Canal operating company; the British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt; the deterioration of the North Atlantic alliance; deeper Soviet penetration of the Middle East; intensification of the difficulty in settling the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Raffi Eylon, the Israeli seaman, was released from an Egyptian jail.

Aug. 15: Ten Arab states called for an urgent meeting

of the Security Council to consider "armed aggression" by Britain in Oman.

Aug. 17: Arab League Secretary General 'Abd al-Khalik Hasunah met with Jordan Foreign Minister Samir al-Rifa'i.

A Turkish tanker ran aground in the Suez Canal, damaging the ship's rudder and holding up Canal traffic for ten hours.

Aug. 19: Jordan announced that it would lodge a complaint with the Security Council alleging that Israel had attacked the demilitarized zone of Jerusalem July 21.

Aug. 20: The Soviet Union supported an 11-Arab nation demand that the Security Council investigate British efforts to put down a tribal revolt in Oman.

British Foreign Office denied Soviet charges concerning Britain's role in the Oman conflict.

A Norwegian freighter bound for Haifa was allowed to enter the Suez Canal after being held up for 4 days by Egyptian authorities.

The U.N. Security Council declined to act upon the Arab charge of armed aggression by Britain in Oman.

Aug. 21: Israel charged that Egypt had deliberately delayed the Israel-bound Norwegian freighter before permitting it to go through the Suez Canal.

Declaring that the ultimate aim of the Soviet Union is to control Syria, President Eisenhower said the situation still did not justify action under the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Aug. 23: Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson met in Ankara with Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes, King Faysal of Iraq and King Husayn of Jordan to discuss Communist gains in Syria.

Aug. 24: Russia charged that the United States was preparing the ground for American intervention in Syria.

A Syrian official said that Moscow had expressed readiness to provide all experts and technicians necessary to carry out the country's long-range development projects.

Aug. 27: Secretary Dulles told a news conference that Syria's neighbors are alarmed by the large quantities of Soviet weapons in the Syrian hands.

Aug. 28: Prof. Cyrus Gordon of Brandeis University in Waltham, Mass., announced that the pictographs and syllabic signs used in an ancient system of Cretan writing have been decoded and found to be Akkadian, the Babylonian language. Formerly called Linear Script A by scholars, this Semitic writing was in use on the island of Crete from the 17th to the 15th centuries B.C.

Aug. 31: Mr. Henderson completed his Middle East Mission in Lebanon and was expected to return immediately to Washington.

Sept. 3: Lt. Gen. Raymond Wheeler, who directed the clearing of the Suez Canal of wrecked ships, was sent back to the Canal by the U.N. to confer with the Egyptian Canal Authority on his work in clearing the waterway.

Sept. 4: Gen. Wheeler said the Egyptian management of the nationalized Suez Canal was excellent.

State Department officials said the U.S. is considering the possibility of providing economic aid to Yemen and the Sudan.

Jordan requested an urgent Security Council meeting to press a charge that Israeli digging operations near Jerusalem constituted an attempt to grab territory that is a no-man's land of about 600 acres between the Jordanian and Israeli lines.

Mr. Henderson reported pro-Soviet moves in Syria that are seriously threatening the free world's security.

Sept. 7: President Eisenhower pledged to use whatever powers necessary to protect pro-Western Arab governments from overthrow by the pro-Soviet government of Syria.

Sept. 8: The French government announced a joint-venture scheme between French oil companies seeking oil in the Sahara and foreign companies who would give financial and technical assistance in return for a share of any oil discovered.

Gen. Wheeler left Cairo to report to Mr. Hammarhjöld.

Sept. 10: Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko denounced Western policy in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East, and declared that a threat of armed intervention in the internal affairs of Syria was being created.

Secretary Dulles tempered earlier official U.S. expressions of alarm over Syria by saying he did not think developments would require "direct armed intervention" under the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Sept. 11: The Norwegian freighter *Mars*, carrying Israeli cargo and bound for Burma, was permitted through the Suez Canal after being held up 24 hours by Egyptian authorities.

Sept. 13: U.S. State Department denied that King Sa'ud had intervened with President Eisenhower to soften U.S. policy toward Syria.

Premier Bulganin accused Turkey of poisoning troops on Syria's borders for a "U.S.-planned attack."

Sept. 14: Suez Canal Authority Director, Muhammad Yunis, announced that the Canal will be deepened by next January to accommodate ships of up to 35-foot draft.

Sept. 15: The Arab Confederation of Labor said Arab workers would hit back hard if the U.S. moved against Syria.

Sept. 16: Syrian Foreign Minister Salah al-Bitar charged that the campaign of the Western powers to change Syria's present democratic regime is a threat of aggression and a violation of the U.N. Charter.

The U.S. joined with Baghdad Pact nations in planning a vast customs union reaching from the Black Sea to the Indian subcontinent, for the purpose of increasing trade and economic cooperation among Middle Eastern nations, to raise living standards and to block spread of Soviet economic influence in this region.

Sept. 18: The U.N. Steering Committee refused to recommend debate on a proposal by Greece to condemn

Britain for "atrocities" and violation of human rights in Cyprus. Instead, the committee approved a Norwegian recommendation of a General Assembly discussion on the "problem of Cyprus."

Poland and Outer Mongolia pledged to support the "fight for independence"—waged by countries of the Middle East against "colonialist powers."

Moscow radio reported that two Soviet warships were en route to Syria for a friendly call at the invitation of the Damascus government.

Sept. 19: Secretary Dulles said Turkey faces a growing military danger from the major build-up of Soviet arms in Syria.

Sept. 20: Mr. Gromyko accused the West of turning the Middle East into a hotbed of international conflict and called upon the General Assembly to defend the independence of these countries.

Sept. 21: Mr. Gromyko renewed charges against the West, presenting two requests to debate the issues in the Assembly.

The French government announced intentions of selling shares in its oil companies to the public.

King Sa'ud was reported to have pledged to Egypt and Syria that his kingdom would give full support to Syria against any aggression.

Sept. 23: Crown Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia said in Washington that Syria was no threat to its neighbors.

Saudi Arabia, Ghana, the Sudan and Ireland became new members of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.

Sept. 25: The Secretary General of the Arab League, 'Abd al-Khalik Hasunah, advised the Western powers to cease interfering in the Middle East and North Africa.

Sept. 26: India called for an immediate arms truce and suggested that U.N. member states voluntarily submit military budgets to the Secretary General.

Secretary Dulles said he would be glad to extend the same courtesy of seeing the Syrian Foreign Minister as he has to other foreign ministers in this country for the opening of the General Assembly.

Iraq's Premier visited Damascus to confer with Syrian leaders and King Sa'ud.

Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Malaya were elected to membership by the World Bank and the Fund.

Sept. 27: The Baghdad Pact nations and the U.S. agreed to expand their program of defense against Communist subversion in the Middle East.

The U.S. conceded that tactical clashes with friendly Arab nations had damaged its propaganda position in the Middle East.

Aden

(See also Yemen)

1957

July 3: The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company opened a \$1,100,000 ship-bunkering terminal at Aden.

Aug. 7: British RAF planes attacked a Yemeni force that

was claimed to have occupied positions inside the Beihan area, in the Western Aden Protectorate.

Aug. 10: An Aden government spokesman said all was quiet along the border between Yemen and the Western Aden Protectorate.

Sept. 19: Yemeni forces withdrew from the Jebel-Dhat-Shukair triangle. A British government statement indicated that most, if not all, the territory in the triangle was now in the hand of British forces.

Afghanistan

1957

July 7: 'Abd-al-Malik was ousted as the Minister of Finance, "owing to increasing corruption and bribery cases in the ministry."

July 11: Kabul radio announced an unsuccessful assassination plot aimed at King Zahir Shah and Premier Da'ud Khan.

July 17: The King and a large delegation, including the Foreign Minister, arrived in Moscow for a state visit to the U.S.S.R. They were met at the airport by Premier Bulganin and Marshal Kliment Voroshilov.

July 30: The Soviet Union agreed to give Afghanistan "disinterested" technical and material aid for oil prospecting in Afghanistan's northern regions.

July 31: The King was given a send-off by Soviet leaders as he terminated his two-week tour.

Aug. 31: Foreign Minister Muhammad Na'im said that Afghanistan would receive about \$25 million in military assistance under the arms agreement signed last year with Russia. He declared the country had entered into the Soviet arms deal because it did not find conditions favorable for obtaining arms from the U.S. or elsewhere.

Algeria

(See also General, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia)

1957

July 2: U.S. Senator John Kennedy called on the Administration to stop supporting France's Algerian policy and start working for Algerian independence. He introduced a resolution in the Senate following the speech urging that the good offices of the Premier of Tunisia and the Sultan of Morocco or NATO be used to obtain such a settlement. He said he favored Algerian "interdependence" with France and its North African neighbors.

July 3: France's Defense Minister suggested that U.S. Senator Kennedy was encouraging Algerian rebels to prolong their revolt against French rule.

July 4: The executive board of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions published a resolution prior to its fifth biennial congress, meeting in Tunis, asking France to negotiate with independence forces in Algeria.

July 5: Algerian laborers went on strike in various places throughout France marking the anniversary of the revolt in Algeria against French control.

July 9: The French military command in Algiers denied categorically that French troops in Algeria were using gas and napalm against the rebels.

French President Coty restated unequivocally the official French position of refusing to grant independence to Algeria.

July 10: Asian and African union leaders, attending the International Unions congress in Tunisia, placed full blame on France for the conflict in Algiers and urged the world's unions to "demonstrate in every way possible their desire to bring peace and freedom to the Algerian people."

July 11: A French civilian committee composed of members of the General Council attached to the Algiers Prefecture recommended the release of some 300 political prisoners.

The French National Assembly's Commission for the Interior voted against a government request for special police powers to detain suspects of the Algerian rebellion in France indefinitely.

One Algerian was killed and two were wounded in unrelated shootings and stabbings in Paris.

July 12: The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions passed a resolution calling for immediate negotiations to bring about a cease-fire in Algeria and to allow self-rule to the Algerian people. Asian and African delegates promised full support of the resolution despite the fact it had been stripped of virtually all of the anti-French declarations urged by these unionists earlier.

July 14: Mulay Merbah, Secretary General of the Algerian National Movement charged that Secretary Dulles' "hands-off" policy on Algeria was benefiting France in the Algerian independence fight.

Nationalists destroyed a municipal power station and caused an explosion that killed eight people in Laghouat, 200 miles south of Algiers.

July 15: Two Muslim women accused of cafe bombings were sentenced by a French military tribunal to die on the guillotine. They were the first women to be tried by the military court since the start of the Algerian revolt.

July 16: A 3-nation arbitration commission met to examine Morocco's claim that an airplane with 5 Algerian rebel leaders was illegally seized by the French last October.

A number of Fighters for Liberation, an underground group of the banned Algerian Communist party, were recently arrested, the police announced.

July 17: Twenty persons were killed in a new upsurge of terrorism in Algiers.

July 18: Five bombs exploded almost simultaneously in downtown Algiers and its outskirts, killing 2 persons and injuring 6 others.

Twenty-one Asian and African nations joined in a request that the agenda for the next General Assembly include an item on the situation in Algeria.

Premier Bourges-Maunoury won a confidence vote from the National Assembly, thereby enabling him to put into effect the special police powers for dealing with terrorists he requested earlier.

July 20: The French government discussed the outlines of a 10-year plan of economic development designed to reduce the poverty in Algeria.

July 21: Twenty-three Algerian rebels surrendered to a French unit in the Oran region. Elsewhere in the area, 18 were killed and 15 captured, according to French authorities.

In France 1 North African was killed and 3 others were injured in shooting incidents.

July 22: Twelve Frenchmen, including a Roman Catholic priest, were charged with treason after they were accused of sheltering Muslims who were being hunted by French paratroopers during the mass arrests in Algiers last February and March.

July 23: A French military convoy was fired on by rebels near the Tunisian border. Three soldiers were wounded. Thirty miles away a mine exploded under a train, derailing 8 cars and injuring 3 persons.

In Oran 8 French Communists—4 of them women—were convicted of acting as liaison agents for the Algerian nationalists. They were given suspended sentences ranging from 18 months to 8 years.

A delegation from the private organization, the International Commissions Against Concentration Camps absolved France from a charge of running a concentration camp regime in Algeria, but stated that there was a "very real concern" for individual liberties and the rights of man on the part of judicial authorities.

July 27: Six bombs exploded at different points of downtown Algiers, killing 3 persons and wounding 5. Three other bombs were discovered and detonated.

July 29: French military authorities accused 2 Muslim officers in the French Rifle Corps as serving as accomplices in a rebel attack against a military post in the region of Aumale.

July 30: French officials reported that their troops had cracked a rebel stronghold in northern Algeria and killed 45 insurgents in an all-day battle.

The French said Algerian rebels stationed on Tunisian territory attacked French soldiers patrolling the Algerian-Tunisian frontier. Three soldiers were killed and 6 were wounded.

French police seized the early edition of *L'Humanité*, Paris Communist newspaper, for publication of detailed allegations of the use of torture techniques by paratroopers in Algeria.

July 31: The Archbishop of Algiers took up the defense of Christians in Algeria who have been blamed for giving help to Muslims.

Aug. 1: Nationalists set off a bomb across the street from the Algiers police headquarters. Two were injured.

Aug. 2: Algerian terrorists killed 6 Muslims and wounded 4 others in France.

A hamlet near Algiers was ordered to pay 700,000 francs because the populace helped a wanted terrorist to escape.

Aug. 3: French authorities said that an Algerian rebel band hurled grenades at an army scout car on the Tunisian border, wounding 5, then fled into Tunisian territory.

Aug. 4: The French government published a report on its efforts to strengthen the Algerian economy.

Aug. 5: A committee of the National Liberation Front said that Algerian nationalism was not turning toward the Communist world, but that nationalists would accept aid from any source to hasten their liberation.

French cavalry and nationalist rebels clashed in the mountains 30 miles from Algiers. French authorities said a large rebel band was surrounded.

Aug. 7: The Grand Mufti of Mostaganem, Si Henni Hajj Ahmad, was assassinated near his home.

A fire broke out in the Sahara 30 miles from the Edjele oil field. It started when engineers drilling for water struck a layer of natural gas.

Aug. 9: Two French oil companies relinquished control of large areas of their original concessions in the Algerian Sahara. The areas returned to the French government become available for prospecting Oct. 24.

Aug. 8: The French government announced it is preparing a series of loan programs to encourage the people of France to invest or settle in Algeria.

Aug. 10: Paris newspapers, *Le Monde* and *L'Express* were seized in Algeria because they published criticisms of the methods used by the French army to put down the nationalist revolt.

Minister for Algeria Robert Lacoste suggested a democratically elected Algerian legislature along the lines of the U.S. Senate and a tribunal similar to the Supreme Court.

Aug. 12: Algerian nationalists in New York appealed to U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to intervene with the French government, on behalf of 2 Muslim girls now under sentence of death in Algiers.

The French Military Command in Algeria announced that French forces had put 800 rebels "out of action" in more than 200 military engagements within 6 days. French losses were not disclosed.

Aug. 13: A military spokesman said French forces killed 98 nationalist rebels in mountain fighting near Tebessa.

Aug. 15: Nationalist guerrillas killed the subprefect of Grenda, in central Algeria, and wounded another civil servant who was with him in his automobile.

Aug. 18: Four policemen were killed just outside Constantine, the capital of eastern Algeria, by rebels. A 5th policeman was wounded.

Aug. 22: Premier Bourges-Maunoury began conversations today with representatives of French political groups in an attempt to win acceptance of a political plan for Algeria.

Aug. 23: Reports said the French government's proposals for a new Algerian statute aroused suspicion among the European population and disappointment among Muslims.

Aug. 24: The plan for Algeria being discussed in the

- French Cabinet would accept for the first time the principle of majority rule, a high authority stated.
- Aug. 28:** The Algerian National Movement rejected the French government's incompleting plan to reorganize Algeria into virtually autonomous regions, calling it a step backward from the 1947 Algerian Statute.
- Aug. 30:** French military and security officers asserted that their troops and police had smashed the National Liberation Front's command for the Algiers region and forced what remained of it to function from neighboring Tunisia.
- Aug. 31:** French authorities in Algiers again seized an edition of the weekly *L'Express*. It contained an account of the difficulties of a commission set up to investigate reports of excesses committed by French forces.
- Sept. 4:** The French government announced that it would call Parliament into special session toward the end of the month to debate a bill to reorganize Algeria's administration.
- Sept. 5:** Guerrilla chief Belunis of the National Movement has gone over to the French side with 500 men, according to French reports.
- Sept. 7:** Nationalist guerrillas ambushed a French army unit in the Kabila region and killed 12 soldiers.
- Sept. 10:** Premier Bourges-Maunoury called a special session of Parliament to meet Sept. 24.
- Sept. 12:** Former Governor General of Algeria Jacques Soustelle and Former Socialist Minister Gaston Defferre both attacked the proposed constitutional law for Algeria on opposite grounds. M. Soustelle said it would, in effect, create an Algerian state and would soon lead to secession. M. Defferre, author of the existing constitutional law for French Equatorial Africa, French West Africa and Madagascar, condemned the proposed plan because it did not go far enough in providing for a real central assembly and government.
- Algerian insurgents crossed from Tunisia into Algeria and attacked 3 French posts.
- Sept. 13:** The French Cabinet announced that it had adopted a plan for a new federal regime for Algeria that would be submitted to Parliament on Sept. 18.
- French authorities said 200 Algerian rebels raided the military post of Sidi al-Khemissi near the Tunisian border and kidnapped 225 Algerians loyal to France. Tunisian authorities denied it, saying no military operations had been launched into Algeria from Tunisia and added that a large number of mostly women and children had fled into Tunisia for refuge, pursued by French soldiers.
- Sept. 14:** M. Lacoste opened a drive to gain the support of the Algerian population for the newly proposed reorganization. He spoke at a union meeting of postal workers in Constantine.
- Algerian refugees told newsmen they had not been kidnapped on Sept. 13, but fled across the border seeking asylum.
- Sept. 16:** A committee representing European war veterans and student organizations in Algeria threatened a general strike in protest against the proposed reorganization law.
- Sept. 17:** The war veterans called off the strike scheduled for Sept. 18.
- The Algeria bill was sent to the French Assembly's Interior Committee.
- Sept. 19:** A spokesman of the Algerian Front of National Liberation, Muhammad Yazid, suggested a round-table conference be held by France, Morocco, Tunisia and Algerian nationalists in order to settle the Algerian question.
- France said it would not oppose a debate in the U.N. General Assembly, although it considered Algeria an integral part of France.
- Sept. 20:** A conference of French government and political leaders adjourned without agreement over the controversial issue of whether the Algeria bill should leave a way open for Algeria's secession from France.
- Ireland called on France in the U.N. to allow free elections in Algeria supervised by U.N. observers, so that the country could determine its own political future.
- Eight bombs were found in Tizi-Ouzou, capital of Kabila. One had exploded in a bakery injuring a French woman.
- The bodies of 8 Muslims described by authorities as "friends of France" were found in a small village near Tizi-Ouzou.
- Sept. 21:** Premier Bourges-Maunoury, meeting with political leaders, worked out a modification in the text of the proposal on Algeria. All political leaders except the Communists and the Poujadists agreed. The bill now proposes that Algeria be divided into semi-autonomous regions roughly along ethnic lines so that heavily outnumbered Europeans may rule their own local affairs in areas where they are concentrated. It also proposes a central executive and assembly, allowing for an over-all Algerian federation and a freer relationship with France. The Muslims would have greater voting rights and more power, but the independence demanded by the nationalists is implicitly barred. Conservative opposition to central institutions that might try to make Algeria an independent nation was dropped at the conference.
- The Political Affairs Committee of the Western European Union Assembly endorsed the French policy in Algeria and urged its support by the U.N.
- Sept. 24:** Saadi Yacef, chief of the National Liberation Front, and Zorah Drif, a woman revolutionary, both who were condemned to death in absentia by a French military tribunal, were captured by French paratroopers.
- Sept. 25:** The French government avoided attempts to delay the debate on the Algerian reform plan.
- Sept. 26:** M. Lacoste said the moment is opportune to vote a reform bill "to show clearly our desire for justice in the face of the destructive rage of the National Liberation Front."

Cyprus

(See also General, Turkey)

- July 9:* New efforts to be made to solve the Cyprus problem were discussed at a Cabinet meeting in Britain.
- July 14:* Statistics compiled during a population registration last October were released. They indicate that Greek Cypriotes outnumber Turkish Cypriotes by 4½ to 1.
- July 15:* More than 1,000 men and women commenced a hunger strike to protest their imprisonment in detention camps without hearing or trial.
- Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd intervened in a House of Commons debate to say that although it would be unfortunate to divide the island, self-determination would have to be on an equal basis for both Greeks and Turks.
- July 30:* 24 Orthodox priests and monks held prisoners by the British in a remote monastery, began their 2nd hunger strike in 6 weeks.
- Aug. 3:* Police cut off 4 main roads leading to Nicosia's busiest intersection for more than an hour until anti-British slogans put up overnight were wiped out. Greek Cypriotes going to work were handed brushes and told to rub out the slogans.
- Aug. 4:* Demonstrators in Nicosia and Paphos were dispersed by British security forces. They carried banners and placards demanding the return of Archbishop Makarios and union with Greece.
- Aug. 7:* British troops launched a large-scale search for terrorists in the mountains of southwest Cyprus.
- Aug. 9:* The Cyprus government announced the withdrawal of 33 of the 76 regulations put into force to combat terrorism. The most important regulation withdrawn related to "consorting with terrorism," which until April carried a death sentence for persons found in the company of terrorists and since then a mandatory life sentence.
- Aug. 30:* Archbishop Makarios said he regretted that the U.S. government had not taken a more active interest in the settlement of the Cyprus question.
- Sept. 7:* Four British Labor party members returned from Athens and said they believed the strain between Greece and Britain had eased.
- Sept. 11:* Further relaxation of anti-terrorist laws were announced by Governor Sir John Harding. He abolished the death penalty for carrying or discharging firearms and for throwing bombs.
- Sept. 13:* Archbishop Makarios arrived in New York to plead for American support of the independence of Cyprus.
- A 17-year-old Greek Cypriot student was sentenced to three years in prison after having been found guilty of distributing leaflets last July for the E.O.K.A.
- Sept. 15:* Archbishop Makarios said during a "Meet the Press" television program that he believed the U.S. would act somehow to further Greek Cypriotes in their attempt to win self-determination.

Foreign Minister Sellwyn-Loyd said that Britain would not present a new plan at the U.N. to give independence to Cyprus.

- Sept. 23:* Twenty-five Greek Cypriotes, held without trial as suspected terrorists, were released in Nicosia.
- Sept. 24:* Archbishop Makarios spoke at the National Press Club in Washington. He said that he did not want to embarrass the U.S. government and would therefore not ask for a meeting with President Eisenhower or Secretary Dulles.
- Sept. 25:* Explosions wrecked a sentry post and part of the main gate of Cyprus police headquarters in Nicosia.

Egypt

(See also General, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Palestine Problem, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia)

1957

- July 3:* More than 5 million Egyptians voted in the first post-revolution elections for representatives to Parliament. Sixteen persons were reported killed as rival tribesmen began pushing one another to vote in the village of Qena, 250 miles south of Cairo.
- July 4:* The Egyptian government announced that it would charge an American archaeologist, Charles A. Muses, with the theft and smuggling of antiquities from a newly discovered pyramid.
- July 5:* Voting returns showed that run-off elections would have to be held for about two-thirds of the membership of the National Assembly. The Ministry of the Interior announced that returns from 189 constituencies showed only 68 Deputies chosen by clear majorities. In 121 other constituencies, no single candidate won a majority.
- July 6:* Moscow radio said Egypt's first atomic electric station had been set up in Cairo with Soviet help.
- France will receive \$34 million worth of Egyptian cotton under a barter agreement concluded between the Egyptian National Bank and a Swiss bank.
- July 14:* Cairo radio announced that Egypt had started sending jets to Saudi Arabia in accordance with a 1956 agreement between the 2 countries.
- The Ministry of the Interior said 2 persons were killed and 15 injured in clashes between rival factions during run-off elections.
- Dr. Ibrahim Fahmi el-Minyawi, chosen to head the 350-man Parliament, died of a heart attack.
- July 15:* Mme. Rawia Attia, a captain in a women's commando unit, and Mme. Amina Shukri, Alexandria social welfare leader, won over their male opponents to become the first women ever elected to any Arab Parliament.
- The government decided to throw open to international bidding a contract for the construction of an oil pipeline paralleling the Suez Canal. The Ministry of Finance said a proposal by Aristotle Onassis to provide financial backing for the project had been rejected.

July 16: The brother of President Nasir, Shawqi 'Abd al-Nasir, won a seat in the new national Assembly. He is a school teacher in Alexandria.

July 17: Authorities disclosed that a dozen army and air force officers and at least three leaders of the outlawed Wafdist party were being held for investigation of charges they had plotted to overthrow the government.

July 18: A new law forbidding the Suez Canal Authority from discriminating against any ship transmitting the Canal, or from committing any other violation of the 1888 Constantinople Convention was enacted by decree.

July 19: A Supreme Military Court was appointed to try 14 persons accused of plotting to assassinate President Nasir. It will be headed by Maj. Gen. Muhammad Fuad al-Digwi, who supervised the last military court in 1954 when leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were sentenced to hang for plotting against the President.

July 20: A group of 625 Egyptians left aboard the Soviet vessel *Georgia* to attend a youth festival in Moscow.

July 22: President Nasir opened the first session of Parliament.

July 23: Soviet-built military equipment was paraded in celebration of the fifth anniversary of the revolution.

July 26: President Nasir charged that the U.S., in league with "imperialists and world Zionism," was trying to isolate Egypt and to destroy Arab nationalism.

July 27: President Nasir watched recently-acquired Soviet-built submarines take part in navy maneuvers.

July 28: The State Prosecutor announced the indictment of the 2 former Cabinet members and 12 other persons charged with plotting to overthrow the government.

July 30: Cairo radio accused U.S. military officials in Jordan of having engineered the conspiracy behind the trial of 22 Jordanians in Amman on a charge of having plotted to kill King Husayn.

Charles A. Muses, American writer and amateur archaeologist, went on trial in an Egyptian court. He denied the multiple charges of theft and smuggling.

July 31: Suitcases full of old marble, pieces of pottery and segments of gold leaf were produced as evidence in the trial of Mr. Muses.

Aug. 1: The State Prosecutor asked that Mr. Muses be sentenced to five years' imprisonment on a charge of attempted smuggling, and that he be fined \$156,291 on a charge of dealing illegally in currency while in Egypt.

Aug. 2: President Nasir elevated his chief political aide, 'Ali Sabri, to ministerial rank with the portfolio of Minister of State for Presidential Affairs.

The Minister of Rural and Municipal Affairs, 'Abd al-Latif el-Baghdati, gave up his portfolio. He was elected speaker of the National Assembly when it opened July 22.

Aug. 6: The National Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the "French and British aggression in Algeria and Oman."

Aug. 12: A prosecution witness at the trial of Egyptians charged with plotting to assassinate President Nasir said that the alleged conspiracy was "an imperialist American plot" and testified that the 2 accused former ministers had been in contact with the U.S. Ambassador. The American Embassy issued a denial. The witness later denied that he had suggested one of the accused was implicated in the plot.

Aug. 13: Mr. Muses was convicted of attempting to smuggle antiquities out of Egypt and of violating currency exchange laws. He was fined \$51,840 and given a 13-month suspended sentence. His attorney said he would appeal.

A defendant repudiated his alleged confession that he had plotted to overthrow President Nasir's regime, charging that he was tortured until he signed.

Aug. 14: A second defendant in the conspiracy trial told the military tribunal that he had been beaten and starved until he signed a confession.

Aug. 17: Greek Premier Constantin Karamanlis arrived in Cairo for talks with President Nasir.

Aug. 19: Premier Karamanlis and President Nasir concluded their talks.

Aug. 30: Eighteen Egyptians were indicted on charges of being members of an underground Egyptian Communist party.

Sept. 2: Maj. Gen. 'Abd al-Hakim Amr, Minister of War, told the National Assembly that the Egyptian Air Force has doubled its strength since last November's Suez crisis.

Prague radio announced that Egypt and Czechoslovakia have reached an agreement for exchange of machinery and industrial products for Egyptian cotton.

Sept. 5: President Nasir was reported to have started seeking a way to improve relations between Egypt and the U.S.

Sept. 7: East Germany and Egypt signed a protocol fixing the volume of trade between the 2 countries at more than \$25 million, an East German news agency announced. It was also agreed that Egypt would establish a trade mission in East Berlin.

Sept. 14: A U.S. Embassy spokesman said an American Air Force plane took off for Nicosia after being delayed an extra day by Egyptian authorities. They expressed suspicion that the plane's crew had photographed an Egyptian military airport. The pilot said he had mistaken the airport for Cairo International airport.

Ethiopia

July 1: The World Bank made a \$15-million dollar loan to Ethiopia for the extension and further improvement of its highway system.

July 19: King Sa'ud arrived in Asmara, Eritrea with three of his sons on a holiday visit as guest of Emperor Haile Selassie.

July 23: King Sa'ud greeted Emperor Haile Selassie on the Emperor's 65th birthday.

India

(See also General, Morocco, Pakistan)

- July 9:** The Air Force confirmed that it would train Egyptian pilots as flight instructors.
- July 10:** Prime Minister Nehru stopped in Cairo for talks with President Nasir after attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London.
- July 11:** A national conference opened in New Delhi on labor policy for the second five-year plan. Threats of strikes for wage increases were voiced by post and telegraph workers, civil aviation employees and Bombay dock workers.
- July 12:** The World Bank agreed to make 4 loans to India totaling \$90 million for modernizing and developing the railways.
- July 14:** Prime Minister Nehru returned to India from Egypt.
- July 23:** The Prime Minister expressed concern over the deterioration of relations between India and Pakistan.
- July 26:** Kashmiri Prime Minister Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad reorganized his Cabinet, eliminating the Minister of Education and Health, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Revenue and Food. He appointed 4 new persons to the Cabinet without mentioning their specific portfolios.
- July 27:** The 3 ousted Kashmiri ministers joined a minority on the left side of the chamber when the newly-elected legislature of Jammu and Kashmir State met.
- July 31:** Prime Minister Nehru told Parliament that a series of small bomb explosions in Kashmir recently might be due to a "liberation movement" launched by Muhammad Akbar Khan, former Pakistani general.
- Aug. 2:** The Soviet Union has agreed to negotiate a credit of \$00 million rubles with the Indian government to finance 5 projects from 1959 to 1961. The projects are a heavy machine building works, a mining machinery plant, a power station, a lignite installation, an optical glass factory and development of the Korba coal field at Bihar.
- Aug. 3:** The Prime Minister introduced a bill that would outlaw strikes in "essential services," including the postal, telegraph and telephone services, the railways, airfield maintenance and the operation of aircraft, the handling of port cargo, the government minting operations, and any service associated with national defense.
- Aug. 5:** More than 2,000 government workers demonstrated outside Parliament as the legislators debated the no-strike bill.
- Aug. 7:** The Cabinet warned essential government workers that a strike threatened by postal, telegraph and telephone workers would result in dismissal.
- Aug. 8:** The threatened strike was called off, 8 hours before the deadline.
- Aug. 9:** India denied charges by Pakistan that the New Delhi government was systematically colonizing Kashmir in an attempt to head off a U.N. plebiscite there.

Aug. 12: An official language commission endorsed the government's plan to drop English from official usage and switch over completely to Hindi.

Aug. 13: Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari declared in Parliament that India's foreign security holdings had dropped below the upper minimum prescribed by the Reserve Bank of India Act.

Aug. 17: A Parliamentary select committee recommended that foreign investors be given a 50 per cent rebate on a wealth tax proposed by the government, and also that new enterprises be given a "wealth tax holiday" for 5 years.

The Prime Minister told Parliament that India had expressed its "concern" to the British government over the latter's military action in Oman.

Aug. 19: Thirteen persons were arrested in Bhopal, capital of Madhya Pradesh, on charges of violating the state ban on the slaughter of cows.

Aug. 20: Master Tara Singh of the Sikhs told his followers to stop work to protest the one-language plan.

Aug. 21: The Indian Communist party appealed for public demonstrations to protest the "conspiracy" to subvert the Communist-administered state government in Kerala.

Aug. 22: A community of Sikhs staged a stop-work demonstration in the Indian Punjab to protest the one-language movement.

Aug. 23: India reached an agreement with Japan to supply 7,200,000 tons of iron ore before March, 1962.

Aug. 25: The Ministry of Defense described as "fantastic" a report from Pakistan that Soviet planes were landing in Kashmir.

Aug. 27: A government spokesman said that the rehabilitation of 4,750,000 Hindu refugees who had come from Pakistan after partition had almost been completed. The government has spent \$630 million in relief and resettlement benefits to the refugees, he said.

Aug. 28: Jayaprakash Narain, one of the leaders of the Peoples' Socialist party resigned from the organization.

Sept. 2: Prime Minister Nehru described the Syrian situation today as dangerous, appealed to the Soviet Union and the Western powers not to use the area as a "checkerboard" in power politics.

Sept. 5: The Prime Minister charged that Portuguese soldiers twice had fired on Indian border posts from the Portuguese colony of Damao, and had run down and killed a villager in a jeep.

The Finance Ministers of India and Pakistan have agreed to meet to discuss financial issues outstanding since partition.

Prime Minister Nehru declared that India would welcome a U.S. loan of \$5 million to \$6 million to help solve India's present exchange difficulties.

Sept. 7: India is seeking \$1 billion in loans from Western sources in the next 3 years. Unless it can get substantially this amount, a government spokesman said, the country would have to abandon some of the essential projects in its 2nd 5-year plan of industrialization.

Sept. 9: Prime Minister Nehru complained that the U.S. military aid program was an economic as well as a military menace to India, because the build-up of Pakistan is forcing India into an arms race it cannot afford.

Sept. 10: Secretary Dulles said that the U.S. would give "sympathetic consideration" to any Indian request for economic assistance.

Sept. 11: Prime Minister Nehru was received in Srinagar, Kashmir by "large and cheering" crowds.

Sept. 13: Pakistan was blamed by Prime Minister Nehru in a statement to the lower house of Parliament for the recent series of bomb explosions in Jammu and Kashmir.

Sept. 14: Five persons were killed when police opened fire on a crowd of about 1,000 at a village in southern Madras. The incident was connected with riots between high- and low-caste Hindus.

Sept. 16: A prominent Indian industrialist, Ghanshyamdas Birla, warned that unless his country obtained a \$5-million dollar loan from the U.S., the 2nd 5-year plan would fail.

Sept. 17: The 8,000 employees of 32 Calcutta banks rejected a government decision to defer their wage increase demands for arbitration and announced that they would strike Sept. 18.

Sept. 18: More than 700 people were arrested as police broke up a demonstration in West Bengal against the high cost of living.

Sept. 19: The U.S. and India signed an agreement that permits the U.S. to guarantee American private investors that their earnings from investments in India can be converted into dollars.

Sept. 20: Police resorted to gunfire in several parts of Madras state to break up clashes between high-caste Hindus and untouchables.

Sept. 21: The week-old "caste war" casualties were listed at 35 dead and more than 100 injured.

Sept. 30: The government announced drastic reductions in imports of consumer goods to be in force until March 1.

Iran

(See also General, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey)

July 2: A 500-mile arc of destruction caused by earthquakes in northern Iran killed at least 200 persons and spread ruin through 120 towns and villages.

July 3: The known death toll caused by the earthquake rose to 750.

July 5: The Iranian Red Lion and Sun appealed to the International Red Cross for aid for the 50,000 homeless victims of the earthquake.

July 6: More than 2,000 bodies have been recovered in areas struck by the earthquake.

July 7: Police arrested a Communist leader, fugitive from jail since 1948 and known as the "Lenin of Iran."

July 9: The Security Department head said that a Communist plot to blow up the Abadan oil refineries had been uncovered.

July 10: Renewed earthquake shocks hit northern Iran again.

The Assembly approved a new oil bill authorizing the government to negotiate oil agreements with Iranian or foreign individuals or firms for exploitation of oil resources outside the present concession area in southwestern Iran.

July 12: The Shah returned from France to supervise relief operations in the Caspian area hit by earthquakes.

July 13: The general manager of the National Iranian Oil Company said negotiations had been completed with 1 Italian and 2 U.S. companies for oil exploitation.

July 16: In a broadcast to the nation the Shah said that membership in the Baghdad Pact had proved worthwhile despite "misgivings in some circles."

July 21: Soviet objections to the use of American pilots by the Iranian Airline produced a deadlock in negotiations for a Teheran-Moscow commercial airlines system. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said the Russians did not want Americans flying over Soviet territory.

Aug. 2: A new trade agreement was signed in Prague between Czechoslovakia and Iran. The Czech exports will include machinery, chemicals, paper, glass and textiles. Iran will send cotton and ores.

Aug. 11: The Soviet Union agreed to have Soviet technicians help Iran develop the Aras and Atrak Rivers for irrigation and power.

The outlaw Dadshah, who last March murdered 3 Americans and 2 Iranian drivers, was being sought additionally for the slaying of members of the tribe commissioned to capture him. He also kidnapped 6 of the tribe's children.

Aug. 24: Dadshah carried out a vengeance threat and attacked a village, killing 4 children and capturing 2 policemen.

Sept. 12: The chairman of Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi, an Italian oil company, announced that his company will start work immediately on developing concessions granted it by the Iranian government. This agreement is said to have angered U.S. oil companies because it gives Iran 75 per cent of the profits as opposed to the customary 50-50 split.

Sept. 26: Princess Shahnaz, 17-year-old daughter of the Shah, will be married to Ardashir Zahidi, son of a former Premier of Iran.

Iraq

(See also General, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey)

July 14: Premier 'Ali Jawdat ordered suspension of the 6-month-old jamming of broadcasts by the Voice of the Arabs, the Cairo radio and Damascus radio. He also announced the revision of a previous decision not to participate in a coming consumer-goods fair sponsored by Egypt.

Aug. 14: Nationalist China and Iraq signed a 10-year cultural pact. It is the first such accord between the Formosa government and an Arab country.

Sept. 15: Announcement was made of the engagement of King Faysal II and 16-year-old Princess Fazilah, distant cousin of former King Faruq.

Sept. 20: Police ordered the arrest of a Baghdad lawyer who led 130 Iraqis to the international youth festival in Moscow. Sixteen other members of the group were also arrested.

Sept. 24: An Iraqi student and a clerk were found guilty of having traveled to the Soviet Union with forged passports and were sentenced to a year of hard labor. They had attended the Moscow youth festival.

Sept. 25: The Premier arrived in Beirut, saying that he would remain for 2 days for talks with Lebanese leaders.

Israel

(See also General, Jordan, Pakistan, Palestine Problem, Saudi Arabia, Syria)

July 2: Three men pleaded innocent at the opening of their trial on charges of murdering Dr. Rudolf Kastner, controversial Hungarian Jewish leader in World War II.

July 7: France agreed to increase credit to Israel from \$30 million to \$45 million.

Security control on Arab citizens was loosened somewhat this week.

July 10: Israel repeated a warning to Syria against further violence along the border.

July 13: Army Chief Maj. Gen. Moshe Dayan said 2 factors were causing Israeli-Syrian border tension: arms to the Arabs from the Soviet Union and some Western countries, and a smear campaign against Israel by the Russians.

July 15: Premier Ben-Gurion declared that Israel was ready to strike back at Syria, if necessary.

July 16: Inflationary pressure forced another general wage increase.

Israel requested that the U.N. put up "look-out posts" on its side of the Israeli-Syrian border.

July 21: The late Baron James de Rothschild bequeathed to the State of Israel \$3,300,000 to finance the construction of a new Parliament building.

July 23: The Shell and British Petroleum companies reported that they plan to dispose of their oil marketing interests in Israel because they were unprofitable.

July 25: An Israeli source said the withdrawal of the 2 British oil companies was regarded in Israel as more of a psychological blow than an economic one.

Three British elder statesmen, former Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison, Conservative backbencher Walter Elliot, and former Minister of Health Clement Davies, urged their government to review the decision of the oil companies to withdraw from Israel.

July 29: Yoakim el-Antoni, former head of the Coptic

Christian Church in Jaffa, was convicted by a Jerusalem District Court of espionage for Jordan.

July 31: At the World Congress of Jewish Studies, an Israeli archaeologist stated that a study of the Dead Sea scrolls showed that St. Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews was addressed to the sect which wrote the scrolls.

Aug. 4: The Secret Service Chief opposed at a court hearing in Tel Aviv the granting of bail to Yaacov Heruti, accused as head of a terrorist organization plotting to blow up the Soviet Embassy in order to provoke Soviet intervention and U.S. retaliation.

American and Israeli private promoters announced a plan to build a \$500 million seaport city to accommodate a population of 150,000. They propose to build the city on the ruins of biblical Ashdod, south of Tel Aviv.

Aug. 5: Twenty-four French parliamentarians, representing all parties except the Communists and the Poudjadists, arrived in Tel Aviv on a goodwill visit. The tour was initiated by the Association for a French-Israeli Alliance.

Israel charged that Bulgaria made a new proposal for payment of compensation for downing an Israeli plane near the Greek border 2 years ago that was "entirely unacceptable."

Aug. 11: Premier Ben-Gurion told a World Zionist conference in Jerusalem that, to insure its security, Israel must take in at least 2 million more immigrants during the next few years.

Aug. 19: Workers of the Ata textile plant in Haifa voted today to accept a settlement negotiated with the employers and 1,600 went back to work after a 102-day strike. The settlement granted a 4 per cent pay increase and adjustment of employment terms.

Sept. 1: Israeli engineers commenced the final stage of the drainage of Lake Hula.

Sept. 8: The airlifting of arms from the U.S. to Jordan is a new source of worry to Israel, the Foreign Ministry said.

Sept. 16: French Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that France would continue to supply arms to Israel.

Ceylon became the 6th Asian country to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, the others being Burma, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines and Japan.

Israel charged that Soviet agents in Odessa had tried to force an Israeli attaché to become a spy. Eliahu Chazan was reported to have been seized Sept. 7 and interrogated for 12 hours.

Sept. 21: The Soviet government denied the Israeli charge of kidnapping, declaring it was an invention designed to cover up the anti-Soviet activities of the attaché.

Sept. 23: The Israeli sailor who was imprisoned in Egypt when he tried to pass through the Suez Canal aboard a Danish freighter on July 22, was charged in Tel Aviv with having given Egyptians information of military value on the promise of an interview with President Nasir.

Sept. 28: Israel was reported to be looking forward to the use of nuclear power for irrigation, industry and the development of mineral resources.

Sept. 29: The government filed charges against Dr. Israel Schieb, editor, and Reuben Greeberg, publisher, of the political periodical *Sulam*. Both were accused of leadership in a terrorist organization.

Jordan

(See also General, Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Palestine Problem, Syria)

July 2: Military Governor Jamal Tuqan charged that two former Palestinians, working with the Egyptians, were directing subversion in Jordan from Damascus.

July 4: All remaining British soldiers and airmen left Aqaba, ten weeks before the final date fixed in an agreement ending the British-Jordanian treaty of 1948.

July 6: Foreign Minister Samir al-Rifa'i condemned Egyptian and Syrian propaganda directed at Jordan and said the two nations did not realize the danger to the general welfare of all the Arab countries.

July 7: King Husayn, in a nation-wide broadcast, warned against a growing danger of atheism and called for greater Arab unity.

July 8: Defense Minister Sulayman Tuqan said that Jordan was grateful for U.S. economic aid, especially since there were no conditions attached to it. He also hoped that the U.S. would be able to give more.

July 9: Sulayman Tuqan announced that treason trials against some prominent Jordanians would commence after the four-day Muslim holiday.

July 10: The Embassy in Washington issued a denial that any representative of Jordan had engaged in negotiations in Rome with Israeli representatives on the Arab refugee problem.

July 16: The government set aside 13,500,000 dinars, more than half its 1957-58 budget, for the army.

July 27: A mission of the World Bank published a report on the outlook for economic development of Jordan. It outlined a 10-year program of public investment designed to increase productive resources, raise the standard of living and reduce the country's reliance on foreign aid. The cost was estimated at about \$118 million, provided that foreign aid did not fall below the 1955-56 level.

A military trial was opened with 22 defendants accused with attempting to overthrow King Husayn. Eight of the defendants are being tried in absentia, including former Army Chiefs of Staff Maj. Gen. 'Ali Abu Nuwar and Maj. Gen. 'Ali Hayari.

Aug. 1: The Cairo newspaper *Al-Saba'* quoted Gen. Abu Nuwar as saying the charges were "trumped and faked." The newspaper confirmed that both Gen. Abu Nuwar and Gen. Hayari were in Cairo.

Aug. 3: A government spokesman condemned as "all lies" a Syrian accusation that Jordan had threatened to use force against Syria, saying that Jordan would never carry out aggression on a sister state.

Aug. 4: Pakistan Prime Minister Suhrawardy and King Husayn pledged common resistance to any aggression or subversive activities in the Middle East. Mr. Suhrawardy left Jordan for Lebanon.

Aug. 5: Deputy Premier Samir al-Rifa'i and the Syrian Chargé d'Affaires, after a meeting between the two, issued a statement saying that the latter had explained Syria's attitude "in respect to Syrian press attacks," and conveyed greetings from Syria's acting President and the Premier. "It is hoped that, as from now on, a new page will be opened in brotherly relations between the two countries and their governments for the good of Arabs," the statement said.

Aug. 12: Nationalist China announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Jordan on an ambassadorial level.

Aug. 17: Jordan will refuse to contribute to the expenses of the U.N. Emergency Force because it does not agree with stationing forces on the Aqaba Gulf. Instead, the government will make a grant of \$70,000 to the U.N. funds for the upkeep of Palestinian refugees.

Aug. 21: Police officials announced the arrest of 4 Communist leaders in Amman.

Yusuf Haikal presented his credentials to the U. N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld as the new representative of Jordan. He is also Ambassador to the U.S., succeeding 'Abd-al-Mon'im Rifa'i in both posts.

Aug. 22: Jordan asked the U.S. to support action it will make in the U.N. Security Council to halt Israeli construction work on Mount Mukabbir in Jerusalem.

Sept. 5: A military court in Old Jerusalem sentenced 30 persons to prison terms ranging from 1 to 2 years for anti-government demonstrations during the political crisis last Spring.

Sept. 9: U.S. transports began an airlift of arms to Jordan. The U.S. Ambassador and Jordan's Deputy Premier and Chief of Staff were at the Amman air field to receive the arms.

Sept. 10: Foreign Minister al-Rifa'i said Jordan had no intention of interfering in Syria despite the arrival of U.S. arms in Jordan. He added that the newly supplied arms would be used against "Israel or any other country that tries to attack us."

Sept. 12: King Husayn returned to Amman from a 3-week vacation in Turkey and Spain.

Sept. 14: The government radio said that the rifles sent by Egypt to Jordan last year were "unserviceable."

Sept. 16: King Husayn signed the United Nations Convention prohibiting the white slave trade.

A number of Arabic-language books were banned because of their "Communist-propaganda" content.

Sept. 18: The government charged in a radio broadcast that the "devils of Communism" in Syria were planning to attack sister states.

Sept. 19: The government accused Syria of repeated efforts to interfere in Jordan's domestic affairs.

Sept. 20: Twenty more persons were given sentences for participation in the April riots. Six of these were sentenced in absentia.

Sept. 21: The government announced the seizure of large amounts of Czechoslovakia-manufactured arms near the Syrian-Jordanian border.

Sept. 22: The government approved a proposal to establish a branch of the Riyadh-Saudi Bank in Jordan.

300 leading Jordanians called on the King to assure him of their support of the government in the wake of criticism leveled by Egypt and Syria.

The military court sentenced a member of the National Socialist party in the lower house to 1 year's imprisonment.

Sept. 23: The Minister of Development and Agriculture told newsmen Jordan was preparing to ask the U.S. for an extra \$10 million in economic aid during the current year.

Sept. 25: A Jordanian was sentenced to death by a military court for spying for Israel. A life sentence was imposed on another and a 3rd accused was sentenced to hard labor for a term of 5 to 15 years.

Generals Abu Nuwar and Hayari, former Foreign Minister 'Abdallah Rimawi and 2 other officers were sentenced in absentia to 15 years' imprisonment. Twelve other officers were sentenced, 4 in absentia, to 10-year terms and 5 were acquitted for lack of evidence concerning their part in the April riots.

A royal decree ordered Parliament to convene Oct.

1. The Parliament was suspended 3 months ago by King Husayn.

Sept. 26: The government ban on about 20 Egyptian technical and social magazines was lifted.

Three Jordanians were sentenced to death on charges of having passed military secrets to Israel.

Sept. 27: The Middle East News Agency said that 120 Jordanian army officers had threatened to resign unless the officers convicted of plotting to overthrow King Husayn were released. The protesting group also criticized the King's regime for allowing U.S. interference in Jordan's affairs, the agency report said.

Sept. 29: Tourists wishing to visit Jordan via Israel will not be allowed to use the same route on the return journey, an official announcement said.

Lebanon

(See also General, Saudi Arabia, Syria)

1957

July 1: The American University of Beirut inaugurated Dr. John Paul Leonard as the 5th president in its 90-year history.

Incomplete election returns gave the pro-Western government of Premier Sami al-Sulh 46 seats out of the total of 66. Foreign Minister Dr. Charles Malik, in his first try in local elections, won by a wide margin.

July 12: Lebanese newspapers started a 3-day strike to protest a government bill that would authorize unlimited preventive arrest of newsmen.

July 15: The U.S. Embassy in Beirut announced that Lebanon would receive \$10 million in economic aid and \$4,700,000 in military aid during the fiscal year

1958 under the Eisenhower Doctrine. The announcement coincided with the arrival of the 2nd shipment of military equipment. This was the first report on actual aid to be furnished under the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Lebanese newsmen called off their strike after the government had accepted a substitute bill by their syndicate.

July 22: The owners of 2 anti-government newspapers were arrested and charged with having published attacks on President Camille Sham'un.

Aug. 1: The 2 publishers were sentenced to 15 days of imprisonment for writing articles deemed insulting to the President.

Aug. 4: President Sham'un called for a "full Arab summit conference on the highest level" to stop bickering among Arab nations.

Aug. 18: Premier al-Sulh formed a new Cabinet. It is: Premier, Justice and Interior—Sami al-Sulh; Finance—Jamil Makkawi; Hygiene and Social Affairs—Joseph Skaf; Agriculture—Khazim al-Khalil; Education and Information—Farid Quzma; Defense and Posts—Majid Arslan; Foreign Affairs—Charles Malik; Public Works—Salim Lahhud.

Aug. 21: The government asked the Chamber of Deputies for emergency powers to arrest anyone considered a threat to the country's security.

Aug. 23: The Internal Security is holding urgent meetings to cope with a wave of sabotage.

Sept. 3: The Security Council held an emergency meeting. It was reported that the Council had proof that Syria was connected with the wave of subversive activities in Lebanon.

Sept. 5: The French Foreign Office disclosed that France had delivered tanks to Lebanon.

Sept. 12: Three Lebanese gendarmes were reported killed in a gunfight with arms smugglers near a village on the Syrian frontier.

Sept. 13: Soldiers reinforced the police in hunting for the gang who shot 3 policemen. Eight others, suspected arms smugglers, were killed in the gunfight. The government announced officially that some of the band fled into Syria and that the shooting continued from the Syrian side of the border.

Sept. 22: The President started work on the Litani River power and irrigation project, backed by the country's first loan from the World Bank.

Sept. 25: The government drafted an indictment for 400 persons, including 3 former premiers as a result of disturbances last May 30 that caused 9 deaths. The charges involved attempts to carry out an armed coup, incitement of the Lebanese against each other on a sectarian basis and attempts to kill members of the national security forces. The premiers are Sa'ib Salam, 'Abdallah Yafi and Husayn 'Uwayni.

Libya

(See also General)

July 29: Identical radio stations were inaugurated in

Tripoli and Benghazi. A special program was transmitted simultaneously from the two stations to introduce the Libyan Broadcasting Service.

Aug. 6: King Idris recognized the republic of Tunisia and sent personal greetings to President Bourguiba.

Sept. 1: The government announced that it would set up a permanent office in New York to deal with consular affairs and to be in close touch with the U.N.

Sept. 2: U.S. Col. Edward Sachs arrived in Tripoli to head the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group that will help train Libya's armed forces.

Morocco

(See also General, Algeria, Pakistan)

July 4: Plans for a University of Morocco were completed, a committee of the National Consultative Assembly announced. It will include facilities at Rabat, Fez, Marrakesh and Tetuan and will open in November.

July 5: Sultan Muhammad V went into the Rif Mountains north of Fez to inaugurate work by 12,000 volunteers on Morocco's Unity Road.

July 9: Mulay Hasan, eldest son of the Sultan, was invested during celebrations of the Great Feast of Islam as Crown Prince and heir apparent to the throne.

July 22: Sultan Muhammad for the first time called for recognition of Algerian independence in a speech to a conference of ambassadors in Rabat.

Aug. 8: Negotiations between France and Morocco were halted because of conflicting demands over the Convention of Establishment. France has made economic aid to Morocco for 1957 contingent upon the conclusion of an agreement which would give to French private interests and French citizens privileges not extended to other foreigners.

More than 9,000 Moroccan workers at U.S. air and naval bases in Morocco voted to go on strike because of alleged insults and mistreatment from American officers.

Aug. 11: The Foreign Ministry in Rabat notified embassies that in diplomatic dispatches Muhammad V should be referred to as King rather than Sultan.

Aug. 12: The Exchange Office ordered a suspension in all Moroccan currency transactions, as a result of the devaluation of the franc in France.

Aug. 13: The Ministry of National Economy announced that Morocco would go along with France's adjustment of the franc.

Aug. 19: An official said that 7 Moroccans were killed by Spanish forces in the enclave of Ifni, where fighting broke out Aug. 17.

Aug. 23: 980 Jews were reported stranded in Tangier without funds or passports to emigrate to Israel.

Sept. 6: Mehdi Ben Barka, President of the Consultative Assembly, declared that the government's decision to freeze the assets of a group of influential Moroccans was "part of a purge of those who collaborated with the French in 1953 to dethrone King Muhammad."

A decree issued during the week gave the names of 193 who cannot make any property transactions without authorization from the Minister of the Interior.

Sept. 9: Foreign Minister Ahmad Balafrej said that Prime Minister Nehru and the Shah of Iran had favorably received his proposal for a conference with the leaders of the Algerian resistance now imprisoned in Paris.

Sept. 16: An official delegation left to negotiate a trade treaty with Communist China. The talks are to be held at the request of the Moroccan government.

Sept. 16: King Muhammad arrived in Tangier to lay a cornerstone for a dam and to inaugurate a court of appeals.

Sept. 17: The King said in a policy speech that Morocco favored independence for Algeria through negotiations, not violence.

Sept. 30: The Foreign Minister urged the U.N. General Assembly to call for a negotiated settlement on Algeria.

Pakistan

(See also General, India, Saudi Arabia)

July 8: Pakistan and Spain signed a treaty of peace and friendship in Madrid, where Prime Minister Suhrawardy is on a brief official visit.

July 10: The Prime Minister was greeted in Washington by President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, Secretary of State Dulles and the diplomatic corps.

July 11: The Prime Minister spoke before the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.

July 16: Dr. M. L. A. Khan Sahib resigned as Chief Minister of the West Pakistan province. Sardar Abdur Rashid Khan was appointed to succeed him.

July 18: The Foreign Ministry said that Pakistan had not recognized Israel and "shall never do so." The statement was made to clarify misunderstanding about remarks made by the Prime Minister in the U.S.

July 21: The new U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, James Langley, arrived in Karachi. He succeeds Horace Hildreth.

July 23: Asghar Khan became the new Air-Vice Marshal, replacing A. W. R. McDonald, on loan from Britain's Royal Air Force. All 3 service chiefs are now Pakistanis.

July 25: A new political group, the Awami National Party, was formed in Dacca, with the avowed purpose of breaking the control of Mr. Suhrawardy's Awami League.

July 29: A shipment of 10,000 toys from the children of San Francisco to the children of Pakistan was presented to the Ministry of Education by the commander of the U.S. Navy Middle East Force.

Aug. 1: The Prime Minister arrived in Amman.

Aug. 5: Pakistan complained to the Security Council that India was systematically attempting to reduce the Muslim majority in Kashmir to a minority in order to frustrate a plebiscite. It accused the Indian government of introducing non-Muslims of non-Kashmir origin into 4 areas of Kashmir.

Aug. 19: The government announced that it will establish diplomatic relations with Morocco and Tunisia at legation level.

Aug. 21: Pakistan asked for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the dispute over Kashmir.

Aug. 24: Foreign Minister Malik Feroz Khan Noon told the National Assembly that "Soviet planes are known to have been landing in Kashmir."

Aug. 27: The Governor of West Pakistan, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, was forced to resign by the Republican party.

Aug. 28: Akhtar Husain, Secretary to the Ministry of Defense, was named Governor of West Pakistan.

Sept. 8: The Foreign Minister denied a declaration made by Prime Minister Nehru that Pakistan would try to seize Kashmir.

Sept. 12: U.N. observers deny that the U.S. is building military bases in Pakistani Kashmir.

Sept. 17: The West Pakistan provincial legislative assembly adopted a resolution that the province be divided into 4 or more separate provinces on a linguistic basis.

Sept. 21: The Foreign Minister said any country, bank or individual loaning money to India would be committing an unfriendly act against Pakistan.

Sept. 24: The Foreign Minister urged the Security Council to take a definite step toward solving the Kashmir dispute.

Sept. 25: It was announced that private industry in Pakistan will receive \$10 million to finance machinery and equipment imports under a special new aid program by the U.S.

Pakistan changed from abstention to a vote in favor of deferring the proposal to consider admission of Communist China to the U.N.

Sept. 26: The World Bank approved a loan of \$4,200,000 to help finance the development of private industry in Pakistan.

Palestine Problem

(See also General, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria)

July 4: U.S. Senator Humphrey proposed the formation of a United Nations good offices commission to explore means of solving the problem of the 900,000 Arab refugees.

July 7: An Israeli spokesman said that a U.N. observer, an officer and 2 policemen were fired at from the Syrian border.

July 9: The U.N. halted fighting between Syrian and Israeli forces which lasted nearly 10 hours on Israel's northeast frontier.

July 10: An Israeli Army spokesman said that an Israeli farmer was wounded when a Syrian fired at a harvesting machine on a border farm.

July 13: Egypt accused an Israeli patrol of kidnapping an Arab guard working in an orange grove south of Gaza.

July 22: Israel filed a complaint with the U.N. charging that Syria had violated the armistice agreement by making "aggressive threats."

July 27: Israel said Syrian troops fired into Israel territory and that Jordanian raiders wounded an Israeli Arab and stole a cow.

July 30: The Israeli-Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commission said that Israeli border guards violated the agreement on July 23 by throwing stones at Jordanian guards across the border.

Aug. 1: Jordan lodged an urgent complaint with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization, charging that Israeli armed forces had fired at Jordanian National Guards and civilians in the town of Qalqilia.

The T.S.O. informed Israel that it will not investigate charges that Syria had violated the armistice agreement by making aggressive threats. Israel protested the action and informed the truce supervision chief that Israel will not acquiesce in the decision.

Aug. 14: An Israeli official charged that Jordanian soldiers seized a Jerusalem youth who had inadvertently stepped over the border while playing ball, and took him into Jordan.

Aug. 15: The reportedly kidnapped boy was found in Tel Aviv.

Aug. 22: A Jordanian was killed and an Israeli was wounded in an exchange of fire by patrols near the village of Yarhiv.

Aug. 24: The Israeli Army reported that 2 Israeli guards were killed while guarding a water reservoir in Beit Govrin by gunmen who fled into Jordan.

Sept. 2: Israel's Foreign Minister, Mrs. Golda Meir, said she did not think that a major effort would be made to settle the Palestine refugee problem when the General Assembly convenes.

Sept. 3: Israel was condemned by a vote of the U.N. chairman and the Jordan delegate to the Israeli-Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commission for 2 border incidents. No Israeli delegate attended the meeting.

Sept. 9: The Armistice Commission accused Israel of sending trained personnel across the demarcation lines to tap Jordanian telephone circuits. Israeli delegates refuse to attend Commission meetings involving border disputes.

Sept. 10: Israel charged that Syrians shot across the border at tractor drivers. Guards accompanying them returned the fire. Syria's charge was that 3 armored cars covering the plowmen suddenly opened fire on two Arab villages, killing an Arab civilian.

Sept. 12: Syria charged that Israeli armored cars and troops occupied a small village in the demilitarized zone for nearly a day. The Israelis ousted the Arab inhabitants, but left the village during the day.

Sept. 14: An Israeli military spokesman said the border patrol shot and killed 2 Arabs who were encountered near the Beeri communal farm and who did not respond to a warning.

Sept. 16: Jordan complained to the Armistice Commission that the Israelis had opened fire on Jordanian forces in a village in western Jordan.

Sept. 17: A shell from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was found in a field near Jerusalem and exploded by Arab children who threw stones at it; 14 were killed and 3 others injured.

Sept. 26: Director General Henry Labouisse, of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency, discussed the status of Palestine refugees in Jordan with King Husayn and his ministers.

The U.N. truce supervisor reported that what Jordan had thought was Israeli military preparation was actually a tree-planting project on the Israeli side of the cease-fire line.

Sept. 30: Mr. Labouisse left Beirut for New York to present a new plea to the General Assembly for funds to keep nearly 1 million Arabs from starvation.

Persian Gulf

(See also General, Egypt, India)

July 19: Fighting between British-led forces of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman was reported centered at Nizwa.

July 20: An official British spokesman said that Britain had agreed to help the Sultan of Oman and Muscat against tribesmen fighting for the Imam of Oman.

July 22: The British government announced full military support for the Sultan.

July 23: The British gave the Imam's forces 24 hours to yield or face the Royal Air Force jet fighters based at Sharja.

July 25: Sir Bernard Burrows, British Political Resident in Bahrain, flew to Muscat to talk with the Sultan.

The fort at Nizwa was attacked by the RAF in 12 sorties. The flight commander said the planes flew in at 700 feet and fired on the roof of the fort with rockets and 20-mm. cannon. He said that the pilots did not notice any return fire.

July 26: A British spokesman in Bahrain stressed that the British were not engaged in combat with the Imam's forces, but that the strategy was to impress them so strongly with the modern weapons that could be used against them that they would give up the idea of resisting.

Air attacks were suspended at the fort of Izki after the red flag of the Sultan had replaced the white flag of the Imam.

July 27: The RAF dropped leaflets over Oman asking for support of the Sultan.

A spokesman in Bahrain said that the Sultan's flag now appears at 3 places held by the Imam's forces: Izki, Araqi and Ainain.

July 28: Sir Bernard Burrows said that the trouble in Muscat and Oman seemed to have been fostered from outside the country, and was very much exaggerated in the outside world.

July 29: A spokesman for the Sultan said that loyal forces were closing in on the last small area held by followers of the Imam. He attributed the revolt and a similar one in 1955 to Saudi Arabian influence.

July 30: Ten British Venom jet fighters fired on a fort at Farq. The populace had had warning and pilots reported no signs of life around the target before the attack.

July 31: The RAF received orders to stop all vehicular traffic in the area still believed in Imam forces' hands.

Aug. 1: The Cairo representative of the Imam announced that he had appealed for "intervention by the African and Asian states to stop aggression against the Omani."

Cities Service Company announced that one of its subsidiaries had discovered a second oil well in the province of Dhufar in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Preliminary tests indicated a producing capacity of 2,000 barrels a day at a depth of 3,200 feet.

Spokesman for the Imam in Cairo reported the capture of Tariq bin Taimur, brother of the Sultan, near the town of Ibri. The British Foreign Office denied the report.

Aug. 2: The RAF attacked the fort at Farq with only 15 minutes' warning by dropping of leaflets, instead of the customary 48-hour warning.

Aug. 3: British ground troops advanced inside the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman to reinforce native troops.

Aug. 4: A British spokesman said that white flags of the Imam were seen in Sharqiya Province. RAF planes dropped leaflets asking tribesmen to support the Sultan.

Aug. 7: British forces were reported to have moved into the village of Izz, 12 miles from Nizwa.

Aug. 8: The Middle East News Agency carried a statement from the Imam saying: "Free Omanis are still holding fast against the Muscat forces backed by planes and forces of the British imperialists. They will not stop fighting until they obtain full rights to freedom, independence and sovereignty in spite of the brutality and savagery of the aggressor who has not hesitated to slaughter pregnant women, old men and children."

British-led forces of the Sultan ran into heavy rifle fire on the outskirts of Farq. About 40 of the Imam's men resisted until they were fired on by rockets from jet planes. They escaped to the hills with no known casualties.

Aug. 10: British bombers made repeated strikes with small fragmentation bombs at opposing forces dug into a hillside near Farq.

The Sultan gave 2 reasons for the bitter resistance against him. One was support from outside and the other was that the rebels knew "if they were captured it would be their end."

Aug. 11: British and Muscat troops broke the resistance at Farq and seized Nizwa without a fight. Representatives of Nizwa met the political representative of the Sultan to announce their recognition of the Sultan's sovereignty.

Aug. 12: The British Foreign Office said that the action of the Imam against the Sultan invalidates a treaty signed in 1920 granting limited autonomy to tribes in the interior of Oman.

The white flag of the Imam disappeared from all but the village of Jabrin, 20 miles west of Nizwa.

Aug. 13: British armored cars led the advance into Tanuf, and 20 miles away the Sultan's troops seized Bahlah.

Aug. 15: British jet fighters attacked the fort and towers at Sait, home village of the Imam.

Aug. 16: A spokesman in Bahrain said statements were taken from captured Omani youths who said supporters of the Imam's brother, Talib bin 'Ali, were trained at Dammam, in Saudi Arabia.

British forces and the Trucial Oman troops moved their camp from Farq to Izki as the first step to final withdrawal.

Aug. 18: Sir Bernard Burrows flew to Muscat to confer with the Sultan.

British troops began arriving at Azeiba airfield to board planes for Bahrain or Aden.

Aug. 19: The Foreign Minister of Muscat and Oman said that the Sultan did not recognize the right of the United Nations to discuss the conflict with the Imam.

Aug. 20: Three leaders of the Oman revolt were reported fleeing toward the coast with Muscat forces in pursuit. British aircraft flew over the area dropping leaflets signed by the Sultan, warning that any who helped the men would be punished.

Aug. 23: The British Foreign Office said that British and native troops supporting the Sultan had killed about 30 followers of the Imam during the fighting. No Sultan supporters were reported killed.

Sept. 19: A representative of the Imam said that he would protest to the U.N. against "British aggression."

Sept. 29: The Bahrain government announced that beginning Jan. 1, goods passing in transit through Manama, the capital city, would no longer be subjected to customs duty.

Saudi Arabia

(See also General, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Persian Gulf, Syria)

July 1: The Minister of Health informed King Sa'ud that water brought to Mecca from Wadi al-Laimun is potable.

Crown Prince Faysal arrived in New York to undergo medical treatment.

President Nasir stated in an interview that his personal relations with King Sa'ud are good and that there is no doubt that his views are Arab.

July 2: Saudi Arabia filed its 7th complaint with the U.N. against Israel for violations of its territory by Israeli armed forces.

The Directorate General of Broadcasting, Press and Publications announced that Publications offices will be opened in Jiddah, Mecca, Medina, Riyadh, Dammam, 'Ar'ar and Qaryah.

July 3: The King received Sudanese Ambassador Mahjub Makkawi and Amir Nayif ibn 'Abdallah, uncle of King Husayn of Jordan.

'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, special adviser to the King, met with Secretary Dulles for an hour and a half. He later stated that Saudi Arabia shares Egypt's leadership of the Arab world and that King Sa'ud favors Arab federation.

The first Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from Iraq, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Suwayyil, presented his credentials to King Sa'ud.

July 4: A visiting Syrian journalist published an interview with the Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation, Amir Fahad. He stated that the Saudi base in Aqaba would be under the joint command of the Arab armies.

July 5: Two squadrons of jets arrived in Jiddah from Egypt, a partial fulfillment of the 1956 agreement between the two countries. The remainder are to be delivered in August.

The Minister of Health announced that the country would establish 14 hospitals next year.

July 10: Pakistan gave Saudi Arabia 7 million Saudi coins minted in Lahore, in accordance with an agreement.

July 11: New roads east of Mina, from 'Arafat to Mecca and another road between Jiddah and Mecca will be built to facilitate the pilgrimage, the Minister of Finance and National Economy announced. Also to be constructed is a shed in Mina to protect pilgrims from sunstroke.

July 12: Tokyo announced the formation of the Japanese Oil Export Company. Delegates will go to Saudi Arabia to sign an agreement with the government. Japan will give the government cash guarantees equivalent to 2 billion yen.

Shaykh Salih Islam was appointed Saudi Minister to Turkey.

July 16: King Sa'ud sent £20,000 sterling to assist refugees of the Iranian earthquake.

July 20: Crown Prince Faysal was released from a New York hospital.

July 21: Trade talks began between the Ministers of Commerce of Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The former Saudi Ambassador to Britain, Shaykh Hafiz Wahbah, stated that Saudi Arabia broke off relations with Britain because of violations of the countries' agreement over Buraimi and Britain's alliance with France and Israel in attacking Egypt.

Aug. 1: General Ma Pu-Fang was appointed Nationalist Chinese Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

Aug. 2: The Ambassador to Syria said that relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria would never be severed so long as "responsible people worked to improve them."

Aug. 6: The Minister of Agriculture was invited to pay an official visit to the U.S.S.R. This is the first Soviet invitation to the Saudi government.

Aug. 7: The government signed a contract with a Belgian company to build an electric railway linking Jiddah to Mecca and 'Arafat. The project will take 5 years to complete and is estimated to cost LE 4 million.

Aug. 10: A Saudi National Reform Front statement published in a Damascus newspaper said that Saudi-Syrian amity will mean little unless Syria and Egypt explain to King Sa'ud the need for reforms.

Aug. 15: Egypt sent another shipment of fighter planes to Saudi Arabia.

Aug. 20: A Saudi Embassy was established in Addis Ababa. 'Umar al-Saqqaf, Director of the Political Dept. of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed Ambassador.

Aug. 22: Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman al-Hulaysi was appointed Ambassador to the Sudan.

The Ambassador to the U.S. signed an agreement with the World Bank, calling for a Saudi subscription of \$10 million.

Saudi Arabia strongly protested the presence of British forces in Buraimi, considering this a violation of the Arbitration Agreement with Britain in 1954 and of international law.

Aug. 30: The Saudi Broadcasting Office in New York reported that Ahmad al-Shuqayri will head the Saudi delegation in the next U.N. General Assembly session.

Aug. 31: The King received the Japanese oil company delegates who arrived in Saudi Arabia to discuss oil trade.

Sept. 7: King Sa'ud arrived in Beirut en route to West Germany for medical treatment. He met with Lebanon President Sham'un and other leaders.

Sept. 21: The Deputy Chief of Protocol for King Sa'ud was barred from the main buildings upon his arrival at the Capetown airport because of South Africa's segregation laws.

Sudan

(See also General, Saudi Arabia)

Aug. 21: The Soviet Union sent a note to Premier 'Abdallah Khalil offering the purchase of crops to help the Sudan "liberate itself from imperialist influence."

Sept. 10: A delegation of present and former executives of the Gezira Tenants' Association left Khartoum for Moscow to attend an agricultural exhibition. At the same time 10 Sudanese students left for Moscow to attend Soviet universities, following a Soviet offer of 12 scholarships to the Sudan.

Sept. 11: The Sudanese delegation to the U.N. was headed by Ya'qub 'Uthman, Permanent Representative of the Sudan in the U.N.

The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Supply announced that the ban on allowing Sudanese goods to be exported to Egypt without import licenses still stood. It was put into force on April 7 following a decision by the Egyptian Ministry of Finance to subject all Sudanese goods to import licenses.

Sept. 17: The Ministry of Finance Under Secretary left for Washington to attend a World Bank meeting. The Sudan became a full member last week.

Syria

(See also General, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine Problem, Saudi Arabia, Turkey)

Aug. 3: The Syrian government said Jordan had threatened to break diplomatic relations and even to use military force unless Syrian newspapers halted a campaign against it, but Syria rejected the ultimatum on the grounds that "the government has no censorship on newspapers."

Aug. 4: Jordan denied having issued the ultimatum and said Syria had distorted what was no more than a firm protest.

Aug. 5: Foreign Minister Salah al-Bitar accused the U.S. of being behind Jordan's "warlike ultimatum," but that Syria and Jordan had settled their differences.

Aug. 6: The Soviet Union promised extensive economic and military aid to Syria as the 2 governments ended two weeks of negotiations in Moscow.

Aug. 7: A delegation headed by Defense Minister Khalid al-'Azam arrived in Prague from Moscow on the invitation of the Czechoslovak government.

Aug. 13: Syria expelled 3 American Embassy officials after accusing the U.S. of having plotted to overthrow President Quwwatli's regime. The 3 were Lieut. Col. Robert Malloy, military attaché; Howard Stone, second secretary for political affairs; and Francis Jetton, vice consul.

Aug. 14: The U.S. retaliated by expelling Syrian Ambassador Farid Zayn al-din and the second secretary, Dr. Yasin Zakariya. The State Department also announced that the U.S. Ambassador to Syria, now in the U.S. would not return to his post in Damascus.

Aug. 15: Col. Ibrahim Husayni, Syrian military attaché in Rome who was accused of participating in an American conspiracy against the government, was recalled to Damascus but was reported as having refused, promising to comply with the order later when sentiments cool and facts are known.

Aug. 16: Col. Husayni declared that Syria was headed "in giant steps" toward a Communist-dominated military dictatorship. He denied that he had been involved in any plot and expressed doubt that any such conspiracy ever existed.

Aug. 17: Col. Husayni said today that he was returning to Syria even though his life might be in danger.

Gen. Afif Bizri was appointed Army Chief of Staff and Brig. Amin Nafuri was named Deputy Chief.

Aug. 18: Thirteen army officers either resigned or were ousted and a number of them fled to Beirut, it was reported.

Aug. 19: The Foreign Minister said the Eisenhower Middle East Doctrine was responsible for Syria's trouble with the U.S.

Aug. 20: An AP dispatch from Lebanon reported that military officers are censoring all dispatches on the Syrian crisis filed by correspondents from Damascus.

A Paris newspaper, *France-Soir*, reported that the Soviet Union would build 8 airfields in Syria before 1960 and 8 more later on.

Gen. Bizri charged that he had been marked for assassination in a plot the U.S. had directed against the Syrian government.

Syria instructed its U.N. delegation to accuse the U.S. before the Security Council of promoting a conspiracy to overthrow President Quwwatli.

Aug. 21: Syria announced officially the arrest of 10 army officers accused of conspiring with the U.S.

Aug. 22: The Defense Minister and the Secretary General of the Foreign Office charged that the Eisenhower administration was putting the brand of communism on Syria as a "propaganda weapon" to push U.S. ambitions in the Middle East.

Aug. 23: No final agreement on the proposed expansion of Soviet aid to Syria and Soviet-Syrian trade has been reached, Syrian officials said.

Aug. 25: President Quwwatli returned from a week-long visit in Egypt with President Nasir. He was met at the airport by the entire Cabinet and ranking officers. He reported "very successful" talks with the Egyptian President.

Gen. Bizri told a radio audience that Zionism and imperialism, not communism, provided the major threat to Syria.

Aug. 28: The Foreign Ministry announced that Nikita Khrushchev and Premier Bulganin would visit Syria before the end of the year.

A team of economic experts left for Moscow to arrange details of a \$140 million Soviet loan to Syria.

Sept. 1: The Minister of National Economy, Khalil Qallas, opened a trade fair in Damascus. He called for a "limitation of economic freedom" to bring Syria in line with "advanced European countries."

Sept. 2: A diplomatic source said the Soviet Union had agreed to provide Syrian airlines with new TU-104 jet airliners.

Sept. 3: Syrian and Egyptian delegations signed an agreement in Damascus to form a joint committee to suggest within 3 months measures for the final economic unification of the 2 countries.

Sept. 7: Syria condemned the arms shipments to Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan, saying that "we will not tolerate any action against our security."

The economic mission returned from Moscow.

Sept. 8: Premier Sabri al-'Asali summoned the Cabinet into emergency session, reportedly to discuss "U.S. aggressive intentions against Syria."

Sept. 9: The government accused the U.S. of sending warships and possibly planes close to Syrian territory in an "open challenge" to the country.

Sept. 10: The Cabinet met in an urgent session.

Sept. 11: Syria sent notes to Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon asking whether they had expressed anxiety to the U.S. over the build-up of arms in Syria.

Premier al-'Asali praised the "hands-off-Syria" warning to the U.S. by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

Sept. 12: Gen. Bizri paid a duty call on the commander of the joint Egyptian-Syrian armed forces in Cairo.

The Asst. Chief of Staff said the Americans had incited Turkey to concentrate a huge army on the Syrian border, ridiculing the explanation that the troops were only on maneuvers.

Sept. 15: Gen. Bizri renewed charges that the U.S. was threatening to attack Syria.

Sept. 16: A cultural delegation arrived in Moscow as guests of the Soviet Society for Foreign Cultural Relations.

Sept. 21: A group led by the Vice President of the Syrian Parliament arrived in Budapest to visit Hungary.

Damascus radio announced an immediate curfew on highway traffic linking Syria's main cities because of "general movements and maneuvers to be carried out by the Syrian Army."

Sept. 22: Gen. Bizri said that he and the Syrian government were willing to talk directly with anyone from the U.S. on American-Syrian relations.

Syrian jet fighters intercepted 2 Lebanese airplanes taking members of a Brazilian Parliamentary delegation to Beirut from Jordan. One airplane was forced to land in Damascus but the other reached Lebanon.

Sept. 23: Syrian authorities released the airplane, explaining the company that had chartered the plane for the Brazilian officials had failed to inform Syria of the plane's flight over Syrian territory.

Sept. 25: King Sa'ud arrived in Damascus on a state visit. Everyone of importance in Syrian affairs was at the airport to greet him.

Sept. 27: King Sa'ud left Syria to return to Saudi Arabia. He promised to help defend Syria in the event of any aggression from any source.

In a policy speech in the General Assembly, Turkey's chief delegate, Seyfullah Esin, accused the Soviet Union of seeking to spoil Syrian-Turkish relations by rumormongering that Turkish troops were poised for attack on Syria's frontier.

Sept. 30: Syrian soldiers seized 2 U.N. border observers and an Israeli army liaison officer near the frontier and took them to Damascus. They were released later in the day.

Ten Syrians, including former President Adib Shishakli and Col. Husayni were ordered court-martialed on charges of plotting with the U.S.

Tunisia

(See also General, Algeria, Libya, Pakistan)

July 5: French Minister for Algeria, Robert Lacoste, outlined plans for sealing the Tunisian frontier against the flow of arms to Algerian nationalists. He said the National Liberation Front was receiving 1,000 rifles and submachine guns monthly from Tunisia.

July 11: French security forces arrested 'Abd al-Majid Chaker, Tunisian political leader, as he stepped off

- the plane in Paris. He was carrying messages from Premier Bourguiba to Ambassador Muhammad Mas-moudi. The French gave no reason for the arrest.
- July 12: France charged M. Chaker with endangering the security of the state in attempting to pass a message to Ahmad ben Bella, Algerian nationalist leader imprisoned in France.
- July 13: A trade agreement between Tunisia and the Soviet Union was signed providing for an exchange to the value of 650 million francs.
- July 20: Prince Salah al-din, third son of the Bey, was jailed on charges of trying to run down a palace guard with his automobile.
- July 22: A meeting of the Constituent Assembly was called for July 25 by the National Committee of the Neo-Destour political party.
- July 23: Tunisia was declared a republic by the National Constituent Assembly, whose legislators unanimously elected Premier Habib Bourguiba as President.
- July 26: President Bourguiba accepted the resignation of the Tunisian Cabinet.
- July 29: The President gave up his title of Premier and announced that all members of his new Cabinet would be Secretaries of State rather than Ministers. The new Cabinet is as follows:

Secretaries of State

Coordination and National Defense—Bahi Ladgham

Foreign Affairs—Sadok Mokkadem

Interior—Tayeb Mehiri

Finance—Hedy Nour

Justice—Ahmad Mestiri

Commerce and Industry—'Izz al-din 'Abbasi

Agriculture—Mustafa Filali

Public Works and Housing—André Barrouche

Post, Telephone and Telegraph—Rachid Driess

Education—Lamine Chabbi

Public Health—Ahmad ben Sala

Labor and Social Affairs—Muhammad Chakroun

Under Secretaries of State

Information—Bechir ben Yahmed

Youth and Sports—Azzou Rebai

Planning—Abdeslem Khani

- Aug. 1: The President, in his first post-republic interview, emphasized that Tunisia is part of the free Western world and will remain so.
- Aug. 2: President Bourguiba warned that if the Algerian guerrilla war continues for another year the nationalists will seek Communist support.
- Aug. 3: All funds and property of the Bey and his immediate family were confiscated. This is remuneration for the total of funds given to the Bey since 1943 beyond the amount provided in the annual civil list.
- Aug. 13: Algerian nationalists were warned by the Tunisian President against launching attacks on the French in Algeria from Tunisian soil.
- Aug. 13: The government announced an intention of issuing its own national currency by the end of the year.

Sept. 1: French troops crossed the Tunisian frontier from Algeria and fought a battle on Tunisian soil, killing at least 7 North Africans. Contradictory details of the incident were given by the 2 countries.

Sept. 3: The French Army admitted that 3 Tunisians were killed in yesterday's battle.

Sept. 6: Another frontier violation by French troops was reported by the Tunisian government.

Sept. 9: The President declared that a "state of emergency" existed in 3 areas along the Tunisian-Algerian border and authorized the local Governors to "take all military and security measures required by the circumstances."

Sept. 10: The government charged the French Army in Algeria with a new frontier violation and the kidnapping of 4 Tunisian civilians.

Sept. 11: President Bourguiba said that Tunisia must purchase arms, if not from the U.S. then from the Communist powers, in order to protect its borders from French "aggression."

Sept. 12: Following a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador, the President assured his countrymen in a radio address that "Tunisia will get arms."

Sept. 14: A government spokesman said that 3 French planes crossed the frontier and dropped bombs on a Tunisian village. French authorities in Algiers said armored vehicles supported by planes and artillery had attacked and scattered a rebel band in Algeria near the border which had fired on a military convoy.

Sept. 15: Secretary of State Bahi Ladgham disclosed that the combined strength of the Army and National Guard was about 6,000 men, but that they have fewer than 3,000 rifles and 15,000 rounds of ammunition.

Sept. 21: The government ordered the suspension of a Tunis Italian-language newspaper and expelled its director. The action followed publication of articles of what the government termed as "likely to harm Italian-Tunisian relations."

Sept. 23: Tunisia's new Ambassador to Egypt announced his government's acceptance of an offer of arms from President Nasir.

Sept. 24: Italy offered to sell arms and ammunition to Tunisia.

The Tunisian Embassy in Washington denied that the acceptance of arms offered by Egypt foreshadowed any change in Tunisia's relations with the U.S.

Sept. 25: The U.S. announced tonight that it will not supply Tunisia with arms directly, but will instead act as broker with friendly European countries to help equip the country with its needs.

Sept. 26: President Bourguiba announced that "Western" arms shipments would reach Tunisia during October and said he hoped that France would not waste time and effort in opposing the deliveries.

Turkey

(See also General, Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Syria)

July 2: Osman Bolukbashi, party leader of the Republic

can Nations was arrested on a charge of "insulting the Grand National Assembly."

July 19: Turkey announced that a French engineering and construction firm will build a suspension bridge across the Bosphorus, linking Europe and Asia. The final contract, to be signed in 3 months, calls for the bridge to be finished within 4 years at an estimated cost of \$30 million.

July 25: Fifteen persons were killed and 12 others injured when a plane exploded in midair and crashed over a residential section of Bursa. It was one of 4 jets flying in formation from the air base at Balikesir.

Aug. 9: Premier Adnan Menderes ended a 4-day 650-mile tour of the Black Sea area of Turkey.

Aug. 20: The Izmir International Trade Fair opened.

Aug. 21: King Faysal of Iraq, vacationing in Turkey, conferred with government officials on the developments in Syria.

Aug. 22: The 3 major opposition parties to the Democratic party agreed to present a united front in the national elections.

Aug. 30: A Soviet trade mission negotiating in Ankara left for Istanbul for talks with bankers about Turkey's industrial needs.

Sept. 2: The Grand National Assembly reconvened after the summer vacation.

Sept. 3: Government radio broadcasts emphasized Turkey's position that partitioning of the island was the only solution to the problem of Cyprus.

The Soviet Union Teknoexport Company signed an agreement to build a caustic soda and calcium plant in Turkey.

Sept. 4: The Council of Ministers decided to hold elections in October instead of the usual time in May.

A Czechoslovak trade mission arrived in Ankara.

Preliminary agreements for a 1,000-mile oil pipeline from Qum, Iran, to Iskenderun, Turkey's southernmost port, were reached by the 2 countries.

Sept. 5: Syrian Parliamentary Deputy Leon Mazarian asked for political asylum in Turkey.

Sept. 6: Two Parliament Deputies resigned from the Democratic party. They both had opposed policies of the party, including the passage of restrictive press and political meetings laws.

Sept. 7: A bill was introduced in the Assembly calling for a parliamentary investigation to determine whether the Minister of the Interior was derelict in his duty in connection with anti-Greek riots in Turkey 2 years ago.

Sept. 11: A flash flood in suburban Ankara sent a 10-

foot wall of water rushing to the Bent River. There were 14 known dead, with estimates reaching much higher.

The Democratic-controlled Parliament revised the election law to prevent 3 opposition parties from offering a united slate in the elections of Oct. 27.

The Foreign Ministry denied a Soviet statement that Turkish troops were massing along the Syrian border.

Sept. 13: Two Soviet attachés in Istanbul were accused of espionage activities and were asked to leave the country within 48 hours.

Sept. 14: The Defense Ministry denied that Turkey was an "aggressive force," saying that some foreign powers had been spreading false rumors "to promote their provocative and insincere aims."

Turkey sent assurances to Syria that its army was not poised for attack.

Sept. 18: A newspaper correspondent reported a visit near the western end of the Turkish-Syrian border which revealed that parts of 3 army corps were participating in Turkey's troop maneuvers. Military men said the maneuvers were purely a precautionary measure.

Sept. 22: The Freedom party and the Republican National party refused to go along with a plan proposed by the People's Republican party to circumvent changes in the election law, designed to block a united opposition.

Yemen

(See also General)

Aug. 3: Britain rejected a new protest from Yemen that the Royal Air Force was "continuing aggression."

Aug. 8: British sources reported the arrival in Yemen of six shiploads of Soviet arms, including tanks, anti-aircraft and ground attack aircraft.

Aug. 12: The Yemen Legation in London charged that the Yemeni post of Shukair was attacked by the RAF with bombs and incendiary rockets.

Aug. 13: Britain announced another Soviet shipment of arms unloading at a Yemeni port.

Aug. 19: The Yemen Minister in Cairo said that continued British aggressive acts against Yemen "may turn the present war into a major war."

Aug. 28: Yemen accused Britain of attacking its forces with a new type of bomb that gave off a fatal smoke. Britain denied the charge, saying only fragmentation bombs were used.

Sept. 16: Yemen accused British forces of continuing aggression with bombings and small arms attacks.

DOCUMENT

CLEARANCE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

A/3719

1 November 1957

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

INTRODUCTION

1. Following the approval by the General Assembly of the Secretary-General's report dated 20 November 1956 on arrangements for clearing the Suez Canal (A/3376), and the adoption on 24 November 1956 of resolution 1121 (XI) authorizing him on the basis of that report to proceed with practical arrangements and negotiation of agreements for the speedy and effective clearance of the Suez Canal, the Secretary-General appointed Lieutenant-General Raymond A. Wheeler, Engineering Consultant to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as his Special Representative in charge of Technical Operations. The Secretary-General announced also that he had secured the collaboration of Mr. John J. McCloy, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chase Manhattan Bank and former President of the International Bank, to assist him in an advisory capacity on the business negotiations connected with the project.

2. General Wheeler was released on loan to the United Nations by the President of the International Bank on 26 November 1956, on which date he assumed his duties at Headquarters. Also provided on loan from the International Bank was Mr. John Connors, to serve as General Wheeler's deputy in charge of technical operations. The Dutch and Danish consortium of salvage engineers, comprising the firms of L. Smit and Co.'s *International Sleep-dienst* of Rotterdam and Messrs. Em.Z. Svitzers of Copenhagen, with which the Secretary-General had entered into preliminary arrangements in early November for a first concentration of salvage craft, crews and equipment to undertake the operation, were requested on the same date, 26 November, to dispatch craft and equipment, already assembled, to the Suez Canal area.

3. On 4 December 1956, General Wheeler left Headquarters to engage in technical consultations with Egyptian authorities in Cairo. These discussions began on 8 December and resulted in agreement for the conduct of an immediate technical survey by the United Nations of obstructions in the Canal, in the first place south of Port Said; a few days later this survey was extended to cover the damaged base workshops in Port Fouad. Consultations between General Wheeler and the Commander of the Anglo/French fleet took place concerning salvage

operations conducted by Anglo/French salvage units in the Port Said harbour.

4. The basis of the understandings upon which the operational relationship between the United Nations and the Government of Egypt was premised was agreed in general terms during General Wheeler's initial discussions. These understandings, as subsequently formalized between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Egyptian Foreign Office, were confirmed in an exchange of letters dated 3 January 1957 between the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary-General. The text of these letters was circulated as an annex to the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, dated 10 January 1957 (A/3492, annex II).

5. On 14 November 1956, the Egyptian Government had announced the existence of mines in the approaches to the Suez Canal. During his planning conversations in Egypt, General Wheeler was informed that further mines and explosive charges had been laid in the Canal south of El Cap. The withdrawal of the Anglo/French fleet was completed on 22 December 1956. On 27 December, negotiations were finalized concerning the agreed disposition of the Anglo/French salvage units retained after the withdrawal. On 30 December, General Wheeler received satisfactory assurances concerning the final removal of explosives from Canal waters so as to enable him to move United Nations salvage crews and vessels safely in Canal waters south of El Cap. The United Nations salvage operation proper commenced on 31 December 1956, although work was resumed by some Anglo/French salvage vessels in Port Said on 29 December and three United Nations salvage vessels were piloted by Egyptian naval craft through mine fields in the southern end of the Canal and began operations there on 28 December.

THE CLEARANCE OPERATION

Plan of operations

23. The plan of operations provided for the clearance of obstructions from channels and ports and harbourages with priority given to the speedy opening of a temporary channel to permit the earliest possible passage of vessels of limited draft and the release from the Canal of transit vessels which had been marooned at the time of its

closure. The plan took into account also the necessity for the rehabilitation of workshop installations to provide: maintenance facilities for operational craft and equipment to the extent necessary for transit operations; the restoration of the inoperative navigational lighting system; repairs to the damaged telecommunications system; the assurance that dredging services would be adequate to provide uninterrupted and safe passage; and the availability of operational craft for the handling of convoys.

Scope and execution of the operation

24. It was established by on-the-spot surveys that forty-two obstructions of a significant character existed in the Canal proper.

25. Of these, two had been refloated and four completely and one partially removed from shipping channels in Port Said by Anglo/French salvage units prior to the assumption of responsibility for the operations by the United Nations. Subsequent to this assumption of responsibility, one further vessel and a sunken crane jib were removed from the channel by British vessels and one tug was shifted to shallow waters by a French vessel and was subsequently refloated by units of the United Nations fleet.

26. Two obstructions were moved by the Egyptian Canal Authority without United Nations assistance, and the wreck of one vessel which had been grounded for six years in the shallows of the eastern harbour of Port Said was found not to constitute an obstruction to shipping and was therefore not included in the United Nations salvage objective.

27. Thirty-two obstructions, including the collapsed spans of the El Firdan bridge, were lifted and removed from the channels by the United Nations fleet.

28. Anglo-French salvage resources had, prior to 22 December 1956, moved five wrecks from the western channel in Port Said harbour in order to provide a limited passage through that harbour for ships of 25 foot draft. The United Nations plan conceived of the removal by early March 1957 of such further obstructions within the channel south of Port Said as would be required to provide passage throughout the length of the Canal for ships of similar limited draft. The plan provided further for the removal by mid-May of remaining obstructions in Port Said and in the southern reaches of the shipping channel proper in order to provide through transit for ships of maximum draft. The final phase of the work, which was estimated to require some weeks beyond the mid-May date, envisaged the clearance of all remaining obstructions from ports and harbourages. Sufficient elasticity within the operating plan was developed to permit work to be executed concurrently where this could be achieved economically and without prejudice to the earliest possible reopening of the waterway to limited draft vessels as a first target objective.

29. A governing factor in the execution of the early phase of the work was the time required for the removal of the cement-laden blockship "Akka" at km. 81.4 and the concurrent removal, *inter alia*, of the tug

"Edgar Bonnet" at km. 74.2 and the frigate "Abukir" at km. 160.7. Although the general designated programme was finished several weeks ahead of schedule in the southern reaches, a first limited channel was not opened within the planned time-limit because of the notification by Egyptian authorities of the existence of explosives aboard the two latter vessels. The blockship "Akka" was removed from the channel on 14 February 1957, but clearance to proceed with work on the "Edgar Bonnet" was given by Egyptian authorities only on 12 March. Explosive charges on the "Abukir" were found to be largely inaccessible for underwater removal and the attempt was ultimately abandoned and salvage work resumed by United Nations crews on the vessel on 22 March. It was finally raised and the remaining explosives removed on the surface on 8 April.

30. Notwithstanding, however, the fact that the above delays prevented the opening to shipping of a first limited channel in early March, as would otherwise have been achieved, the delays in effect aided in an earlier completion of the over-all clearance operation. Some slowing down of the final salvage work would have been inevitable had it had to be conducted concurrently with the passage of vessels in transit through the first limited channel. The impossibility of such passage in these circumstances, in fact, enabled the residual work to proceed unhampered, and the final clearance of the Canal in all its stages, including the opening of ports and harbourages, was completed on 10 April, some weeks earlier than had originally been predicted for the full clearance of the main shipping channel only.

Rehabilitation of workshops

31. A survey disclosed that, of the maintenance workshops required for efficient Canal operation, those in Port Tewfik and Ismailia were undamaged, although substantial damage had occurred in the main workshops at Port Fouad. Technical assessments indicated that the bulk of the damage could be made good by a first restoration of some of the sections of the shops which, in turn, could provide the means for the rehabilitation of the remaining sections. Accordingly, a plan was agreed between General Wheeler and the Egyptian Canal Authority whereby the latter undertook the work of restoration, with the United Nations providing some limited advisory assistance and the replacement of essential non-repairable machine tools and equipment. Under this plan, the workshops were reinstated by the Egyptian Canal Authority to an estimated over-all efficiency close to normal at the date of resumption of traffic through the Canal.

Restoration of navigational lighting

32. The navigational lighting system was found to be out of commission mainly as the result of the destruction of the central gas-producing plant servicing the system from Ismailia. This plant was out-dated and its replacement by a similar system was not considered to be either economical or possible within the target schedule for the resumption of through transit. As an interim and

temporary measure, therefore, General Wheeler arranged with the Egyptian Canal Authority that it should adapt the system to the use of locally produced butane gas, a limited quantity of essential material being provided by the United Nations. This measure, while neither permanently reliable nor entirely satisfactory, was considered, after tests, to suffice for short-term needs, pending the conversion of the lighting buoys to the use of an alternative permanent electric system of operation; this is currently being undertaken in the Egyptian Canal Authority's workshops, material furnished by the United Nations being utilized.

Repairs to telecommunications system

33. Considerable damage to the overland and radio-telecommunications system necessary to the operation of the Canal was disclosed. Technical consultants were furnished by the United Nations to advise on the restoration of this system. The rehabilitation of the overland communication system was undertaken and completed by the Egyptian Canal Authority from its own resources. Destroyed radio-telephonic equipment was replaced by the United Nations and was installed by the Egyptian Canal Authority, with advisory assistance furnished by the United Nations.

Dredging

34. Prior to the closure of the Canal in October 1956, maintenance dredging needs had been met both by equipment operated by the Egyptian Canal Authority and by external contractors. Approximately 3,600,000 cubic metres of deposits had to be removed annually to maintain the proper depth of the waterway. Of the two suction dredgers and nine bucket dredgers operated by the Authority, seven had been sunk or damaged and were still unavailable for use at the time of completion of the clearance operation. The remaining operative dredgers, together with two small dredgers working under contract to the Canal Authority, had resumed operations.

35. Under the terms of reference for the United Nations operation, the Organization had an active interest in steps to be taken for the removal of silt, thus restoring the Canal to its full capacity. A comparison of hydrological surveys conducted just before the closure of the Canal and at the time of its reopening indicated an accumulation of 500,000 cubic metres of silt. Transit channels were sufficiently cleared for the safe passage of vessels of up to 33-foot draft, but this situation had to be related to the normal increase in the siltage rate which would occur once transit passage was resumed. While the Egyptian Canal Authority embarked upon steps to maintain uninterrupted through transit at the level obtaining at the time of the reopening of the Canal, it was to be expected that some time must elapse before fully adequate arrangements could be completed for the restoration of dredging services and the gradual replacement of lost equipment. Consequently, there remained a problem of concern to the United Nations. There has been a full sharing of views between the Egyptian Canal Authority and the United Nations on this matter and

the Secretary-General, at the invitation of the Government of Egypt, has continued to maintain contact with the Canal Authority.

Rehabilitation of floating equipment

36. The resumption of safe and continuous passage required sufficient operating craft and equipment in addition to adequate facilities for dredging maintenance. In addition to the loss of dredgers already referred to, important items of operating equipment totally lost or semi-permanently damaged included, *inter alia*, one of two rockbreakers, the only two available lifting craft, three large floating cranes, four out of seven hoppers and a floating dock. Further, twelve out of fourteen salvage and harbour tugs of adequate horsepower rating for the servicing of transit convoys, as well as one workshop tug, were sunk. A small proportion of the damaged equipment was restored and all of the sunken tugs were refloated.

37. While it was at first considered probable that the temporary hire of some tugs on an appropriate basis would be required to ensure first transit facilities, the rapid restoration of the Port Fouad workshops enable the Egyptian Canal Authority to undertake from its own resources the repair and rehabilitation of many of the essentially needed tugs as they were refloated. Extensive replacement of equipment would prove essential to ensure continuing operational and maintenance needs. However, rehabilitation work had progressed sufficiently by the date of the reopening of the Canal in April to supplement undamaged operational craft and ensure that minimum needs for the full resumption of traffic would be met. In these circumstances, no necessity arose for continuing consideration on the part of the Secretary-General of the emergency provisions of such operational equipment by the United Nations.

FINANCING THE OPERATION

Loan contributions received

38. By a letter dated 25 December 1956, the Secretary-General invited Member nations to make available to him contributions by way of an advance of funds toward the discharge of his responsibilities in connection with the Canal clearance operation.

39. In response, loan contributions were received as follows:

Country	Approximate equivalent in US \$
Canada	1,044,045.68
Sweden	772,201.00
Liberia	4,000.00
Ceylon	3,733.49
Australia	1,000,000.00
Federal Republic of Germany	1,000,000.00
United States of America	5,000,000.00
Italy	399,525.68

Norway	1,000,000.00
Denmark	500,000.00
Netherlands	503,947.37
Total	11,227,453.22

The advances were deposited with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which acted as fiscal agent for the United Nations for this purpose.

40. Services and supplies, valued at \$500,000 on a comparable basis for similar services and supplies provided under United Nations commercial contractual standards, were commissioned by the United Nations subsequent to its assumption of responsibility for the operation, from resources made available by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France.

EXPENDITURES INCURRED

41. The following summary reflects the limit of expenditures and obligations incurred by the United Nations:

Administrative and general expenses of the United Nations	\$ 357,093.57
Operating costs of United Nations contractors	6,306,368.63
Survey and rehabilitation costs of Canal base workshops, the navigational light-	

ing system and the telecommunications system

962,580.67

Reimbursement for services and supplies provided by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France at the request of the United Nations

500,000.00

Contribution to essential dredging services

250,000.00

Total \$3,76,042.87

PROPOSAL FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF THE COSTS OF THE OPERATION

42. After consideration of various possible alternatives for meeting the costs of the operation as reflected in paragraph 41 above, the Secretary-General would recommend that, subject to reduction by such resources as might become otherwise available, repayment to contributor countries be effected by means of the application of a surcharge on Canal traffic under which arrangement a levy of 3 per cent on Canal tolls would be paid into a special United Nations account, the procedures to govern such payments to be negotiated with the Egyptian Government and with the other parties to the payments. On the basis of the current level of Canal traffic, it can be estimated that by this method the costs would be reimbursed over a period of about three years.

BOOK REVIEWS

GENERAL

ISLAM IN MODERN HISTORY, by Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. 308 pages; index to 317. \$6.00.

Reviewed by Edward J. Jurji

Whoever writes on the crucial issues of Islam these days is likely to attract initial interest. Whether what he offers contributes to knowledge and understanding or not, whether it engenders mutual respect, succeeds in transforming attitudes and elicits a measure of goodwill improving the course of events, these are entirely different matters. At any rate, an ever-growing literary output notable for the dearth of really first-rate titles is reasonable ground for concern. The trouble has been that a specialist must, after all, seek (in the writing of books) an outlet for pet theories and accumulative research. A casual observer innocent of hard-won knowledge of the subject is ever tempted to try his hand at producing what might intrigue an unsuspecting audience. Between these two extremes varieties of motivation have netted seemingly inexhaustible bids for a place in the sun by aspiring writers on this most critical of topics.

Let it at once be emphasized that Professor Smith's book is not subject to the foregoing strictures. His is not merely another volume destined for a quiet place on the shelf. What have we here, it may well be asked, that is unlike anything in print and therefore of real significance?

To begin with, Wilfred Cantwell Smith has persevered long and assiduously in the preparation of his task. His great competence in Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and Urdu, and in the far from easy to master heritage of Islam, are but part of his qualifications; added to these are a keen mind and versatility in English prose, together the making of a discerning scholar.

The table of contents reveals skill, prudence, and creativity of structure. Two introductory chapters, on Islam in history and in recent

times, lead off to full discussion of such major themes as this: an understanding of Islam as a requisite insight to an appreciation of what is happening in contemporary Muslim society. The Arab problem is next interpreted as an Islamic crisis; reformation is the clue to Turkey's revolution; the formation of an Islamic state marks the rather turbulent decade of Pakistan; as for India's Muslims theirs is largely explained as an involvement in a larger Hindu ethos. The remaining two chapters barely touch upon such other areas as Indonesia, Islam in the USSR, China, and Negro Africa, and then bring the argument to a conclusion.

There is depth of reflection in much of the text: A true Muslim is not a man who believes in Islam—especially Islam in history, but one who believes in God and is committed to the revelation through the Prophet. Paradoxically, however, Islam is the business of modern Muslims. It is profoundly true, furthermore, that the problems of the Muslim world cannot be adequately met unless men have an intellectual honesty, self-critical humility, and some kind of an effective faith.

As for Arab Islam, the author agrees with Professor H. A. R. Gibb that the future rests where it has rested in the past—on the orthodox ulema. Critical references to *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* include the shrewd observation that their published literature shows no grappling with the intricate responsibilities of modernity and their lack of trained experts must be first admitted before it can be in principle remedied. Actually the new Islamic upsurge is a force not to solve problems but to intoxicate those who cannot longer abide the failure to solve them.

In the course of the "survey" (as the author refers to his work, p. 297), other views and judgments are expressed: even a religion, he warns, can make no standstill agreement with history. Hence Pakistan's violent decision to set up an Islamic state has proved largely futile. Such a failure stems from the bifurcation between the religious tradition and modernity, each going its separate way. In the latter coun-

try Muslims are more conscious of what they are not than of what they are.

Less persuasive perhaps are certain other generalizations: Western writing on the Arabs, as on Islam, is according to the author customarily read by modern Arabs and duly appraised, not in terms of whether its statements are accurate or its contribution illuminating but whether they are laudatory or adverse. Elsewhere one reads that Islamic apologetics miss the heart of religion. Yet the book stands on no explicit position regarding religion. It is precisely at such culminating points of philosophical and theological mystery that the author betrays short breath. To stand outside one's tradition is a matter of the utmost delicacy and toughness, tougher by far if the light is hid under a bushel.

In short, this makes an impressive interim report, incorporating the author's earlier researches and the results of his doctoral dissertation. Although the book bears a 1957 copyright the bulk of its content is pre-Suez! Errors notwithstanding, the volume raises cardinal questions and is distinguished by penetrating insight and elevation. What will Muslims do with their tradition? Will they commit themselves to a narrow loyalty or will they find in their faith the inspiration to be and become? In all that there is nothing irreverent in noting, as does Professor Smith, that the future of Muslim peoples' faith has still to be determined. For them he seems to covet nothing more than modernity, without acids, we trust.

◆ EDWARD J. JURJI is Professor of Islamics and Comparative Religion at the Princeton Theological Seminary.

ISLAM AND THE WEST: PROCEEDINGS OF THE HARVARD SUMMER SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, July 25-27, 1955, ed. by Richard N. Frye. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1956 (Distributed in the U.S. by Gregory Lounz). 215 pages. \$5.00.

Reviewed by Wilfred Cantwell Smith

Ten years ago there was a complaint that students of Islam ignored the present day, while students of the modern Muslim world—mostly social scientists—ignored or did not substantially understand Islam. The complaint has proven effective, in that today questions of con-

temporary Islamic development and its role in contemporary Muslim development are receiving serious and competent attention. The present volume well illustrates the point that some of the ablest established Islamic scholars are bringing their classical preparation to bear upon the modern period, while some of the young men taking up modern "Near Eastern" studies are devoting themselves to the religious aspect.

The present work is a symposium of material, a little of it radically reworked, originally given at a 1955 Summer School conference at Harvard. The title of the conference was "Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey—an Islamic Renaissance," which on further consideration was wisely regarded as not quite appropriate, though the new title is still inadequate. One of the things that Westerners have to learn, and that a book like this may help to teach, is that the West is not the basic factor in current Islamic processes, though of course it is a major irritant.

The opening section is on Muslim nationalism, by von Grunebaum (late of Chicago) and is of the quality that one has learned to expect from his erudite and penetrating mind. It is an example of how a satisfactory portrayal of nationalism among Muslims can be had only from an observer whose grasp of classical Islam is thorough. To be fruitful, however, this needs supplementing by a wide reading of modern Muslim literature, to which von Grunebaum has, fortunately for us, been latterly devoting much time.

Symposia are notoriously uneven; but half of this book consists of its section on "Turkey," whose three articles are, quite simply, excellent. In the first Niyazi Berkes of McGill breaks quite new ground by tracing secularism back in Turkish development for two centuries before the Kemalist revolution culminated the process in a decision of secularization and westernization that Berkes calls "inevitable, given the way in which Turkish history has been developing" (p.42). Next, for the 20th century Dankwart Rustow of Princeton traces the position of Islam in the Turkish revolution, during the Kemalist regime, and in the recent "revival," with a broad documentation and clear, sympathetic analysis. His study brings together

and surpasses, as well as providing background for, the considerable amount of study that has been done lately on this last question. Finally Howard Reed of Beirut gives a masterly presentation of "The Religious Life of Modern Turkish Muslims" that is bibliographically rich, painstakingly comprehensive, and imaginatively descriptive. This section brings the study of the modern history of Islam, so far as this one nation is concerned, to a quite new level—and to a level that has no counterpart yet for other Muslim areas.

These valuable articles on Turkey "make" the book, give it its chief significance. However, there is more. An apologetic article on 'Abduh by 'Uthman Amin of Cairo adds virtually nothing to what was previously known on this figure, for instance from Amin's earlier writings; and a sermon on Islam, presented under the caption of "Religion and Government in Pakistan," by Zafrullah Khan of the World Court, raises various questions. The problem of intercommunication between Muslims and the West is still unsolved; the West's willingness to listen, as here, is a great step forward but is not in itself enough.

Kenneth Cragg of Hartford (now of Jerusalem) contributes a knowledgeable and sensitive study of "The Modernist Movement in Egypt," in which he asks what that movement has tried to do, and shows that the answer is not a reconsideration of theological or intellectual matters, as outsiders expect, but a demonstration of a practical adequacy of Islam to today's concrete problems. The editor, finally, has a paper on Iran, which effectively stresses the uniqueness of that Muslim country among its Near Eastern neighbors, touches on the intellectual and spiritual problems of Irani modernizers, and ends with a moving plea for the need for (a reformed) Islam, asserting that Islam stands for the dignity and worth of man and that Iran clearly needs its inspiration. Unfortunately his Irani commentator, Kazimzadeh of Harvard, feels that Islam has too patently failed to meet modern needs for a reformation or revival to be likely "It has already been displaced, not by a new system of values, but by intellectual and moral chaos" (p. 97).

The book is without index: can we not have a law against this? Apparently under European pressure, the editor has preserved the integrity (he phrases it, "has refrained from correcting the style . . ." (p. 57) of the various articles, but one wonders who is responsible for the consistent misspelling of Azhār (for Azhar).

♦ WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH is Director of the Institute for Islamic Studies at McGill University and author of the recent *Islam in Modern History*.

ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND THE WEST, VOL. I: ISLAMIC SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, PART II, by H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. 285 pages. 35s.

Reviewed by Roderic H. Davison

With this long-awaited volume the authors' survey of Islamic society before the impact of western thought and institutions set in has been completed. As readers of Part I (reviewed in the *Middle East Journal*, vol. 5, no. 1, Winter 1951) will recall, the area covered is not the entire Muslim world, but Turkey and the Arab states; and actually there is little mention of Arabia, or of North Africa apart from Egypt. For such limitations both the scope of the task and the availability of sources offer good reasons. Even so circumscribed, the survey is a big job.

The authors' aim has been to describe Islamic society accurately and in sufficient detail so that the effect of changes in the 19th and 20th centuries can be more clearly gauged in subsequent volumes of the planned work. The date chosen for the survey is the period 1739-1767 when Western Europe was taken up with two major wars but the Ottoman Empire was left at peace. This, it is true, is after the first thin trickle of western influences began to enter the Empire—the report of Yirmisekiz Mehmed Çelebi, a Turkish press, military advisors—but it is a logical point of survey because there was as yet no substantial western impact on Ottoman institutions. The authors' cross-section of the Empire at mid-century avoids leaving the erroneous impression that here was a static society waiting to be moved by western impulses. Their survey shows rather a constantly changing society. Al-

though they are concerned with the mid-eighteenth century, they trace the origins and background of the institutions they describe from early Ottoman or early Islamic times. In the eighteenth century this process of development was not arrested, though it was often in a downward direction as corruption or intellectual and moral debasement affected various of the institutions described.

Part I of the survey had dealt primarily with the civil and military aspects of the Ottoman government, in the capital and in the provinces. In Part II a lengthy chapter on taxation and finance, which deals with the sources of revenue, treasury organization, tax-farming, coinage and its debasement, is added to the treatment of governmental institutions; this chapter bears also on the descriptions in Part I of the peasantry and land tenure and of industry and commerce. Part I also contained a brief statement on the relation of Islamic law to the Ottoman state. Part II now returns to the religious theme in detail, examining in successive chapters the ulema—their jobs, ranks, corruption; the law, the cadis and muftis; education in the mekteb and medrese; the nature and administration of the *evkaf*, or religious endowments; the dervish orders and their influence; and the status of the non-Muslim "peoples of the book"—Greeks, Armenians, Jews and splinter groups.

What the authors have done with these topics is to derive from a range of sources in Turkish, Arabic, and western languages (bibliography, pp. 263-271, as well as copious footnotes) a meticulous description of each institution and its component part and workings. They have wisely not attempted to use Ottoman central or local archives. Some decades and many monographs hence their survey can be reassessed against the products of archival research, though it seems unlikely that the main lines of their description will be altered. Meanwhile they have been able to use for Part II some of the products of recent Turkish scholarship. They have evidently not attempted to use the product of Yugoslav research in Ottoman archives as well.

The end result is a good picture of the structure of Ottoman political, religious, economic,

and social institutions. It is not a social history, as that term is often understood. One will not find here how a pasha spent his day, an investigation of mechanical contrivances, what music was popular with the peasant, how one actually got business done at the Sublime Porte. Nor is there a full account of literary culture. This is, in other words, not another Lane, another "manners and customs" against which to measure the westernization of modes and mores. It is a broad base to use in measuring changes in the institutional structure of a society.

As such this study will be extremely welcome to all students of the Turkish and Arab worlds. The careful, detailed, concise descriptions of Ottoman institutions give a firmer footing for investigations of the modern period than we have had heretofore. Readers will also be grateful that the authors have disregarded their own prefatory admonition that "any generalizations would be premature." Part II produces quite a few generalizations, sometimes arguable, often very perceptive, and always germane to the subject and data at hand.

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SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE EAST, 1920-1927: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, by Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert C. North; SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE WEST, 1920-1927: A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, by Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Harold H. Fisher. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957 (2 vols.). Volume I: 478 pages. \$10.00. Volume II: 450 pages. \$10.00.

Reviewed by Ivar Spector

These two volumes are a timely and valuable contribution to the field of Soviet diplomacy. They will constitute a standard reference work for students and scholars probing Soviet relations with Asia and Europe in the crucial years subsequent to the Bolshevik Revolution. The material, which is arranged chronologically and topically, will likewise serve as an indispensable guide to the rich resources of the Hoover Library. The documents and documentary excerpts assembled in these volumes, most of which are now available in English for the first time, will undoubtedly lead to a revaluation and

reinterpretation of the issues uppermost during this period.

The bulk of the two volumes deals with Europe and the Far East. Only about 200 pages have been devoted to the Near and Middle East. It is natural, however, that the collection should begin with the Middle East, since Bolshevik Russia, which was on the defensive in Europe and the Far East during the early post-revolutionary years, was on the offensive in the Muslim World of the Near and Middle East. Of the two volumes, the one dealing with Soviet relations with the West appears to be the better organized and edited. In general, although a real contribution has been made to the less well-known field of Soviet-Muslim relations in the Middle East, the editors of this documentary survey are more at home in handling sources pertaining to Europe and the Far East.

Since the bulk of the documentary material in these volumes is abridged and frequently "surveyed," it will not altogether relieve the scholar from the responsibility of consulting the original sources. A striking example of the limited value of excerpts is to be found in the brief quotation from K. M. Troianovsky's *Vostok i Revoliutsiia* (p. 92) which omits the pertinent reference to Persia as "the Suez Canal of the Revolution," as important to the revolutionists as Suez to the imperialists. Scholars without access to Russian sources would have profited from a translation in full of page 47 of the Troianovsky work.

The variety of Soviet sources represented in these volumes surpasses that of an earlier publication, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, edited by Jane Degras. Whereas the latter contains mainly unabridged formal documents, *Soviet Russia and the East* also includes editorials and articles from *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, excerpts from Soviet periodicals, such as *Novyi Vostok*, *Zbizi Natsionalnostei*, *Revoliutsionnyi Vostok*, etc., as well as passages from early and now rare Soviet pamphlets and books. Although the bulk of the material is translated from the Russian, occasional items have been gleaned from Japanese, Turkish, and other sources. Where it has been possible to compare the two translations (Degras and Eudin-North) with the Russian

text, the Degras version appears closer to the original. In diplomatic correspondence, where interpretations may depend on the choice of a single word, it is sometimes disturbing to discover "free" translations which aim to preserve only the spirit and ignore altogether the letter. A typical instance is afforded by the translation of some passages of Kemal Pasha's telegram of November 29, 1920, to the Soviet Government. (see pp. 187-88; also p. 110).

In spite of the richness of the materials assembled here, there are some surprising omissions. For instance, the Comintern summons to the Baku Congress, "The Communist International to the Enslaved Peoples of Persia, Armenia, and Turkey," should merit more than a passing reference in a work of this kind. It is likewise regrettable that nothing was culled from Yu. Steklov's article "Turetskaya Revoliutsiia" (*Izvestia*, April 23, 1919) which, as an expression of official opinion must have aggravated Turkish suspicion of Soviet sincerity in regard to the abandonment of Tsarist designs on the Straits. Further evidence that the Soviet Government, in spite of its magnanimous gestures, still coveted Constantinople is to be found in M. Pavlovitch's *Revoliutsionnaya Turtsiia* (Moscow, 1921), also overlooked although there are numerous quotations from this and other writings of Pavlovitch, then editor of *Novyi Vostok*. Although there is an excerpt from the Turkish press (pp. 110-111) of the memoirs of Gen. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, first nationalist Turkish ambassador to Moscow, the 3-volume collection of his memoirs, especially Volume II, *Moskova Hatıraları* (Istanbul, 1955) should have been included at least in the bibliography.

The explanatory comment on the documents, which amounts to a running narrative coordinating and integrating the translations, reflects credit on the editors and reveals their fine grasp of the field. Both volumes include useful chronological tables, extensive bibliographies, and indices. The volume devoted to Soviet relations with the East has in addition several pages of biographical notes.

Attention is called to a discrepancy in dating the "Appeal of the Council of People's Com-

missars to the Muslims of Russia and the East." In the Chronology (p. 397) it is dated November 20, 1917, as in some recent Soviet publications. In the text however (p. 92), it is dated December 7, as in Kluchnikov and Sabanin (II, p. 94).

The above limitations are by no means intended to detract from the outstanding contribution made by the editors of the two volumes. The appearance of these documentary surveys will whet the appetites of scholars for a more complete translation of Soviet and early Comintern materials pertaining to foreign policy and for the extension of the present survey beyond 1927.

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TURKISM AND THE SOVIETS, by Charles Warren Hostler. New York: Praeger, 1957. 244 pages. \$7.00.

Reviewed by Włodzimierz Baczkowski

This thought-provoking and timely book deals with the national problems and political aspirations of the Turkic-speaking peoples and tribes who live in the vast regions of Russian and Chinese Turkestan, the Caucasus, the Middle Volga, the Turkish Republic itself, northern Iran, western Afghanistan, etc. The Republic of Turkey is the main cultural and political center of this immense Turkic-speaking world of over 54 million persons, which is roughly divided into two parts: the Turks living within the borders of the Soviet Bloc, and an equal number in the Free World, mainly in Turkey.

The Turkic-speaking populations of the USSR and China live under subjugation with constant pressure of Russification and colonization; yet they cherish hopes of liberation from Communist rule. It is particularly opportune that the facts on the Turkish peoples within Soviet Russia are revealed at this time in this book, when the Soviets are driving to win the confidence of the Asian peoples and eliminate Western influences.

Besides its timeliness and significance, the permanent value of this book rests in its rich and basic material about the Turkish world,

here collected and synthesized for the first time since 1920. The author is well-prepared to write such a study since he has lived for more than seven years in Turkey, the Balkans, and in the Arab States. There he had the opportunity to meet and discuss the problems of the area with prominent Turkish scholars, politicians, and emigrés from the Soviet Muslim republics. Colonel Hostler is not only a career officer in the U.S. Air Force, but also a scholar and linguist with four university degrees.

In the course of his researches the author collected many little-known sources, such as the indispensable British *Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism*, and such Soviet publications as Arsharuni and Gabidillin's *Outlines of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russia*. Perhaps the most valuable is the exploitation of the important sources connected with the Promethean League, which is practically unknown to Western researchers. This movement was supported by the pre-war Polish government and united the independence efforts of national committees and governments-in-exile representing the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Empire from 1926 to 1939. The Turkic-speaking peoples of the USSR formed an important section of the Promethean League and this book makes good use of their publications.

Basically the book is in two parts. The first part is a "Handbook of the Turks of the World," describing the national and tribal traits, linguistic differences, and cultural characteristics of the Turkic-speaking peoples. Although this part of the book is based on descriptive material, it is very important in furnishing a concise and hitherto unavailable analysis of the dispersed Turks of the world.

The second part deals with the origin and development of Turkish nationalism, Pan-Turkism, and the Turkish unifying ideal. It is characteristic that Turkish national trends assumed the form of a Pan-Turkish movement outside of Ottoman and Kemalist Turkey. The natural political and cultural gravitation of the sympathies of about 20 million Russian Turks toward Turkey creates a serious potential problem for the USSR. It requires a cautious policy by the Turkish leaders toward the potential in-

dependence movements of the Turkish peoples in Russia, in order to avoid any violent reaction by the Soviet Government.

It is a fact that at present the Turkish nationalists have shown exceptional political realism. They are not influenced in their political practice by a vision of a huge Turkish empire stretching from the Dardanelles to Sinkiang and from Tabriz to Kazan. Their current political attitude is to "wait and see." Their hopes are based on their belief in the future inevitable collapse from within of the Soviet Empire.

This book is an indispensable and timely contribution to the understanding of the important and little-understood question of the Turks of the world, and essential to the library of those concerned with Soviet-Middle Eastern affairs.

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INSTITUTIONS DU DROIT PUBLIC MUSULMAN, by Emile Tyan. Vol. II, SULTANAT ET CALIPHAT. Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1956. 587 pages; biblio., index to 626. No price indicated (In French; biblio. in French and Arabic).

Reviewed by N. J. Coulson

The first volume of this work traced the declining fortunes of the Caliphate until its ultimate collapse as an effective organ of government in the early 3rd century A.H. Political power was henceforth monopolized by the Sultans, and though the Sultanate thus "in the face of the failure of the Caliphate assured the permanence of authority," it remained from the point of view of Islamic political theory "an ungodly institution which changed the very nature of the supreme power in Islam." It is this basic conflict between theory and practice which forms the unifying theme of the present volume, a theme which is sustained, with the author's customary clarity through a most impressive array of subject matter.

Though the second part of the volume is primarily devoted to a lucid exposition of the theory of the Caliphate according to both the Sunni doctrine and the doctrine of the various heterodox sects, the relationship between the

ideal theory and the actual practice is always an integral part of the discussion. Thus while the doctrine insisted upon a single supreme ruler, Islam was in practice divided into a number of independent kingdoms. Yet a semblance of conformity with the law was maintained by the formal delegation of powers to each independent ruler by the Caliph. Similarly, while the doctrine admitted only strictly regulated forms of election and testamentary designation as modes of accession to the Caliphate, in practice the hereditary transmission of power was the rule. Yet at the same time it was the influence of the ideal doctrine which prevented the dynastic principle from developing in practice to its full and logical conclusion. Perhaps the one ground for criticism of this vitally important aspect of the book is that the author has not devoted sufficient space to a consideration of the corresponding influence of the practice upon the theory, which manifests itself, among other respects, in the doctrine that a ruler who is not legally entitled to his position must nevertheless be obeyed by his subjects.

It is, however, the first three chapters of this volume which most clearly mark it out as an original contribution of the utmost value for the study of Islamic constitutional law. Here, following a comprehensive historical survey of the Sultanate from its origins in the Buwaihîd dynasty to the end of the Mamluk period (early 10th century A.H.) and of the status of the Caliphate under the various regimes, there is a penetrating analysis of the relationship between Caliph and Sultan. The author's views are crystallized in his discussion (pp. 244-51) of the view that a distinction between Caliph and Sultan represents a separation of the spiritual and temporal powers. Professor Tyan argues, most convincingly, first that the Caliph was not wholly deprived of temporal power, and secondly, that he possessed no spiritual authority as such. "It was simply because the Caliph had lost the effective exercise of authority and particularly the exercise of the intrinsically civil attributions of that authority that its religious character was brought into greater relief."

Another outstanding aspect of the author's method deserves unqualified approval. This is

the way in which the essential meaning and spirit of the original Arabic texts are, throughout the work, brought home to the reader in a remarkably clear and forceful fashion. For example, no firmer basis for a correct appreciation of the force of the hereditary and dynastic principle in Islam could be laid than by the author's observations on the Arabic terminology involved. "The term *dawla*, which finally came to mean 'the State,' signified, in ancient terminology, 'the ruling dynasty.' . . . This was perfectly in accordance with the grammatical sense of the term which implies the idea of rotation and succession in point of time. The idea of sovereign authority was thus firmly linked with the idea of transmission in time within the bounds of one particular family group."

Finally it is to be regretted that a work which contains so much of lasting value should not have been published in some more durable form.

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MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC PAPERS, 1956, by the Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut. Beirut: Dar el-Kitab, 1957. 175 pages. £L6.

Reviewed by Adnan Mahboub

Middle East Economic Papers, 1956, which was issued recently by the American University of Beirut, is the third of its kind to appear. The present collection contains six articles dealing with individual countries, two with the entire area, and one of a conceptual character.

In the first article, Albert Badre publishes the now-widely-circulated estimates of "The National Income of Lebanon" from a study conducted at the Institute during 1951-55. Of the ten sectors into which the study was divided, the results of seven—covering the period 1948-50—have been published earlier in monograph form. In the present article Professor Badre judiciously publishes the figures for 1950 only, perhaps in order not to convey any mistaken impressions about the accuracy of his findings. The total national income was placed at £L 1,026 million in 1950, with about one-third derived from trade and finance. Robert Oswald's article on "Industrial Production of

Cyprus" falls into the same category, and contains a summary of the 1955 industrial census of Cyprus. David Finsie then discusses the activities and contribution of the Basra Petroleum Company to the economic and social development of the surrounding area.

The three articles which follow are rather disappointing. Both Paul Khlat on "The Future of Economic Development in the Arab World" and Albert Meyer on "Economic Thought and Its Applications and Methodology in the Middle East" have very little to say. It will be admitted that it is difficult to discuss such broad subjects in a few pages. Some modesty in selecting the titles would have helped. On the other hand, Arthur Mills, in "Economic Change in Lebanon" devotes much attention to detail. Hussein Motamen similarly reviews "Development Planning in Iran."

The last two papers are the most carefully documented in the series. The article by Yusif Sayegh on "Under-Employment: Concept and Measurement" deals with a relatively neglected problem in economic development literature. The author attempts to provide criteria for the identification and measure of under-employment. For the latter objective, one or two alternate methods are proposed. The first entails the setting up of a "standard of full agricultural employment against which under-employment can be measured." The variables that must be taken into account in formulating such a standard are enumerated in the present paper, but it is far from clear how it is possible to establish such a standard in practice. The second method makes use of production coefficients arrived at in other countries where similar conditions prevail. It will be most helpful if Mr. Sayegh would pursue this line of research in a case study where he would apply his own criteria.

Finally, William Thweatt reproduces a chapter from a more comprehensive study on the "Egyptian Agrarian Reform" and its economic effects. With "only some 7% (of the total cultivable area) available for redistribution . . . over a five-year period" the land redistribution effects of the reform are quite moderate. But in addition the law "aimed quite distinctly at

altering the landlord-cultivator relation." The author maintains that in an underdeveloped country such as Egypt, the law may quite "possibly enhance the rate of economic growth."

It is encouraging to note the continuous improvement in the quality of this series of economic papers. As one would expect in such a publication, great differences in quality among the various articles persist. But the book fills an important gap in Middle Eastern studies. It is interesting to note that the majority of the contributors have been associated at one time or another with the American University of Beirut. Perhaps a few papers written by other economists from Egypt, Turkey, Syria and other Middle Eastern countries would be interesting and valuable.

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DE LESSEPS OF SUEZ: THE MAN AND HIS TIMES, by Charles Beatty. New York: Harper's, 1956. 334 pages. \$4.50.

Reviewed by Harry N. Howard

Of "the making of books" concerning the Suez Canal there is evidently no end. The problem of the Canal, whether of construction, management and operation, or transit and navigation, for the modern world, at least, has been with us for over a century. Charles Beatty, the author of the present volume, has chosen for his theme, not the "crisis" of our time with regard to the Suez Canal, nor even the story of the Canal itself. Rather he has elected to portray the life of the man who essentially conceived the Canal and engineered its construction, and the era in which he lived, in popular but authentic terms.

It was a most extraordinary life, seemingly always on the grand scale. Born at Versailles on November 19, 1805, Ferdinand de Lesseps died, somewhat in disgrace, at Paris on December 7, 1894. He spanned almost the entire 19th century, and not only achieved distinction in the two careers of diplomacy and engineering, but in the realm of parenthood brought 12 children into the world after the age of 64, having fathered two families. He also had a very large

hand in the development and construction of the world's two greatest canals at Suez and Panama, the latter begun under his direction at the age of seventy-four.

A man of great vision and tremendous energy, de Lesseps had an abiding faith in the development of science and scientific terminology and what these could contribute to the progress of the human family. Mr. Beatty, who relies heavily on the de Lesseps documents, along with the standard works, narrates well the story of de Lesseps' incipient interest in the Middle East during his earliest years, and details the story of his negotiations with his old friend, Sa'id Pasha, and his son Isma'il Pasha, as well as with the Ottoman Government and the French and British Governments. His account of British official opposition to the construction of a canal at Suez and of British commercial interest in the enterprise is one of great interest, if not essentially new. Similarly, the account of the achievements of the original concession in 1854 and the definitive concession of 1856 bears repetition, centering as it does around the personality of de Lesseps. The symbolic triumph came, of course, with the grand opening of the Suez Canal, amid the strains of the gala performance of *Aida*, when the Empress Eugenie inaugurated the great waterway, leading a procession of 51 ships, in the company of the great engineer.

Here the Suez story substantially ends, and another begins, since de Lesseps turned toward the conquest of other worlds, and the author is not primarily interested in the events of 1875-1882, when Great Britain assumed a commanding position concerning both the Canal and Egypt. In May 1879, de Lesseps reluctantly accepted the presidency of the Universal Inter-oceanic Canal Company for the construction of a canal at Panama, became involved in financial scandals, and in 1892, together with his son, was sentenced to prison for five years. Despite the disgrace of his last years, Mr. Beatty notes that de Lesseps, whose career had reached its peak with the construction of the Suez Canal, had the "capacity to inspire idealism and devotion." An authentic genius of his time, with all the human frailties, the achievement of de Lesseps was a rare one indeed, and although

his statue may lie in ruins, the monument of the Suez Canal remains.

Mr. Beatty has not written for the technical scholar, steeped in the lore of either the Suez or Panama Canals, but for a much wider audience, and his volume will repay the reading. It is well-illustrated with cartoons and photographs and an occasional diagram. There are also a brief bibliography and a chronology of the life of de Lesseps. Aside from its portrayal of a most interesting life, this biography should serve as useful background for an understanding of the present Middle East crisis in general and of the Egyptian attitude and policy with regard to the Suez Canal.

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ARAB WORLD

SYRIA AND LEBANON, by Nicola A. Ziadeh.
New York: Praeger, 1957. 312 pages. \$6.50.

Reviewed by Elie Salem

The appearance of Professor Ziadeh's book is timely, if for no other reason because of the rapid and perhaps decisive evolution of history in the Arab Middle East, and the need for clarification of the true issues there. With notable exceptions, those Arabs who have responded to the need of explaining the roots of the Arab political crisis to the outside world have been historians, many of these associated in one way or another with the American University of Beirut. Scholars like Costi Zurayq, Nabih Faris, Albert Hourani, and Nicola Ziadeh himself have in the past produced excellent works on the Arab national movement, and Professor Ziadeh's newest work is a worthy addition to this list.

Foreign scholars and statesmen as well will find the present work useful as a source of information on the complex political developments in Syria and Lebanon. There is no passionate appeal for restoring Arab rights in its pages, though the facts so carefully collected and examined by the author plead in eloquent silence for a profound reconsideration of policy on the part of both East and West toward the

crisis-ridden Middle East. Professor Ziadeh stresses the basic resentment on the part of both Syrians and Lebanese over the artificial arrangements imposed by Britain and France on their territory after World War I, and the distortion of the Western image in their eyes caused by British policy of supporting Zionism in Palestine.

The Zionist challenge is also the key to understanding of the military coups and counter-coups that shook Syria from 1949 to 1954, and seem to be continuing to plague that country's restless political atmosphere. There is in English no fuller and more detailed account of these eventful years in Syria and Lebanon than in Professor Ziadeh's book. It seems to this reviewer that the author consciously attempted to squeeze into his book every significant political detail of Syrian and Lebanese political life during the past decade, sometimes at heavy cost in both style and fluency. The author is at his best in giving the background setting for his exposition, his historical briefing is lucid and instructive. This is perhaps due to his extensive research on Syria's classical history. The reader will also find concise, yet accurate and useful, information on the geography, economy, and constitutional framework of Syria and Lebanon.

Since there is much interest on the direction of political thought in Syria and Lebanon, the chapter on political parties would have been the proper place to expound on the political philosophy that may very well determine the political destiny of the Middle East. In this chapter as in others, footnotes guiding the reader to sources where the perusal of the argument may be completed are conspicuously lacking, although the book's general usefulness makes it belong definitely on the reserve shelves of all Middle Eastern libraries. The evaluation of the political theory that permeates the area is especially urgent at the present time in face of the communist ideology that is challenging the Arab World to define its intellectual position.

Professor Ziadeh does not duplicate in his present book the work of the same title by Albert Hourani. The latter's study was published in the 1940's before the unfolding of the recent crisis, and Hourani's approach, though

following certain historical lines, was entirely cultural. Ziadeh is more factual and detailed, and since he completes, at least historically, Hourani's work, the two books may be regarded as complementary.

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HISTOIRE SOCIALE D'UN VILLAGE EGYPTIEN AU XXIEME SIECLE, by Jacques Berque. The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1957 (Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, VIeme Section, "Le Monde d'Outre-Mer Passe et Present," Premiere Serie: Etudes III). 87 pages. No price indicated (In French).

Reviewed by Morroe Berger

In this absorbing little monograph, Professor Berque, member of the Collège de France, brings together and expands several previously-published articles on recent social change in an Egyptian Delta village, Sirs al-Layyan, about 40 kilometers north of Cairo. Although he is interested primarily in the present, the author does not catalogue all the institutions of the village in the manner of traditional ethnography; rather, he selects several important ones and shows how they have changed in the last half-century.

The author bases his current account on two years of residence in the village (with UNESCO's Arab States Fundamental Education Center), the assistance of a local school head, studies of other villages by the trainees at the UNESCO center (which provided comparative data) and the indirect evidence of some novels whose scenes are laid near the village. For the data on the earlier period, Professor Berque relies on a wide variety of accounts by Egyptian and Western observers and the memories of older villagers today.

The subjects the author discusses are the historical background of the village; land distribution and its sectional divisions; religion and ritual; the nature of the solidarity of the extended family in its social and economic functions; social status and power; and the effects of education and secularization. Throughout, he

shows the changes that have been wrought in the village as Egypt itself has responded to internal and external influences bringing the entire society out of cultural isolation. He has an acute appreciation of the tragedy as well as the progress involved in these changes, but nowhere does he display that sentimentality often found in observers of village life over the disappearance of "quaint" or "wise" customs.

At various points in his analyses and descriptions, Professor Berque discusses the influence of formal education and the penetration of village life by the radio, newspapers, and urban politics. Recent years have seen a familiar pattern in Sirs: loosening of parental authority, weakening of older forms of religion, a greater disposition to seek enjoyment of body and mind freely and in new ways, new relationships among the sexes, and a general awareness of the world outside with its dangers and attractions. To the old-timers all such changes are bad, except one: modern communications have made it possible for many more villagers of Sirs to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The interplay between the old sentiments and the new loyalties the author describes with insight and feeling. Thus he relates the attenuation of old rituals to the opening of other emotional outlets, one of which is politics of a new kind—not merely the old fierce struggles between families and villages but the world of national and international politics brought into Sirs by the mass media. Professor Berque sees a new "folklore" here in the radio's amalgamation of the political speech and the songs of Um Kalsum.

But change itself is not new to the Egyptian village, which over a much longer span of history than the last 50 years, Professor Berque remarks, has been able not only to resist innovation but to adapt itself to it. Meanwhile the elements or "heroes of this rural drama," as he calls it, remain allied even if in new forms: water, land, man, animal, and plant. The sequence is Professor Berque's, and man is at the center.

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THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JORDAN, by an IBRD mission. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957. 433 pages; annexes to 475; index to 488. \$7.50.

Reviewed by Loren Tesdell

Appearing at a time when interest in Jordan's future has been heightened by political developments, this report will be welcomed as a careful and cautiously optimistic survey of Jordan's economic potentialities. It is the work of an IBRD mission which prepared recommendations at the request of the Jordan Government "on a long-term development program for increasing the country's productive resources, raising the standard of living of the people and reducing as far as possible the country's dependence on external financial assistance."

The Mission's response to this challenging assignment has been to recommend a 10-year program of government action. In the early years the largest capital expenditures would be devoted to improving transport and communications. Most strongly urged are the completion of an Amman-Aqaba highway and development of Aqaba port, both being essential for export of increased amounts of phosphates. Also emphasized is a program to improve telephone and telegraph services.

First priority in the total program, however, goes to agriculture. Research and educational activity to increase production per *dunum* in the rain-fed areas is particularly stressed, though the potential benefits of a Yarmuk-Jordan valley development are given careful attention as well. Jordan's industrial potential is felt to be severely limited by scarcity of raw materials, the high cost of power and the small size of the domestic market. Recommendations in this sector stress a revival of the potash industry, a rapid expansion of phosphate mining, olive oil refining, tanning, weaving, food processing, tourism, and petroleum refining for domestic needs. Though the Mission did not include in its membership specialists in education and health the report contains substantial and well-considered treatment of needs in these areas.

One of the more difficult tasks facing the Jordan government in implementing this program will be to provide effective administration—especially coordination. After careful attention to this need and to the inadequacy of existing machinery for fulfilling it, the Mission makes what is perhaps its most interesting and significant recommendation. It proposes that the Jordan Development Board, formerly composed of cabinet ministers and foreign aid representatives but acting only to administer the British development loan, be reconstituted and functionally expanded so that it may operate as an effective overall planning and coordinating body. The improved Board, now resembling its Iraqi counterpart, would be composed primarily of top career officials from the appropriate ministries and headed by a neutral chairman with semi-permanent status. It is noteworthy that the Mission does not suggest foreign members for the Board, as in Iraq, though use of outside experts is recommended for the Board's technical staff. A warning that the Board should confine itself to overall planning, coordination, and the supervision of projects, avoiding undertaking actual execution of them is well taken and will be welcomed by readers familiar with the Iraq experience.

One of the crucial functions of the Board would be to take responsibility "for all negotiations regarding the allocation and disbursement of foreign aid funds and the procurement and assignment of experts obtained under foreign technical assistance programs." It may be anticipated that some difficulty will be met in inducing foreign aid agencies, and government ministries as well, to subordinate sufficiently their short-run goals to the needs of the overall program. (It is interesting that in this respect, as well as in some others, practices of U.S. aid missions in Jordan are criticized in the report.) Effective coordination will also require Jordanian development in the arts of conferring-among-equals and of making decisions in such a way that the participants feel mutually committed—arts needed at various levels from the cabinet downward.

Various administrative shortcomings of the

Jordan government receive the attention of the Mission and are dealt with largely as technical problems. Yet their roots in many cases lie deep in social and political tradition. Regarding such matters as these, the recommendations of a mission composed of outsiders with but brief tenure in the country are necessarily limited to the "ought" and the "why" of reform. Answers to the "how" questions—much the most difficult—will need to be worked out in practice through patient and skilful effort of Jordanians who have the will to make the necessary changes. Yet it may well be on answers to such questions that the success of the program will turn.

Foreign capital requirements for the proposed program resemble current levels (as of 1955, the time of the Mission's research in Jordan) and would appear to be obtainable even in the light of more recent developments which, though they seem to have resulted in the cessation of the British development loans, have increased aid, actual or potential, from the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

Few readers will question the Missions general conclusion that it will be impossible for Jordan, even assuming full and successful implementation of the ten-year program, to provide a living from the country's own resources for the total population, including refugees, expected in 1965. Thus only large-scale emigration or discovery of now-unknown resources could make Jordan economically self-sufficient. Continued outside support, at least sufficient to maintain the refugees, would be necessary even after completion of the program, the Mission concludes. Though Jordan's resources are thus severely limited and serious political and administrative questions surround the likelihood of their efficient development, the net effect in the minds of many readers of this careful and practical set of proposals will be one of increased, if restrained, optimism for Jordan's future.

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INDIA

PLANNING FOR AN EXPANDING ECONOMY, by C. N. Vakil and P. R. Brahmanand. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1956 (Printed in India). 404 pages. \$4.50.

Reviewed by Irving B. Kravis

In this book the authors, economists from the Bombay School of Economics, present a critical analysis of the basic strategy involved in Indian economic planning. They argue that the strategy adopted in the Second Five Year Plan, which began in 1955-56, will at best result in an increase in real national income by 12-15% instead of the promised 25%, and advance an alternative approach which they believe will be more effective in raising the national income.

India's First Five Year Plan (1950-51 to 1955-56) placed heavy emphasis on agricultural development rather than industrialization; about a third of investment was allocated to agriculture (including community development, irrigation and flood control) and only 7% to industry. The actual increase in real national income was 18% compared to a planned increase of only 13%. At least part of the better-than-planned performance was attributable to bumper crops. The authors suggest that another part may have been statistical rather than real owing to improved coverage of production statistics, so that the true increase in income during the plan period was perhaps 15% or even less. This increase could have been greater had the economy absorbed into useful work the underemployed. However, not only was disguised employment not mopped up but open unemployment appeared and grew steadily worse during the plan period despite the expansion in income. The rate of expansion in economic activity was sufficient to absorb only about half the annual additions to the labor force of 1½ to 2 million workers.

The Second Five Year Plan may be regarded as a compromise between the desire to foster more rapid industrialization and the growing public and governmental anxiety over the unemployment problem. The development of basic and heavy industries and the provision of

greater employment opportunities were among the major aims specified. Although the absolute amounts of development funds scheduled for investment in agriculture were larger than under the first plan, the proportion of the total was only 21% compared to 33% under the first plan, while the share allocated to industry increased from 7% to 21%. Most of the funds marked for industry will go into heavy industries. The planned rate of growth in consumers goods output is lower than in the first plan; cottage and small scale industries aided by discriminatory taxation and technical assistance are to provide a substantial share of the target increase. The authors center much of their attack on the encouragement given to these labor intensive units which, even in India, apparently cannot achieve the low costs of large scale mechanized plants. Although they recognize the attraction of village industries to the Gandhian school of thought and the argument that owing to underutilization of capital and labor in the villages output can be increased with slight investment of capital, the authors regard the encouragement of labor intensive industries as a wasteful use of labor. Realizing that surplus workers drawn from agriculture or urban pools of unemployed will consume more if put to work in construction or other capital-forming activities, they regard the first task of an economic development program for an underdeveloped economy such as India's to increase the output of wage-goods (i.e., the goods which the newly employed workers in the new sector will wish to buy with their wages). The increased savings contemplated for the first stage in almost any strategy of economic development would thus be used by Vakil and Brahmanand to raise the rate of growth in the output of wage-goods well above the rate of growth in the labor force. After some time—perhaps 10-12 years in India—the disguised and open employment would be mopped up and the country could begin to shift emphasis toward the development of capital goods industries. Then after the capital goods industries necessary to satisfy the requirements of the consumer goods industries had been developed, attention could be turned to the rapid expansion in the standard

of living. This three-stage program is advanced by the authors as their "new approach" designed to replace the present strategy of the Second Five Year Plan.

While one can understand and sympathize with the author's impatience with the make-work aspects of India's Second Five Year Plan, it is hard to escape the feeling that they have not faced up to the very difficult problem of finding the wherewithal to provide the increased output of wage goods. The labor is available, but how is the accompanying capital to be provided? At one point at least the authors seem to hint at the need for grub-staking loans from other countries. They also touch on other aspects of the matter such as the desirability of restraining wage increases and preventing luxury consumption, but the main question of the capital accumulating mechanism during the period of increasing output of wage goods is not treated convincingly.

One of the authors notes in the preface that the book was produced in great haste and without time for literary polishing. While the timeliness and urgency of its message may have justified this, the result is to work some hardship on the reader. Reduction in size could have been achieved by the avoidance of repetition, also improving the clarity. Standardized terms in economic literature are occasionally used with different meanings than usual, and some of the *obiter dicta* upon the economics of developed countries are so far off the mark that they shake the reader's confidence in the acuity of the authors' insight into their own country. It may be true as the authors claim that the economic theory of developed countries is not applicable to underdeveloped countries, but they appear to be concerned with the same problems that concern western economists—the behavior of the saving-income ratio as income rises, the response of investment to various stimuli, etc. What they apparently mean is that the institutional differences between developed and underdeveloped countries are sufficiently great to modify or even alter drastically the policy implications derived in the western world from the method of reasoning known as economic theory.

Despite these defects, the book deserves the attention of all persons seriously interested in the economic problems of underdeveloped countries.

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SHORTER NOTICES

THE NILE, by H. E. Hurst. Rev. ed. London: Constable, 1957. 331 pages. 30s.

It is now about a year and a half since the Western Powers damned Aswan; the resulting backwaters still peril the Middle East. The publication of a new edition of this study is most timely, even though the revision consists mainly of four pages on the High Aswan Dam proposal. Dr. Hurst finds that the High Aswan "is complementary to the Equatorial Project (on the White Nile in southern Sudan) and not, as some have thought, an alternative to it." International cooperation for the development of the Nile basin has become increasingly difficult. Both the Sudan and Egypt have proposed irrigation of new areas. Dr. Hurst notes that "the Equatorial countries . . . have discovered . . . the value of irrigation as a supplement to an erratic rainfall. As a result it now appears that the area of land in the Basin which might be cultivated or benefit by irrigation is greater than all the waters of the Nile could supply even if used to the last drop."

◆ ABRAHAM M. HIRSCH, Washington, D. C.

THE RIGHT OF RESISTANCE OF THE CYPRIOT PEOPLE DURING OPPRESSION: A CRITIQUE ON COLONIAL IMPERIALISM, by Demos N. Mexes. Athens: Constantine A. Theoharides, 1956. 112 pages. No price indicated (In Greek).

The Cyprus question has become the focal point of Greek political literature in recent years, distinctly reflecting the national character which the problem has assumed in Greece. Unfortunately much of the literature is tinged with emotion and the central theme has been to justify the "Greekness" of the Cypriote majority as the *raison d'être* for Enosis sentiments.

The present work does not generally follow this theme; essentially the author attempts to establish a "legal" justification for armed Cypriote Greek resistance to British administration, a subject largely ignored to date by Greek writers on the Cyprus issue. His analysis is premised on the theory that "there exists the right of defense by the people when the legality of government is in itself illegal." This condition, he states, is generally characteristic of government founded on "colonial imperialism," and in the case of Cyprus has been precipitated by the "anomalous" legal situation created by the "abolition of Cypriote freedoms." In seeking to create legal grounds for resistance, the author cites Augustine, Rousseau, Stammler, Blackstone, and many others for support. While his book is unique in recent Greek literature on Cyprus, for these reasons, it completely ignored all positions except the wholly pro-Greek one.

◆ LOUIS G. SARRIS, Washington, D. C.

DE BAGDADSPOORWEG; BIJDRAGE TOT DE KENNIS OMTRENT HET OPTREDEN DER MEGENDHEDEN IN TURKIJE, 1888-1908, by E. R. J. Brünner. Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1956. 409 pages; documents, biblio., index to 468. f. 6.25 (In Dutch).

In this study of the Baghdad Railway and the activities of the powers in Turkey from 1888 to 1908, Mr. Brünner has made a long and detailed analysis of railway construction in Turkey before 1908, the concession of 1903, increasing international tension over the Baghdad Railway between 1903 and 1906, and the significance of the Railway for German expansion into the Middle East. While Mr. Brünner's marshalling of sources is impressive, it is unfortunate that he has been unable, presumably, to look at the mass of German diplomatic correspondence on Turkey from the German Foreign Office files which fell into Allied hands in 1945, and which is available at the National Archives in Washington and the Public Record Office in London. It is also to be hoped that such an otherwise excellent and well-planned study as this one will be published in some language other than Dutch.

◆ BRADFORD G. MARTIN, Washington, D. C.

THE BEDOUIINS: MANNERS AND CUSTOMS, by Touvia Ashkenazi. Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1957. 222 pages. No price indicated (In Hebrew).

Touvia Ashkenazi, who has spent many years among the Transjordanian Bedouins and authored several studies on the Bedouins of Palestine, discusses in this popular volume the main aspects of Bedouin life: their problems, their family life, their law and economy. Although the title makes the reader expect a monograph on the Bedouins in general, in fact the author concentrates mainly on those in Israel today, and refers only cursorily and occasionally to the large tribal groups of the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Jordan and Syria who form the bulk of the Bedouin element in the Middle East. The collection of Bedouin proverbs and expressions listed in the appendix is useful.

◆ RAPHAEL PATAI, New York, New York.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

General

Arab and Jew in the Land of Canaan, by Ilene Beatty. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1957. 98 pages; Notes to 108. \$2.50. The author makes a case for the Arab "right" to Israel over the Israeli "right," which she claims is no longer valid. She then pleads ingenuously for the creation of an international spiritual monument comprising all of Palestine, under UN administration.

Bedouin Doctor, by Herbert Pritzke, transl. by Richard Graves. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957. 255 pages. \$3.95. The true story of a German doctor who escaped from British internment in Egypt during the Second World War and worked among Bedouins in Saudi Arabia.

Documents on International Affairs 1954, ed. by Denise Folliot. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. 366 pages. \$8.80. The sixth volume in this series which reprints important documents of each year, it includes texts of the Turco-Pakistani treaty, and of those documents pertinent to the Iranian oil controversy and the Suez Canal Zone.

Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba in International Law, by L. M. Bloomfield. Toronto: Carswell, 1957. 240 pages. \$5.00. A discussion by a Canadian lawyer of the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway. The author recommends UN trusteeship over the southern Sinai Peninsula as a solution to all conflicting claims.

The Interplay of East and West, by Barbara Ward. New York: Norton, 1957. 152 pages. \$3.50. Essays by a

brilliant British economist based on her McGill Lectures.

Islam Inflamed, by James Morris. New York: Pantheon, 1957 (Published in Great Britain as *The Market of Selenkia*). 320 pages. \$5.00. A journalist's report of the Middle East at the moment of the Suez crisis, it is scanty in depth but a slickly-written portrayal of surface tensions and activity there.

Land Reform and Development in the Middle East, by Doreen Warriner. New York: Oxford University Press, 1957. 197 pages; biblio. \$2.90. A study of changes wrought by agrarian reform in Egypt, mechanized farming in Syria and investment of oil revenues in Iraq. *Le Probleme Juridique des Lieux-Saints*, by B. Collin. Paris: Librairie Sirey, 1956. 208 pages; Documents (relative to the subject) to 434. No price indicated (In French). A consideration of the Holy Places of Jerusalem under Arab, Crusader, and finally Ottoman control, followed by a discussion of 20th century aspects of the problem and its present status. The second half of the book reproduces a variety of documents from historical times relative to the subject.

Les Secrets de l'Expedition en Egypte, by Merry and Serge Bromberger. Paris: Aymon, 1957. 269 pages. Frs. 795 (In French). A controversial work by 2 French journalists which prints a number of "revelations" concerning Israeli-French collusion prior to the invasion of Sinai.

La Signification Economique du Moyen-Orient, by Henri Laurens. Aalter (Belgium): Andre de Rache, 1956. 202 pages. No price indicated (In French).

Cyprus

Cyprus, by Sir Harry Luke. New York: Roy, 1957. 190 pages. \$5.00. An historical sketch and appreciation by a long-time British resident official on the island.

Egypt

Egypt, ed. by George L. Harris. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957. 343 pages; biblio., index to 370. \$8.50. Another in the Country Survey series.

L'Egypte en Mouvement, by Jean and Simone Lacouture. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1956. 479 pages. Frs. 1200 (In French). A survey of recent history, 1913-56.

Revolution and Roses, by P. H. Newby. New York: Knopf, 1957. 261 pages. \$3.50. The author of *Picnic at Sakkara* evaluates the Egyptian character and chides the UN for shortcomings in international comradeship in a new novel.

Ethiopia

Äthiopien, Land im Aufbruch, by H. Jenny. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957. 290 pages. f 16.85 (In German). Has a foreword by Erno Littmann.

India

India and the United Nations, by the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace. New York: Manhattan Pub. Co.,

1957. 213 pages; index. \$3.00. Report of a study group set up by the India Council of World Affairs.
- Modern India*, by Sir Percival Griffiths. New York: Praeger, 1957. 246 pages; maps, index. \$5.75. Another in the Nations of the Modern World series.
- Party Politics in India*, by Myron Weiner. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. 290 pages; biblio., index to 319. \$5.00. An analysis of the multi-party system with comments on individual parties.
- The Theory and Working of Union Finance in India*, by R. N. Bhargava. New York: MacMillan, 1957. 308 pages. \$6.75. An analysis of the basic principles of public finance in a federal state.
- The Transfer of Power in India*, by V. P. Menon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. 442 pages; appendices to 533, biblio., index. \$8.50. A study in Partition and pre-Partition, 1939-49, by Mountbatten's chief Indian advisor.

Iran

- The Last Migration*, by Vincent Cronin. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957. 343 pages. \$4.50. True story of the last migration of one nomadic tribe of Iran.

Israel

- Bridgehead*, by Waldo Frank. New York: George Braziller, 1957. 220 pages. \$3.75. A philosophic appraisal of modern Israel which conveniently ignores all aspects of the creation of that state except the idealistic ingathering of the Hebrews.
- Estimates of Israel's International Transactions, 1952-1954*, by N. Halevi. Jerusalem: Falk Proj. for Econ. Research in Israel, 1957. 139 pages. \$2.00.

North Africa

- Yallah*, by Paul Bowles. New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1957. Text plus photos by Peter Haerberlin of Africa north of the Cameroons. \$10.00. A photographic essay.

Linguistics, Literature, Religion

- Indo-Iranian Frontier Languages*, vol. 3, *The Pasbai Language: 3, Vocabulary*, by Georg Morgenstierne. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. 242 pages. \$10.80. (Oslo Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, series B40, vol. 3.)
- Telafluzlu Ingilizce-Turkce Lugati*, by K. M. Vasif Okucugil. Hollywood, Florida: Transatlantic Arts Press, 1957. 847 pages. \$7.50. An English-Turkish school dictionary.
- More Stories from the Arabian Nights*, by Sir Richard Burton, ed. by Julian Franklyn, glossary by Eric Partridge. Westport, Conn.: Associated Booksellers, 1957. 286 pages. \$4.00.
- Golgotha and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre*, by Andre Parrot. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. 122 pages; biblio. \$2.75. Studies in Biblical Archaeology #6.
- Revelation and Reason in Islam*, by A. J. Arberry. New York: Macmillan, 1957. 114 pages; notes, index. \$3.00. A compilation in book form of the Hopwood Lectures for 1956, given by the author at Liverpool University.
- The Secret of Divine Civilization*, by 'Abd al-Bahá ibn Baha Ullah, transl. by Marzieh Gail. Wilmette, Illinois: Baha'i Public Trust, 1957. 127 pages. \$2.50. A translation of the original Persian text composed in 1875, addressed to the Persian rulers of that time whose onglorious civilization had died from loss of the essential truths of religion.

FORTHCOMING BOOKS

- Backdrop to Tragedy: The Struggle for Palestine*, by William Polk, David Stamler, & Edmond Asfour. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Bitter Lemons*, by Lawrence Durrell. London: Faber & Faber. A memoir of Cyprus.
- The Economy of Pakistan*, by J. Russell Andrus and Azizali F. Mohammed. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Pakistan: A Political Study*, by Keith Callard. New York: Macmillan. To be a joint publication with the Institute of Pacific Relations.
- Suez Story: Key to the Middle East*, by William Longgood. New York: Greenberg. A popular history of the Canal.

THE REFERENCE SHELF

(The JOURNAL herewith presents for the convenience of its readers a bibliography of reference materials—pamphlets, booklets, monographs—that appear to have merit but due to length, organization, or other reasons do not warrant full reviews. All works listed are 1956-57 publications.)

The Arab Bloc in the United Nations, by G. Moussa Dib. Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1956. 128 pages. No price indicated. The first chapter is a historical appraisal of Arab solidarity and its countering dispersive forces. Two chapters discuss Arab behavior and problems in the UN. Chapter 4 discusses Arab neutrality, and Chapter 5 suggests an economic union of the Middle East. The author concludes that the split between Iraq, due to the Baghdad Pact, and Egypt, advocate of Pan-Arabism, will increase Arab difficulties and weaken Arab bargaining power in the UN.

The Black Record. Issued by the American Jewish Congress, January, 1957. 40 pages. Free distribution. This pamphlet describes the alleged persecution and expulsion of Egyptian Jewry by President 'Abd al-Nasir's government after the Israeli invasion of Sinai, emphasizing Egypt's use of former Nazi personnel and techniques, and urges U. S. resettlement of these refugees.

Cahiers, Serie F: Niveaux de Développement et Politiques de Croissance (Israel). Paris: Institut de Science Economique Appliquée, 1956 (?). 90 pages. No price indicated. (In French). Four papers: 1) on Israel's economy, by A. Bonné and I. Guelfat, 2) development problems, by A. L. Gaathon, 3) money and prices 1949-53, by Patinkin, and 4) immigration, by Sitton.

Education in Iraq. Washington: Office of the Cultural Attache, Embassy of Iraq, 1957. 48 pages. Free distribution. A booklet which describes educational progress at all grade levels. Enrollment figures are generally recent (i.e. 5,000 college students for the 1956-57 academic year). In addition to reports on primary, secondary, and higher education, the booklet includes sections on teacher training, adult education in both rural and urban areas, and general educational activities in Iraq.

Egypt and the West, by E. V. Lawrence. New York: Institute of International Information, 1956. 85 pages. Free distribution. Subtitled "Salient Facts Behind the Suez Crisis," it brings the story of the Suez issue up to September, 1956.

First Population Census of the Sudan, 1955-56; First Interim Report, 52 pages, 15 tables, map of census areas. *Second Interim Report*, 54 pages, 15 tables, map, errata to *First Interim Report*. *Third Interim Report*, 37 pages, gives a brief description of the background, methods, rules and definitions of the Census (vide MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 11, Winter, 1957, p. 107). All reports prepared and disseminated free by the Ministry for Social Affairs, Republic of the Sudan, Khartoum.

An Interpretation of Islam, by Laura Vaglieri, transl. by Aldo Caselli. Washington: American Fazl Mosque, 1957. 87 pages. Free distribution. Foreword by Sir Zafrullah Khan. An English translation of an Italian work originally published in 1925.

Jewish Architecture in San'a, Yemen, by Carl Rathjens. Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1957. 68 pages; appendix, glossary, map to 79. \$2.50. (Oriental Notes and Studies, no. 7.) Introduction and Appendix by S. D. Goitein. Goitein suggests that a San'ani Jewish house be erected in Jerusalem to serve as a living museum, now that the Yemenite Jews and particularly the master builders are in Israel. Following a general introduction on the Jewish quarter of San'a and a comparison of Arab and Jewish houses there, Professor Rathjens describes in detail a single house (House S.) as typical of Jewish domestic architecture. The text is accompanied by numerous sketches and black-and-white pictures.

Libya—Building a Desert Economy, by Agnese N. Lockwood. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957 (International Conciliation series, no. 512). 65 pages. \$1.00 annual subscription. A compact monograph describing the formation of the United Kingdom of Libya, internal problems, development, and the aid programs of the UN specialized agencies and other organizations. Concludes that the best hope for Libya's future lies in its lack of a blinding, prejudicial nationalism.

Al Maktaba, vol. 1, Parts 1 & 2, by Jamal Mouhaseb. Printed in Lebanon, 1956. A selected bibliography in Arabic and English for books issued in Arabia in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The criterion is that each book listed be pertinent to a university, college, or secondary school library. All books listed are recent (i.e. 1956 and after).

Memoirs of the Institute for Oriental Culture, nos. 10 & 11, Fifteenth Anniversary issue. Tokyo: Institute for Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, 1956. No. 10, 563 pages; no. 11, 375 pages. No price indicated. A collection of papers in Japanese, each of which is summarized briefly in English. Two deal tangentially with the Middle East.

The Middle East in the Cold War, ed. by Grant S. McClellan. New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1956. (The Reference Shelf, vol. 28, no. 6.) 190 pages. \$2.00. Reprints of newspaper and magazine articles, mostly from *The New York Times*, followed by a selected bibliography.

Middle East Crisis, by Guy Wint and Peter Calvocoressi. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1957. 127 pages; appendices to 141. (\$0.50.) The text is a factual report criticizing the West for a progressive series of blunders and concluding that the U.S. should keep the peace in the Middle East and the West promote a regional development scheme under international authority ignoring

- national boundaries. The appendices, a hodge-podge, contain Middle East oil statistics, the 1888 Suez Canal Convention, the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, the UN resolution of October 13, 1956, on Suez transit, and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's October 24 letter to Dr. Fawzi, the Egyptian delegate.
- Pakistan: Society and Culture*, ed. by Stanley Maron. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957. 173 pages; biblio., glossary, index to 192. \$3.50. The editor's introduction describes briefly the historical background, creation, present social structure and geography of Pakistan. Then follow seven "chapters" (really sociological reports) on various ethnic elements. These range in breadth from John J. Honigsmann's "Woman in West Pakistan" to "Chittagong Hill Tribes" by Denise and Lucien Bernot. Other papers deal with the Pathans, Punjabi rural and urban life, and Bengali village life. Although better organized than the companion HRAF Country Survey volumes, and full of useful data, this monograph suffers from the usual dry pedantry, lack of illustrative vividness, and clinical approach common in sociological compendia of this type.
- La Persécution des Chrétiens Himyarites au Sixième Siècle*, by Jacques Ryckmans. Istanbul: Netherlands Historical and Archaeological Institute, 1956. 24 pages; plates. f 6 (In French). An excellent study of a rather specialized subject.
- The Refugee Problem in the Middle East*, ed. by A. G. Mezerik. New York: International Review Service, 1957. 37 pages; biblio., appendices to 66. No price indicated. Draws together a great variety of public statements and comments about the refugees into a formal report. This is followed by the texts of all official resolutions, pronouncements, etc. Useful for general reference and classroom or other discussion.
- Report on Current Research on the Middle East*, ed. by William Sands and John Hartley. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1957. 74 pages. \$1.00. Another supplemental volume to *Current Research on the Middle East*, published annually by the Institute. This volume contains seven articles by distinguished scholars on the methodology and findings of their research on the Middle East.
- The Suez Canal*. New York: Praeger, 1956 (issued under the auspices of the Society of Comparative Legislation and International Law). 71 pages; biblio. \$2.50. A selection of documents relating to the Canal. Contains the complete French texts of the 1856 Concession and the Statutes of the Suez Canal Company, plus English extracts from the latter.
- The Suez Canal: Nationalization, Invasion, International Action*, ed. by A. G. Mezerik. New York: International Review Service, 1957. 48 pages. \$2.50. The Canal is described both in historical perspective and after its nationalization. The pamphlet, prepared in convenient looseleaf form, also contains a chronology and selections from all the key documents.
- The Suez Canal Problem*, July 26-September 22, 1956. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956. 370 pages. \$1.25. Official Département of State Publication #6392.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer

With contributions from: Ernest Dawn, Richard Ettinghausen, Sidney Glazer, R. S. Harrell, Louis A. Leopold, Bernard Lewis, M. Perlmann, C. Rabin, W. Spencer.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab World, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Palestine and Zionism*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library, New York.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, The Middle East Journal, 1761 N Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

For list of periodicals reviewed, see page 468. For list of abbreviations, see page 471.

GEOGRAPHY

(General, descriptive, travel, natural history, geology)

- 10011 "The natural conditions of Central Asia." C. A. Rev. 4 no. 1 (1956) 4-10. A short description of the climate, soil, and vegetation.
- 10012 BEN-ZVI, Y. "The travels of Sason Hai of the house of Castile." (in Hebrew) *Sefunot* (Jerusalem) 1 (1956) 141-84. A Constantinople Jew ca. 1700 gives an account of his travels in both eastern and western countries.
- 10013 LAFORE, LAURENCE. "The tourist's Persia." *Harper's Mag.* (N.Y.) 214 (Je '57) 51-6. Deplores the fact that, while Iran contains magnificent sight-seeing attractions, tourists do not flock to them. The author, a history professor at Swarthmore College, describes a few of the high spots.
- 10014 THOMAS, TAY and LOWELL, JR. "Flight to adventure." *Natl. Geog. Mag.* 112 (Jl '57) 49-112. Well-illustrated description of a year-long plane trip covering North, East and West Africa and the Middle East.
- 10015 ZAKHODER, B. N. "Central Asian-Khorasanian geographical writing of the 9th-10th century on the Volga region and Eastern Europe." (in Russian) *Ucb. Zap. Inst. Vostok.* (Moscow) 14 (1956) 5-30. The geographical literature of the caliphate points to the insufficiently appreciated role of the Volga and the Caspian in the old East-West trade.

HISTORY

(Ancient, medieval)

- 10016 "Central Asian town planning in the Middle Ages." C. A. Rev. 4 no. 1 (1956) 60-5. A summary of V. A. Lavrov's *Gradostritel'naya kul'tura sredney Azii* (The city-building civilization of Central Asia [from ancient times to the second half of the 19th century]—1950).
- 10017 ADONTZ, NICHOLAS. "Vard Mamikonian." *Armenian Rev.* 10 (Je '57) 15-30. Mamikonian was a brother of Empress Theodora and a leading personality of the Byzantine Empire. A statesman-general, he also made an important contribution to education and the cause of spiritual enlightenment.
- 10018 AHMAD, NUR. "Some glimpses into the life and character of Sultan Mahmud the Great of Ghazni." *Islamic Lit.* 9 (Ap '57) 227-32. Strives to correct the distorted picture of the 10th-11th cent. conqueror that is presented in most history books. The author demolishes with convincing detail the account of Mahmud's mistreatment of the Persian poet Ferdowsi.
- 10019 ASHTOR-STRAUSS, E. "Saladin and the Jews." *Hebrew Union College Annual* (Cincinnati) 27 (1956) 305-326. "He was as friendly to them as to Moslems and to Christians, without being tolerant."
- 10020 BABINGER, FRANZ. "Ein besitzstreit um Sulu Manastir unter Mehmed II, 1473." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 29-37. Seeks to explain a phase of the early history of the Armenian patriarchate of Constantinople on the basis of a Turkish document of

- Mehmed II. Includes a new etymology (supplied by Jean Deny) of the word *murakkasab* used in Turkish texts for high Armenian church dignitaries.
- 10021 BEN ZE'EB, ISRAEL. "Documents pertaining to the ancient Jewish cemetery in Cairo." (in Hebrew) *Sefunot* (Jerusalem) 1 (1956) 7-24. Facsimile and edition of a judgment in support of the contested Jewish ownership in the times of Qaitbay (1482).
- 10022 BLASKOVICS, JOSEF. "Ein schreiben des ofener defterdâr Mustafâ an den Hatvaner Mauteinnehmer Derwîlbala." *Charisteria O* (Prague '56) 60-71. Analysis of an archival document—one of several hundred—which furnishes valuable data on the second Turkish occupation of Slovakia (1599-1697).
- 10023 AL-DAYWAHJI, SA'ID. "The bridges of Mosul in different periods." (in Arabic) *Sumer* 12 no. 1-2 (1956) 108-23. An interesting, illustrated history of these structures (including the new one started in 1955) derived from the works of the classical Arab geographers and western travelers.
- 10024 D'ESZLARY, CHARLES. "Les musulmans hongrois du Moyen Age." *I.B.L.A.* 19 no. 4 (1956) 375-86. Although not very numerous, the Muslim minority (which migrated in two waves from the East to the Middle Danube valley) occupied a "qualitatively" important position in medieval society by virtue of their activities as bankers, landlords, etc. The author notes as a "simple and curious coincidence" the fact that all the major insurrections in Hungarian history—including that of 1956—originated in regions where the Muslims were numerically significant.
- 10025 DURI, A. A. "Al-Zuhri: a study on the beginnings of history writing in Islam." *B.S.O.A.S.* 19 no. 1 (1957) 1-12. This scholar (124/742)—founder of the Medina school of history—made a valuable contribution to the knowledge of Muhammad's biography and to early Islam. He was among the first to use writing.
- 10026 GHIRSHMAN, R. "Le problème de la chronologie des Kouchans." *J. World Hist.* no. 3 (1957).
- 10027 HORÁČEK, CYRIL. "Die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen aspekten der Türkenkriege in 16. jahrhundert." *Charisteria O* (Prague '56) 103-12. Ottoman pressure in Hungary during the 16th cent. had certain direct and indirect consequences on the political, economic, and social life of neighboring Bohemia. Despite the constant threat of invasion, there were various elements that sought and obtained an alliance with the Turks against their internal enemies.
- 10028 KAFIH, JOSEPH. "The book *Dofî bazeman* of R. Sa'id Sa'adi." (in Hebrew) *Sefunot* (Jerusalem) 1 (1956) 185-242. Edition of a Yemenite Jewish chronicle of the years 1717-26.
- 10029 KOWAR, IRFAN. "Procopius on the Ghassânids." *J.A.O.S.* 77 (Ap-Jc '57) 79-87. An enthusiastic appraisal of the value of the contribution of this 6th cent. Greek historian (as primary source material) to the history of the Christian Arab vassal-state of Byzantine emperor Justinian.
- 10030 LAMB, ALISTAIR. "Prester John." *Hist. Today* 7 (My '57) 313-21. Readable account of the five-century old legend of the Christian priest-king that sustained the hopes of Christian Europe in its struggle with Islam. It encouraged the exploration of the land route between Europe and Central Asia and the Far East and contributed to the discovery of the direct sea route to the East Indies.
- 10031 MAKDISI, GEORGE. "Autograph diary of an eleventh-century historian of Baghdad, III." *B.S.O.A.S.* 19 no. 1 (1957) 13-48. Text and translation.
- 10032 MINORSKY, V. "Mongol place-names in Mukri Kurdistan (Mongolica, 4)." *B.S.O.A.S.* 10 no. 1 (1957) 58-81. Stimulating review of the effect of the 13th cent. Mongol invasion on the local toponymy of the region south of Lake Urmia.
- 10033 MIRNY, S. A. "Hayton's *La flor des estoires de terres d'Orient* as an historical-geographical source on the East and the history of the Mongols." (in Russian) *Sov. Vostok* 2 no. 5 (1956) 72-82. Written by an Armenian prince in old French in 1307, this work was an excellent source of information for its own time; it was also drawn upon heavily by later authors.
- 10034 AL-MUJAHID, SHARIF. "Karbala in the historical perspective." *Islamic Lit.* 9 (Mr '57) 151-8. The murder of the Prophet's grandson near Karbala, Iraq in 680 A.D. was one of the greatest tragedies in Muslim history in that it nullified the socialistic principles of Islam and established the idea of an hereditary monarchy. This brought consequences to Islam that exceeded in gravity the Crusades, the Mongol onslaught, the expulsion of the Muslims from Spain, etc.
- 10035 O'LEARY, DE LACY. "Islam and Abyssinia." *Islamic Lit.* 9 (Ja-F '57) 63-7. Traces the history of Arab-Ethiopian relations, with brief notes on the Perso-Byzantine rivalry in Yemen.
- 10036 PETRUSHEVSKY, J. P. "The *serbedars* movement in Khorasan." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vostok.* (Moscow) 14 (1956) 91-162. "Despite the religious-mystical form in which the (14th cent.) movement was disguised, like other similar movements of the age, the historical role of the *serbedars* must be recognized as progressive." Rich documentation.
- 10037 RUNCIMAN, STEVEN. "Baghdad and Constantinople." *Sumer* 12 no. 1-2 (1956) 43-50. The coinciding of the great ages of Muslim Baghdad and Byzantine Constantinople resulted, despite intermittent hostilities, in friendly and intellectually beneficial competition. "The rivalry revitalized the civilization of Constantinople and developed that of Baghdad."
- 10038 SOLODUHO, Y. A. "On the social structure of Iraq during the 3rd-5th centuries A.D." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vostok.* (Moscow) 14 (1956) 31-90. Talmudic data are of great importance for the social history of the Sassanian period since neither Arab nor western sources are adequate.
- 10039 SPULER, BERTOLD. "Iranische einflüsse auf die islamische staatsauffassung bis ins 11. jh. n. Chr." *Charisteria O* (Prague '56) 321-8. A summary of the major Iranian-Sassanian and Achaemenid elements in early Islamic administration.

10040 TAESCHNER, FRANZ. "Der Achidschuk von Tabriz und seine erwahrung im Iskandarnäme des Ahmedi." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 338-44. This ruler of Tabriz, although in power for only a comparatively short time (1356-59), managed to arouse the interest (for reasons not given here) of more prominent contemporaries, e.g. the Mamluk sultan in Egypt. He was also the subject of an entire chapter in the celebrated *Iskandarnäme* of the old Ottoman poet Ahmedi, written 50 years after he was overthrown.

10041 TAUER, FELX. "Analyse des matières de la première moitié du *Zubdatu-t-tawarib* de Häfiz-i Abrü." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 345-73. The Persian historian—a member of Tamerlane's court—wrote numerous chronicles, essentially of compilatory nature. Prof. Tauer has painstakingly analyzed the *Zubdat*—the first half of which treats of the events of the Tamerlane era, 736-807 A.H.—and in the present article cites the sources for each chapter.

See also: 10113, 10132, 10146

HISTORY AND POLITICS

(Modern)

10042 "Afghanistan." *C.A. Rev.* 4 no. 2 (1956) 161-200. An extensive survey of Russian bibliography concentrating on: (1) Soviet treatment of certain events in Afghan history, (2) Soviet writing on current affairs, (3) Soviet views on Afghan literature and languages.

10043 "The Baghdad Pact." *Round Table* 187 (Je '57) 215-24. A detailed account of how Nuri al-Sa'id brought Iraq into the pact; the effect of Suez and the Eisenhower Doctrine. An optimistic, well-reasoned, if not completely persuasive, appraisal of the defense value of the instrument.

10044 "The cultural heritage of Uzbekistan, I, II." *C.A. Rev.* 4 no. 1, 2 (1956) 36-48, 144-52. Analysis and summary of the *Ocherki istorii kul'tury Sovetskogo Uzbekistana*, (1955) by T. N. Kary-Nujazov.

10045 "Elections in the Lebanese republic." *World Today* 13 (Je '57) 206-5. Written in advance of the event. Not a forecast, but an analysis of some of the basic issues and factors involved. The electoral system does not produce a strong government—which the Lebanese do not expect it to do—but does provide a high and near-unique personal freedom from fear.

10046 "Jordan." *Arab World* 31 (Ap '57) 15-19. Chronology of principal events from the founding of the state to the Jordanian decision to terminate the treaty with England.

10047 "Persia." *C.A. Rev.* 4 nos. 3-4 (1956) 287-331, 382-431. An analysis of Soviet views on aspects of Persian history and culture. Since published material on Persian history and contemporary events is designed to indoctrinate the public with official policy, it gains in political significance what it loses in objectivity. On the other hand, Soviet linguistic and literary studies display, for the most part, first-rate scholarship.

10048 "Soviet linguistic policy in Central Asia." *C.A. Rev.* 4 no. 2 (1956) 99-103. The question of national

language was important enough to attract and hold the attention of Stalin for some time. The official policy—waving between unification (Russianization) and differentiation (to increase the difficulties of intercommunication)—has apparently not yet crystallized.

10049 "A year of independence in Tunisia." *World Today* 13 (Je '57) 241-50. The past year shows that the state—a product of its geography and history—is inclined to social reform and is markedly free from a narrow religious and linguistic nationalism. The Algerian question remains to plague the able Bourguiba in his efforts to solve the economic and social problems of his country.

10050 ARMSTRONG, HAMILTON FISH. "The U.N. experience in Gaza." *For. Aff.* 35 (Jl '57) 600-19. While reviewing the developments just prior to and subsequent to the United Nations Emergency Force's moving into Gaza, the author frequently voices regret at the various opportunities lost—through indecision or lack of courage, it seems to him—to take concrete measures that might have led to the beginning of a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem.

10051 BALDWIN, HANSON W. "Strategy of the Middle East." *For. Aff.* 35 (Jl '57) 655-65. The *New York Times* military expert maintains that the basic strategic problem in the area is "not overt Soviet aggression, but covert Soviet infiltration complemented, perhaps, by proxy aggression . . . by some of Soviet Russia's Communist allies." He also advances a number of specific suggestions whereby the U.S. might develop a more satisfactory security posture in the Middle East.

10052 BENNIGSEN, A. and CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE, H. "Une république soviétique musulman: le Daghستان." *Rev. des Etudes Islam.* 23 (1955) 7-56. 75% of the 1.2 million population is Muslim. 20 ethnic groups, 10 literary tongues (of which 9 are official) contribute to the Eastern Caucasus' being a haven of refuge for tiny social fragments.

10053 BOURGUIBA, HABIB. "Nationalism: antidote to communism." *For. Aff.* 35 (Jl '57) 646-53. The Tunisian leader contends that his country's experience proves that the struggle for independence has served as an "antidote" to communist expansion. He also sets forth the nature and rationale of Tunisia's international policies.

10054 CANSACCHI, GIORGIO. "I termini giuridici e politici della controversia di Suez." *Oriente Mod.* 37 (F '57) 89-92. Summarizes the legal arguments and political interests of Egypt and the Canal users.

10055 CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE, H. "La 'destalinisation' dans l'Islam soviétique." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 37 no. 1 (1957) 30-42. The case of Baghirov (executed in Baku—April 1956) and the rehabilitation of cultural nationalism in the Caucasus are highly significant indicators that destalinization has gone quite far, and they may even lead to derussification.

10056 CLUBB, O. EDMUND. "Suez and the Indian Ocean." *U.S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 83 (Ag '57) 829-35. The conclusion of this analysis of the ebbing of western sea power and influence in the Middle East and Indian

- Ocean area is that: "In over-all military terms, the Indian Ocean is tending rapidly to resume the character it had before the arrival of Vasco da Gama—that of an *Asiatic lake*."
- 10057 COTTRELL, ALVIN J. and DOUGHERTY, JAMES E. "Algeria: a case study in the evolution of a colonial problem." *U.S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 83 (Jl '57) 723-33. "The need for a political solution is more urgent than ever. In view of the uncertainty . . . of just who is behind the FLN, mediation by Tunisia and Morocco is desirable to preclude the emergence of the FLN as the sole negotiator for the legitimate Algerian aspirations."
- 10058 DAWN, C. ERNEST. "'Abdallāh ibn al-Ḥusein, Lord Kitchener e l'idea della rivolta araba." *Oriente Mod.* 37 (Ja '57) 1-12.
- 10059 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "Un grand témoin des premières idées modernisantes en Tunisie." *I.B.L.A.* 19 no. 4 (1956) 349-73. The *Aqum al-masalik* of Khérédine (1810-90), vazir of Ahmad Bey and Sultan Abd el Hamid was the first work in Arabic to give the essentials of a realistic political program. The ideas of this farsighted thinker are valid even today.
- 10060 GORDLEVSKY, VLADIMIR. "Shaikh Süleyman (from the Nakshbandi life in Turkey)." (in Russian) *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 80-5. Interesting details—obtained during the course of the author's visit to Turkey in 1928—of the life and preaching of this leader of the "reactionary" dervish order whom Atatürk managed to render ineffectual.
- 10061 HAYRAPETIAN, YERVAND. "The February 18, 1921 Armenian revolt." *Armenian Rev.* 10 (Je '57) 101-20. Valuable eyewitness account of this first massive uprising against the Soviet regime. Based on the memoirs of an Armenian army officer, Martiros Abrahamian of Bashkiarmi.
- 10062 HESSLER, WILLIAM H. "There's no substitute for diplomacy or for power." *U.S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 83 (Jl '57) 691-7. Case study of the Suez crisis. Conclusion: "The United Nations . . . is not a proper or safe channel for handling problems which entail great-power rivalries in highly strategic regions of the world."
- 10063 HODGKIN, THOMAS. "Muslims south of the Sahara." *Current Hist.* 52 (Je '57) 345-50. The condition of Islam on its still-expanding southern frontier.
- 10064 HUGOT, P. "Tchad et Soudan." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 37 no. 1 (1957) 3-10. Twelve million Muslims from French Equatorial Africa maintain contact with the countries of the Arab League through the 30 km. road linking Adré in Tchad with the Sudanese village of Geneina. Hence, the importance of cordial relations between the two regions and of remaining alert to the "dangers" of pro-Arabism.
- 10065 KEDOURIE, ELIE. "Panarabism and British policy." *Pol. Quart.* (London) 28 (Ap-Je '57) 137-48. Pan-Arabism—promoted after World War I by a group of disaffected Arab Ottoman officers and later by King Faruq—was endorsed by the British on the basis of flimsy, romantic reasoning. The author contrasts the generous (but self-defeating) attitudes of the British with the cautious, niggling approach of the Axis powers.
- 10066 KHAN, MUHAMMAD YAKUB. "Is Islam a preparation for communism?" *Islamic Rev.* 45 (Ap '57) 25-9. The author disagrees profoundly with the affirmative answer to the question expressed by Nabih Amin Faris and other Arab scholars.
- 10067 KISELEV, V. J. "The national liberation movement in the Sudan after World War II." (in Russian) *Sov. Vostok.* (Moscow) 2 no. 5 (1956) 35-47. An outline of the country's economy and body politic.
- 10068 LASHAURI, M. "Current Soviet interpretations of XIX-XX century Georgian history." *Caucasian Rev.* 3 (1956) 77-98. Excerpts from the writings of "official" historians like Khachapuridze who have systematically distorted fact.
- 10069 LICHTHEIM, GEORGE. "The U.S. backs the Arab monarchs." *Commentary* 23 (Je '57) 516-22. Considers that recent American moves in the Middle East, beginning with promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, have contributed markedly to the relative stabilization of the area and to the perceptible decline in Egyptian influence.
- 10070 MANGO, ANDREW. "Turkey and the Middle East." *Pol. Quart.* (London) 28 (Ap-Je '57) 149-57. Turkey's membership in NATO and the Council of Europe is a symbol of the country's deep and irreversible westernization in all phases of life, including the moral. The author urges continuing European support for Turkey and its efforts to induce the Arabs to become "citizens of the West."
- 10071 McKITTERICK, T. E. M. "The problem of Egypt." *Pol. Quart.* (London) 28 (Ap-Je '57) 118-26. A sympathetic, but not uncritical, view of 'Abd al-Nasir's foreign policy and the western response. While endorsing the Eisenhower Doctrine, McKitterick recommends abandonment of efforts to maintain political instability and a balance of forces against Egypt and leaving the Arabs to deal with the Egyptians in their own way.
- 10072 MOISEEV, P. I. "The 'law of national defense' of 1940 in Turkey." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vostok.* (Moscow) 14 (1956) 221-46. Discusses economic and social conditions rather than the law in question.
- 10073 NIKULIN, LEV. "Turkey revisited." *New Times* 18 (My '57) 24-7. The well-known Soviet writer traveled "cognito" about the country and professes to have found many indications that the "traditional hospitality . . . and friendly feelings of the Turks toward visitors from the Soviet Union" are very much alive.
- 10074 PERLMANN, M. "Withdrawal in east—retreat in west." *Mid. East. Aff.* 8 (My '57) 174-9. Summary of events in the Middle East, plus brief comments, since promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine.
- 10075 PRICE, M. PHILIPS. "Journey through Turkey." *R.C.A.J.* 44 (Ap '57) 94-101. The much-traveled English M.P. notes the weaknesses (particularly over-rapid development) and strengths of the country. In Anatolia he saw evidence of the political and social

- consolidation of the Republic as the old *millet* system and other empire relics continue to wither away.
- 10076 REED, HOWARD A. "Secularism and Islam in Turkish politics." *Current Hist.* 32 (Je '57) 333-8. "Islam has not been replaced . . . by secular principles. It is thoroughly controlled by the rational secularists who wield political power."
- 10077 RONDOT, PIERRE. "Conflicts en orient et neutralisme arabe." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 38 no. 2 (1957) 15-25. Until the west grasps the true nature of Arab neutralism and evolves suitable means for dealing with this original and subtle form of political action, no progress can be made toward the solution of Middle East problems.
- 10078 RONDOT, PIERRE. "Islam, nationalisme, état moderne en Orient." *Orient* 1 no. 1 (Ja '57) 9-16. The clash of secular nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism and communal particularism has created problems whose coherent solution is still remote.
- 10079 ROUSSEAU, G. "La politique du colonel Abd al-Nasser et l'économie égyptienne." *Orient* 1 no. 1 (Ja '57) 17-35. General background of the economy; the present policy of conflict with the West is seriously damaging it, according to the author.
- 10080 SAMUEL, EDWIN. "Israel and the Arab states." *Pol. Quart.* (London) 28 (Ap-Je '57) 179-87. A summary of Arab attitudes toward Israel. Includes the reasons for the "planned but non-collusive" Israeli invasion of Egypt and the ensuing Arab frame of mind.
- 10081 SARAFIAN, VAHE A. "World War I American relief for the Armenians." *Armenian Rev.* 10 (Je '57) 121-31. A documentary study of developments beginning with the telegram of U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Morgenthau to the State Department relating that "the destruction of the Armenian race is rapidly progressing."
- 10082 SHAMSUTDINOV, A. M. "The participation of old Turkey in the intervention against Soviet Russia in 1918." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vostok.* (Moscow) 14 (1956) 163-96.
- 10083 SHEK, L. K. "From the history of Soviet-Bukhara relations." (in Russian) *Trudy, Sredneaz. Gos. Univ.* (Tashkent) 78 (1956) 105-28. Emphasizes the early years 1918-20.
- 10084 SHOCK, MAURICE. "Gladstone's invasion of Europe, 1882." *Hist. Today* 7 (Je '57) 351-7. A step-by-step account of how the liberal, morally righteous prime minister came to sanction the use of military force against Egypt.
- 10085 SHWADRAN, BENJAMIN. "The kingdom of Jordan: to be or not to be." *Mid. East Aff.* 8 (Je-Jl '57) 206-4. That is the question, still. Nor can even the inkling of an answer be found in this detailed review of political events since 1950. The apparently self-defeating nature of British policy, if not its motivation, is made clear.
- 10086 SPECTOR, IVAR. "Soviet influence on Islamic peoples." *Current Hist.* 32 (Je '57) 351-6. In spite of major shortcomings, the Soviet Union has achieved the formation of a "highly articulate group of Soviet Muslims . . . who can be counted on to be loyal to the U.S.S.R. Within recent years the Soviet regime has been making increasing use of them abroad and at home."
- 10087 STEPHENS, ROBERT. "Political and social development." *Pol. Quart.* 28 (Ap-Je '57) 107-17. The author urges focussing less on the "instability" of the Middle East than on the "surprising degree to which it nevertheless continues to make an erratic but undeniable progress."
- 10088 VALUISKY, A. M. "On the creation of the first Young Turk organizations." (in Russian) *Uch. Zap. Inst. Vostok.* (Moscow) 14 (1956) 197-221. A general compilation on the economic and political conditions in Turkey and the groups active before 1908.
- 10089 WHEELER, GEOFFREY. "Russia and the Middle East." *Pol. Quart.* (London) 28 (Ap-Je '57) 127-36. A review of Soviet policy and tactics since the Revolution. Greater subtlety, flexibility and realism—based on increasing knowledge—strengthen the communist position and hopes immeasurably. The author strongly advises systematic analysis by western scholars of Soviet publications which, far from being mere propaganda, often exhibit first-class scholarship. "They all reflect either directly or indirectly Soviet policy, of which they are regarded as one of the most important instruments. This study is indispensable for a proper apprehension not only of the dangers, but of the weaknesses of Soviet policy."
- 10090 WRIGHT, ESMOND. "Defence and the Bagdad pact." *Pol. Quart.* (London) 28 (Ap-Je '57) 158-67. Disposes of some favorite myths in British thinking about the Middle East and attempts to evaluate the Pact. Wright concludes, in the words of Jo Grimond: "What we (British) want is not an Eisenhower Doctrine of defence, but a liberal doctrine of offence against the poverty, chaos, and suspicion in which communism grows so readily."
- See also: 10048, 10103, 10108, 10112, 10118, 10130, 10132, 10163, 10202

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation and communication)

- 10091 "The Abyan scheme." *Arab World* 32 (Jl '57) 22-6. An account of irrigation farming in the Abyan District of the Western Aden Protectorate.
- 10092 "The agricultural machinery industry in Central Asia." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 2 (1956) 104-11. The new five-year plan includes, apart from improvements in existing plants, the largest factory in the USSR—near Pavlodar (Kazakhstan)—for the manufacture of grain and corn combine harvesters and components.
- 10093 "Domestic housing (in Central Asia)." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 2 (1956) 130-6. Despite the increasing number of units completed yearly, demands from the rapidly expanding population far exceeds supply and slums

- are extensive. This condition is due largely to lack of raw materials and inefficient use of available machinery.
- 10094 "The food industry in Central Asia." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 1 (1956) 20-7. The growth and processing of food are major activities of the Central Asian republics, which are being developed into one of the main economic units of the U.S.S.R.
- 10095 "Fruit cultivation." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 4 (1956) 374-81. Despite the seeming unsuitability of vast areas of Central Asia for large-scale fruit farming, research, increasing population, and development of the canning industry have led to the inclusion in the sixth five-year plan of a large expansion in fruit production.
- 10096 "The hungry steppe." *C. A. Rev.* 5 no. 1 (1957) 42-8. Notes on the efforts to develop the *Golodnaya Step'*, an inhospitable area of some 13,000 sq. km. lying between the Tashkent and Samarkand oases.
- 10097 "More power for Central Asia." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 3 (1956) 269-75. The sixth five-year plan (1956-60) calls for an increase in the production of electric power in all the republics.
- 10098 "The new coal fields of Kazakhstan." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 2 (1956) 111-3.
- 10099 "New methods and machines in industry." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 1 (1956) 11-19. Coal mines, oil wells, refineries, cotton processing and other improvements. Almost total dependence on imports of machine tools from European Russia is the main reason why the modernization of Central Asian industry is still seriously lagging.
- 10100 "The oil resources of Central Asia and Kazakhstan." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 3 (1956) 276-87. Factual account of current production and future prospects; an appendix lists the major oil fields in each republic.
- 10101 "Pig-farming in Central Asia." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 4 (1956) 369-73. Now encouraged, even in Muslim areas, apparently owing to the still-widespread meat shortage.
- 10102 "The Vakhsh valley project." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 3 (1956) 264-8. Origin and development of a plan to turn a semi-desert area of Tajikistan into a cotton-growing one.
- 10103 ABU AL-SU'UD, HASAN. "A study on land reform in Egypt." *Islamic Rev.* 45 (My '57) 14-19. The justification, provisions, and consequences of the agrarian reform law of September 9, 1952.
- 10104 ABU AL-SU'UD, MUHAMMAD. "Economic policy in Islam." *Islamic Rev.* 45 (My '57) 7-14. Contrasts Islamic economic principles with those in modern systems of thought.
- 10105 BONNE, A. "Population growth and economic development in underdeveloped countries with special reference to recent trends in the Middle East." *Scripta Hierosolymitana* (Jerusalem) 3 (1956) 1-19. Population is only one of the factors which affect per capita output; "improvement of levels of living is contingent . . . also upon a series of conditions of a non-economic nature."
- 10106 BURTON, H. M. "Marketing in Iraq, Persia, and Kuwait." *Arab World* 31 (Ap. '57) 20-2. Outlines the sales methods that are likely to produce results.
- 10107 MICHAELIS, ALFRED. "International Bank activities in the Middle East." *Mid. East. Aff.* 8 (My '57) 180-4. The Bank has made remarkably few loans to Middle Eastern countries due to its inherent conservatism. Therefore, it cannot meet the needs of underdeveloped countries and a new and broader approach to the problem must be made.
- 10108 PATRICK, MARTIN. "Oil in the Middle East." *Pol. Quart.* (London) 28 (Ap-Je '57) 168-78. Examines the nature of the growing "partnership" between the Middle East countries and the oil companies. The author is strongly opposed to altering the present arrangements by putting them on a government-to-government basis.
- 10109 SPROGE, W. "The Caspian Sea problem." *Bulletin* (Inst. for the Study of the USSR, Munich) 4 (Ap '57) 32-9. The water level has been falling constantly over a long period of time and so the present shortage is not attributable to normal cyclical fluctuations. The effect on the Soviet economy is serious. Various plans proposed for alleviating the problem are here discussed.
- See also: 10049, 10067, 10072, 10075

SOCIAL AFFAIRS

(General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and health, religion, law)

- 10110 "The agrotown." *C. A. Rev.* 5 no. 1 (1957) 49-54. Account of this new Soviet-planned type of agricultural settlement—an advance over the old *sovkhob* farm community—which has been introduced on the steppes of Kazakhstan.
- 10111 "Kazakh customary law." *C. A. Rev.* 5 no. 2 (1957) 127-43. Based on information derived from T. M. Kul'teylev's *Ugolovnoye obychnoye pravo Kazakhov* (Criminal customary law of the Kazakhs), Alma Ata, 1955.
- 10112 "Legal aspects of the Suez crisis." *World Today* 13 (My '57) 189-99. Renders judgments, on the basis of interpretation of international law, on nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping through the Canal, the Israeli invasion, the Anglo-French invasion, Egyptian obstruction of the Canal, original refusal of Israel to comply with U.N. resolutions to withdraw behind the armistice line, and Egyptian refusal to permit freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba.
- 10113 "Seasonal nomadism." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 3 (1956) 226-38. Quotations from many writers on the phenomena that underlay much of Central Asian culture.
- 10114 "The social structure and customs of the Kazakhs." *C. A. Rev.* 5 no. 1 (1957) 5-25. A description of the traditional Kazakh way of life and system of justice prior to the coming of the Russians. Does not supersede or duplicate Hudson's work. Based largely on Soviet source material.
- 10115 "Technical education in Central Asia." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 4 (1956) 354-61. A survey of the various schools

- training persons for specialized work in industry, agriculture, and public service.
- 10116 CARRET, JACQUES. "Le problème de l'indépendance du culte musulman en Algérie." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 37 no. 1 (1957) 43-58. Traces the evolution of relations between Muslim worship and the French state from 1830 to the present. The author offers a tentative solution for the impasse.
- 10117 CUNCTATOR, FABIUS and JAUSERAND, MICHEL. "Réflexions sur la réforme communale en Algérie." *L'Afrique et l'Asie* 38 no. 2 (1957) 44-62. Analyzes the effect of the decree of June 28, 1956 on the "transformation des communes mixtes en communes régies par la loi du 5 avril 1884."
- 10118 DINITZ, SIMCHA. "The legal aspects of the Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal." *Georgetown Law J.* (Washington) 45 (winter '56-'57) 169-99. Examines the legality of Egyptian restrictions on the free use of the Canal—touching only incidentally on the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the ensuing crisis—in the light of existing international agreements, principles of international law, and U.N. resolutions.
- 10119 GAI, B. M. "Wine in the Orient and its prohibition." *Indo-Iranica* (Calcutta) 9 (S '56) 31-46.
- 10120 HAMIDULLAH, M. "Codification of law by Abu Hanifah." *Islamic Rev.* 45 (Ap '57) 10-13. Discusses his role as head of the academy of Muslim law in Kufa.
- 10121 IRVINE, KEITH. "Religion in the Middle East." *Current Hist.* 32 (Je '57) 327-31. This rather optimistic account reports "that the permanent democratic revolution is beginning to work its heaven."
- 10122 KHAFAGUI, AHMED RIFAAT. "La corruption en droit égyptien." *L'Egypte Contemp.* 48 (Ap '57) 5-45. Evolution of corruption in the sources of the Egyptian Penal Code—Roman, French, and Islamic.
- 10123 LELONG, M. "La personnalité de la femme tunisienne." *I.B.L.A.* 19 no. 4. (1956) 422-35. Modern economic and social forces are exerting a steady and increasingly potent influence on Tunisian family life.
- 10124 MAGNIN, J. "Au service de l'enfance abandonnée." *I.B.L.A.* 19 no. 4 (1956) 387-414. This grave social problem is unprecedented and derives from the new economic and social forces at work in Tunisia. Adoption no longer suffices as it did in the past.
- 10125 MASSIGNON, L. "Les sept dormants d'Éphèse (*abl al-kahf*) en Islam et en Chrétienté, II." *Rev. des Etudes Islam.* 23 (1955) 93-106.
- 10126 MONTERRAT, MICHEL. "Regards sur la jeunesse irakienne." *Orient* 1 (Ja '57) 36-9. Impressions of a three-month visit. The young intelligentsia is in a mood of revolt and shows an utter contempt for traditional values, much warmth for 'Abd al-Nasir.
- 10127 ROUX, J.-P. "Brève enquête sur l'Islam en Turquie 1955." *Rev. des Etudes Islam.* 23 (1955) 57-68.
- 10128 EL-SAATY, HASSAN. "The middle classes in Egypt." *L'Egypte Contemp.* 48 (Ap '57) 47-63. Notes on social stratification, mobility, size, and influence of the middle classes upon social and economic development.
- 10129 EL SENOSSI, AHMED TAHA. "Notion de nationalité en droit musulman comparé." (in Arabic) *L'Egypte Contemp.* 48 (Ap '57) 15-70. An extended, documented analysis of the views of Arab and western scholars on the nation and the individual and their reciprocal relations.
- 10130 SMITH, WILFRED CANTWELL. "Islam in the modern world." *Current Hist.* 32 (Je '57) 321-5. Description of the way in which Islam—as a religion and as a civilization—is adapting to the mid-twentieth century world.
- 10131 VON GRUNEBaum, GUSTAVE E. "The problem of cultural influence." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 86-99. A penetrating analysis of the nature of the Hellenistic impact upon Islamic civilization, with pertinent observations on the process of westernization now at work throughout the Middle East.
- 10132 WESTPHAL-HELLBUSH, SIGRID. "Die kultur der Ma'dan in gegenwart und vergangenheit." *Sumer* 12 no. 1-2 (1956) 66-75. Some anthropological and historical notes on the southern Iraq marsh-dwellers.
- 10133 WESTPHAL-HELLBUSH, SIGRID. "Transvestiten bei arabischen stämmen." *Sociologus* (Berlin) 6 no. 2 (1956) 126-37. Dwells on the case of a *mustarjil*, an Iraqi woman who dressed as a man and achieved fame as a tribal poet.
- See also: 10049, 10066, 10072, 10075, 10086, 10089, 10103

SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, QUR'AN AND THEOLOGY

- 10134 BUTT, MAULAVI MUHAMMAD YAHYA. "The *mi'raj* or ascension of the Prophet Mohammad." *Islamic Rev.* 45 (Je '57) 11-14. An orthodox interpretation.
- 10135 MUID KHAN, M. A. "*Kitābu ta'bīr-ir-ruya* of Abū Ali Ibn Sīnā." *Indo-Iranica* (Calcutta) 9 (S '56) 15-30. A translation.
- 10136 AL-MUJAHD, SHAREEF. "Islam and dualism between the spiritual and temporal power." *Islamic Rev.* 45 (Je '57) 5-10. A critical appraisal of 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq's *Islam and the principles of government*.
- 10137 PLESSNER, M. "Der astronom und historiker Ibn 'Šā'id al-Andalusī und seine geschichte der wissensschaften." *Riv. degli Studi O.* 31 no. 4 (1956) 235-57. Plessner disagrees with Blachère and sees in the 11th cent. author one of the finest humanists of medieval Spain.

ART

(Archaeology, epigraphy, manuscripts and papyri, minor arts, numismatics, painting and music)

- 10138 "The year's work in Central Asian archaeology, 1954-1955." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 2 (1956) 153-60. Round-up of newspaper articles, arranged by chronological periods. Although the data obtained by the archaeological expeditions are valuable, the conclusions drawn are less so because of tendentiousness.

- 10139 ARBERRY, A. J. "Al-Ash'ari's tract on faith." *B.S.A.O.S.* 19 no. 1 (1957) 160-2. Discussion of a second copy of this treatise in the Chester Beatty collection (the first being a Cairo MS, which was the basis of Spitta's edition).
- 10140 BALOG, PAUL. "Fausses monnaies islamiques." *Cong. Internat. de Numismatique 1953, II* (Paris '57) 469-71. Islamic counterfeit coins are very rare. The article describes a Sassano-Arab dirham, a dinar of Nāṣir Muḥammad b. Qal'awn, and a dinar of another Mamluk sultan Barsbay. Illust.
- 10141 BALOG, PAUL. "La technique du monnayage en Égypte musulmane au Moyen Âge." *Cong. Internat. de Numismatique 1953, II* (Paris '57) 551-6. Coins were struck from dies prepared by casting.
- 10142 BELENITSKY, A. M. "An Arabic inscription from Panjikent." (in Russian) *Epigrafika Vostoka* 11 (1956) 27-9. The city was destroyed by the Arabs and by the 8th cent. was dead. Pieces of pottery with Arabic lettering of a 10th cent. type were discovered in 1953. This would seem to show the survival of the technique among later inhabitants of the "ghost" city.
- 10143 BERNSTAM, A. N. "Old Turkic runic inscriptions from Ferghana." (in Russian) *Epigrafika Vostoka* 11 (1956) 54-8.
- 10144 DAVIDOVICH, E. A. "The Samanids of Ferghana—numismatic data." (in Russian) *Epigrafika Vostoka* 11 (1956) 14-26. A table of rulers in the 9th-10th century based on a study of local coinage.
- 10145 DEL RIVERO, CASTO M. "Acerca del estudio de la numismática hispano-musulmana." *Cong. Internat. de Numismatique 1953, II* (Paris '57) 477-85. A bibliographic review of this comparatively neglected field from the work of the great systematizer D. Francisco Codera *Tratado de numismática árabe-española* (1879) to the highly praised *The coinage of the Umayyads of Spain* of George C. Miles.
- 10146 DOTHAN, ALEXANDER. "On the history of the ancient synagogue in Aleppo." (in Hebrew) *Sefunot* (Jerusalem) 1 (1956) 25-61. Devotes much attention to a container for a law-scroll of artistic and historical value (1710).
- 10147 GARABETIAN, BERJ M. "Monnaies quadrilingues au nom d'Abagha, khan de Perse." *Cong. Internat. de Numismatique 1953, II* (Paris '57) 497-502. In Mongol, Arabic, Armenian, and Nestorian letters these coins (the first quadrilinguists of the Middle Ages) bear importantly on the Mongol invasion of the Middle East. The Armenian inscriptions are to be explained by the fact that the Armenians were the principal allies of the Mongols. Abagha, son of Hulagu, was, like his father, a Christian and he was married to a Christian princess.
- 10148 GUZALIAN, L. T. "A 624/1227 inscription on a tile in the Kiev Museum." (in Russian) *Epigrafika Vostoka* 11 (1956) 33-43. Text and translation of poetic passages.
- 10149 HEKMAT, A. A. "Persian inscriptions of India." (in Persian) *Indo-Iranica* (Calcutta) 11 (S '56) vi-10.
- 10150 JUNGFLAISCH, MARCEL. "Les empreintes sur verre." *Cong. Internat. de Numismatique 1953, II* (Paris '57) 473-5. A brief but stimulating sketch of this valuable form of artistic expression, the history of which stretches from antiquity to modern times.
- 10151 MASSON, M. E. "Central Asian tomb qayraqs." (in Russian) *Epigrafika Vostoka* 11 (1956) 3-13. The term is applied to river-smoothed stones used for epitaphs, with figurines. They date from the 12th cent. A.D.
- 10152 MILES, GEORGE C. "A brief report on the coins found in the excavations at Iṣṭakhr, 1935 and 1937." *Cong. Internat. de Numismatique 1953, II* (Paris '57) 491-6. Of 1,053 coins over 900 were Islamic, and most of these 'Abbāsid. Many appear to be new to the corpus of Islamic coins and provide additional testimony to the value of new material (particularly of unknown local issues) obtained through excavations.
- 10153 MUṢṬAFĀ, MUḤAMMAD 'ALĪ. "Excavations at Kufa (third season)." (in Arabic) *Sumer* 12 no. 1-2 (1956) 3-32, photographs, plans. Clearing away the debris from four previously-unearthed palace areas has resulted in the discovery of perhaps the most imposing administrative building of the Islamic era dated 17 A.H. It is expected that, when completely excavated, the structure will increase our knowledge to the genesis and development of Islamic architecture.
- 10154 AL-NAQSHABANDĪ, NĀṢIR. "Qur'āns from early Islam." (in Arabic) *Sumer* 12, no. 1-2 (1956) 33-7, illust. Descriptions of some of the treasures of the Iraqi Museum.
- 10155 REINHARD, KURT. "Zustand und wandel des bauerlichen musiklebens in der türkischen provinz Adana." *Sociologus* (Berlin) 6 no. 1 (1956) 68-78. Observations made during a 1955 field trip.
- 10156 AL-RUBAY 'Ī, WĀ'IL. "Excavations at Dāqūq." (in Arabic) *Sumer* 12 no. 1-2 (1956) 38-89, illust. An account of the archaeological activity in this early and comparatively little known Muslim city near Kirkuk and a summary of the available data on its history.
- 10157 ŠTĚPKOVÁ, JARMILA. "Über das wesen und die funktion der dirhamen-bruchstücke." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 329-37. Traces in broad strokes, through Arab sources, the history of the use of fragmented coins (brokemoney) by the weight and value of their metal content.
- 10158 WALKER, JOHN. "The coins of the amirs of Crete." *Cong. Internat. de Numismatique 1953, II* (Paris '57) 487-90. Presents, for the first time, "evidence for attributing certain gold and silver coins of the 'Abbāsid series to the Muslim governors of Crete" in the 9th cent. A.D.
- 10159 YUSUPOV, G. V. "On the problem of the history and classification of Bulgaro-Tartar epigraphy." (in Russian) *Epigrafika Vostoka* 11 (1956) 44-53.
- 10160 ZHUKOV, V. D. "A qayraq with a bilingual inscription of 574/1178." (in Russian) *Epigrafika Vostoka* 11 (1956) 30-2. The short Arabic inscription is followed by a quatrain in Tajik. The monument is located in Samarqand.

LANGUAGE

- 10161 DENY, JEAN. "Turc ak-bag." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 76-9. Discussion of this work meaning both "white head" and "bishop," which is part of a family of Turkish words whose semantic development evolved around color of hair.
- 10162 GRUNIN, T. I. "The adjective in Turkic." (in Russian) *Vopr. Yazykozn.* (Moscow) 4 (1955) 55-64.
- 10163 HENZE, PAUL B. "Alphabet changes in Soviet Central Asia and Communist China." *R.C.A.J.* 44 (Ap '57) 124-36. The linguistic and alphabetic chaos arbitrarily introduced into the languages of Central Asia prevents the visible manifestation of cultural progress. "Only when the fetters of Communist control are appreciably loosened are we likely to gain a real measure of the cultural capabilities of the Central Asian peoples."
- 10164 HRBEK, IVAN. "Eine volksetymologie des namens 'Bulgar'." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 113-9. The author bases his interpretation of the folk etymology of Bulgaria (from Turkish *biler* "a learned man") on a passage from an Arabic travel book by the 12th cent. Abū Hāmid al-Gharnāṭī al-Andalusī.
- 10165 MACKENZIE, D. N. "Bājalāni." *B.S.A.O.S.* 18 no. 3 (1956) 418-35. Some linguistic notes on this Kurdish dialect spoken in the region some two miles east of the Tigris River.
- 10166 MOSCATI, S. "Sulla posizione linguistica del semitico nord-occidentale." *Riv. degli Studi O.* 31 no. 4 (1956) 229-34.
- 10167 NÉMETH, JULIUS. "Zu den türkischen aufzeichnungen des Georgievits." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 202-9. Comments on Heffening's analysis of the writings of Bartholomaeus Georgievitz—a Croat from Hungary who was captured in the battle of Mohács (1526) and spent ten years in captivity in Turkey where he learned to write Turkish. His material constitutes an invaluable source of information for historic Osmanli dialectology.
- 10168 PALMER, F. R. "'Openness' in Tigre: a problem in prosodic statement." *B.S.A.O.S.* 18 no. 3 (1956) 561-77. The data are drawn wholly from the nominals.
- 10169 PALMER, F. R. "The verb in Bilin." *B.S.A.O.S.* 19 no. 1 (1957) 131-59. Bilin is a dialect of the Cushitic language of Agau spoken in and around the town of Keren in Eritrea.
- 10170 PETRÁČEK, KAREL. "Bemerkungen zur artikulation der liquiden im arabischen." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 227-32.
- 10171 RÄSÄNEN, MARTTI. "Einige iranischen entlehnungen in den finnisch-ug-rischen und türkischen sprachen." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 274-9. The Finno-Ugric peoples had come into early contact with Indo-Europeans, particularly the old Iranians. And some Finno-Ugric tribes—the Mordwins, Cheremiss, and Permians—continued to maintain close relations for a long time with such Iranians as the Scythians and Ossetians.
- 10172 ROSSI, ETTORE. "A note to the manuscript of

the *Diwān Luḡāt at-Turk*." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 280-4. Discusses the meaning of an Arabic colophon to this unique MS of Maḥmūd al-Kāshgarī that tends to confirm that the language of the medieval Turkish dictionary is Qipchaq, i.e., N.W. Turkish.

- 10173 SAURANBAIEV, N. T. "Dialects in contemporary Kazakh." (in Russian) *Vopr. Yazykozn.* (Moscow) 5 (1955) 43-51.
- 10174 SULTANOV, A. F. "The problem of the formation of a national language in Egypt." (in Russian) *Vopr. Yazykozn.* (Moscow) 6 (1955) 32-47. Finds signs of penetration of the spoken idiom into literature.
- 10175 WATERSON, NATALIE. "Some aspects of the phonology of the nominal forms of the Turkish word." *B.S.O.A.S.* 18 no. 3 (1956) 578-91.
- 10176 ZAJACZWOKSKI, A. "The latest dictionaries of modern Turkish." (in Polish) *Przegląd O.* (Warsaw) 4 (20) (1956) 509-21.

See also: 10020, 10032, 10042, 10048

LITERATURE

- 10177 "The re-examination of the Soviet Asian epics." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 1 (1956) 66-71. Oral literature constitutes the bulk of the literary heritage of the native peoples of Central Asia. Representing and often reflecting, as they did, nationalist and independence sentiments, the epics have come under systematic, officially inspired attack.
- 10178 BERTELS, YEVGENY E. "On the question of 'Indian style' in Persian poetry." (in Russian) *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 56-9. Argues that this bombastic and complex style did not develop in India, that it represents not a geographic or national term, but a social one and rejects the view, advanced by Shibli Nu'mānī, that the 16th cent., almost forgotten, Shirazi poet Bābā Fighānī was its creator.
- 10179 BIELAWSKI, J. "Hayy ibn Yaqzan, Ibn Tufayl's philosophical novel." (in Polish) *Przegląd O.* (Warsaw) 4 (20) (1956) 443-60.
- 10180 BOLDYREV, A. N. "From the history of the development of literary Persian." (in Russian) *Vopr. Yazykozn.* (Moscow) 5 (1955) 78-92. Attempts to assess the social significance of the rise and recognition of the language, and adduces a number of instructive passages from various sources.
- 10181 FARZAAD, M. "Ḥaafiz of Shiraz, I, II." *Islamic Rev.* 45 (My, Je '57) 24-9, 30-5. An able analysis of the problems involved in establishing a sound Hafiz text and in effecting a first-class translation; sample excerpts.
- 10182 FERHADI, A. R. "Le majlis de Mansur-e-Hallaj, de Shams-e-Tabrezi et du Molla de Roum." *Rev. des Etudes Islam.* 23 (1955) 69-91. Translation of a rather recent Shi'ite drama (*ta'ziye*) from a Vatican MS in Persian.
- 10183 HAYRAPETIAN, YERVAND. "The role of the translation of the Bible in Armenian culture." *Armenian Rev.* 10 (Je '57) 152-60; The intellectual climate in early Christian Armenia.

- 10184 KUBÍKOVÁ, VĚRA. "Un éclair de sourire sur un visage tragique." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 142-8. Synopsis of a story *Ābe-e zendagi* by the modern writer Sādeq Hedāyat, with comments on his style, language, philosophy, and place in Persian literature.
- 10185 LANDAU, JACOB M. "Lo scrittore arabo Domet e l'impresa sionistica di Erez Israel." *Rassegna Mensile di Israel* (Citta di Castello) 22 (O '56).
- 10186 LANG, D. M. "Recent work on the Georgian New Testament." *B.S.A.O.S.* 19 no. 1 (1957) 82-93. The Gospels were among the first works translated into Georgian early in the fifth century on the heels of the invention of the Georgian alphabet. Much important research has been done in recent years on the Georgian New Testament and its textual evolution.
- 10187 LANG, D. M. "'Wisdom and lies': variations on a Georgian literary theme." *B.S.A.O.S.* 18 no. 3 (1956) 436-48. Discussion of a work by the scholar-politician-monk Sulkhan Orbeliani (1658-1726).
- 10188 MACHALSKI, FRANCISZEK. "Šams et Toğra, roman historique de Muḥammad Bākīr Hosrovi." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 149-63. Synopsis and detailed analysis of this great pioneer work of modern Persian literature, written during the times and reflecting the attitudes of the Persian constitutional struggle early in the 20th century.
- 10189 MASSE, HENRI. "Quinze poésies de Qāsim-ol-Anvar." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 164-78. Text and prose translation of some of the poems of this Timurid era mystic (1356-1433) who, although not powerful or original, nevertheless frequently wrote subtle and beautiful poetry.
- 10190 MINORSKY, VLADIMIR. "Pūr-i Bahā and his poems." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 186-201. An appreciation of the works of this outstanding but hitherto virtually neglected 13th cent. Persian poet who lived during Il-Khan rule over Persia. Besides literary merit, his verses reveal much about the history and atmosphere of the Mongol era.
- 10191 NIKITINE, BASILE. "Farang-Sbenāsi ou l'Europe vue de Téhéran." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 210-26. Translated excerpts from and comments on an important contemporary Persian novel *Darkness and Light* by Fakhr ed-Din Shādmān containing ideas on various aspects of European and American civilization. The hero of the novel embodies the ideals of Persian youth.
- 10192 PAPADOPOULOU, A. "La saison théâtrale au Caire." *Rev. du Caire* 19 (Ap '56) 325-38.
- 10193 SHAKI, MANSOUR. "An introduction to the modern Persian literature." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 300-15. A communist interpretation of the history, forms, and chief protagonists of 20th cent. Persian literature. The sketch, despite a superabundance of Marxian clichés, is valuable for some sharp insights.
- 10194 TURKOVÁ, HELENA. "Über ein türkisches sprichwörtergedicht." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 374-86. Text, edition, and translation of this Turkish poem consisting wholly of proverbs. The author is unknown.
- 10195 ZAJACZKOWSKI, ANANIASZ. "The oldest Turkish version of the poem *Khosrov-i-Shirin* of Kutb." (in Russian) *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 387-96. A comparison of the Turkish adaptation of Nizami with the origin is extremely instructive both from the literary and from the linguistic points of view. The occasional literal passages of the Turkish makes it possible to emend the Teheran edition of Nizami, as the excerpts here given show.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 10196 CRESSWELL, K. A. C. "A bibliography of the Muslim architecture of Mesopotamia." *Sumer* 12 no. 1-2 (1956) 51-65. 183 items listed alphabetically by authors under "general" and then under various Iraqi cities. Part of the vast *Bibliography of the architecture, arts, and crafts of Islam*.
- 10197 MOUBARAC, Y. "Éléments de bibliographie sud-sémitique." *Rev. des Etudes Islam.* 23 (1955) 121-76. Contains 606 items, some annotated; 80 deal with contemporary Arabia.
- 10198 VAN LEEUWEN, A. "Références." *I.B.L.A.* 19 no. 4 (1956) 447-64. Classified, unannotated periodical bibliography, August 1 to December 31, 1956. See also: 10042, 10047

BIOGRAPHY

- 10199 "B. V. Miller (1877-1956)." *Sov Vostok.* 2 no. 2 (1956) 158-9. This well-known Soviet orientalist was a specialist in Caucasian and Iranian studies.
- 10200 "V. A. Gordlevski." *Sov. Vostok.* 2 no. 5 (1956). Turcologist, folklorist, and Islamist (1876-1956), he was an excellent teacher.
- 10201 IMAMUDDIN, S. M. "Lévi-Provençal—a great historian." *Islamic Lit.* 9 (Je-F '57) 41-3. An appreciation of the recently deceased scholar's contribution to the history of Muslim Spain.
- 10202 MANDALIAN, JAMES G. "Dro-Drastamat Kanyan (1884-1956)." *Armenian Rev.* 10 (Je '57) 3-14. Biographical sketch of a veteran fighter against the Turks.
- 10203 SHAHUNI, V. "The Soviet interpretation of Khachadour Abovian." *Armenian Rev.* 10 (Je '57) 133-6. Some biographical details on this Armenian author, acknowledged as the founder of modern Armenian language and literature. The 150th anniversary of his birth in 1955 signalled the beginning of a campaign launched by the authorities in the Armenian SSR to portray him as a Russophile.
- 10204 TASHJIAN, JAMES H. "Life and papers of Vahan Cardashian, II." *Armenian Rev.* 10 (Je '57) 52-72. Cardashian was an outstanding publicist for the Armenian cause and he exerted considerable influence on a number of prominent Americans before and during World War I.
- 10205 TAUER, FELIX. "La vie et l'oeuvre de Jan Rypka." *Charisteria O.* (Prague '56) 7-28. A bibliographic study of the noted Czech Iranologist.

MISCELLANEOUS

- 10206 "Central Asian newspapers." *C. A. Rev.* 4 no. 1 (1956) 79-81. Brief note on the content, layout, typography, etc.
- 10207 CORMACK, WILLIAM. "The future of tourism in the Arab world. *Arab World* 31 (Ap '57) 7-8. Modern tourists seek beaches, not museums or picturesque ruins. The Arab World is rich in tourism's greatest natural resource—the sun. If Arab governments act accordingly, "the future will be prosperous indeed."
- 10208 KAYSER, JACQUES. "La presse française et la crise de Suez." *Polit. Etrangère* 22 no. 2 (1957).
- 10209 KRACHOVSKY, I. Y. "Semites in the universities of the Soviet Union." (in Russian) *Vopr. Yazykoz.* (Moscow) 4 (1955) 83-8.
- 10210 LELONG, M. "Faut-il arabiser l'enseignement des sciences?" *I.B.L.A.* 19 no. 4 (1956) 415-22. Sums up the views of several Tunisian professors on the principle, possibility, and means of arabicising the teaching of science. In general, they favor the principle but urge its implementation with the greatest of caution.
- 10211 REYCHMAN, J. "A few words on Rumanian oriental studies." (in Polish) *Przegląd O.* (Warsaw) 4 (20) (1956) 523-9.
- 10212 ZAJĄCZKOWSKI, A. "The opening of the XIV convention of Polish orientalists." (in Polish) *Przegląd O.* (Warsaw) 4 (20) (1956) 471-5.
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ABBREVIATIONS

A., Asian, Asiatic, asiatique
 Acad., Academy
 Aff., Affairs, affaires
 Afr., African, Afrique, etc.
 Amer., American
 Archeol., Archaeological, archéologique
 B., Bulletin
 C., Central
 Cent., Century
 Contemp., Contemporary, etc.
 Cult., Culture
 D., Deutsch
 Dept., Department
 East., Eastern
 Econ., Economic, économique
 For., Foreign
 G., Gesellschaft
 Geog., Geographical, géographique, etc.
 Gt. Brit., Great Britain
 Hist., Historical, historique, etc.
 Illust., Illustrated
 Inst., Institute
 Internat., International
 J., Journal
 L., Literature, etc.
 M., Morgenländisch, etc.

Mag., Magazine
 Mid., Middle
 Mod., Modern, moderno, etc.
 Mus., Museum, musée
 Natl., National
 Nr., Near
 Numis., Numismatic, numismatique
 O., Oriental, oriente, etc.
 Pal., Palestine
 Phil., Philosophical
 Philol., Philological, Philologique
 Polit., Political, Politique
 Proceed., Proceedings
 Quart., Quarterly
 R., Royal
 Res., Research
 Rev., Review, revue
 Riv., Rivista
 S., School
 Soc., Society, société
 Stud., Studies
 Trans., Transactions
 U.S., United States
 USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Univ., University, université
 Z., Zeitschrift, Zeitung

Arabic

K., Kitab, etc.
 Maj., Majallah, etc.

Russian, Polish, etc.

Akad., Akademii
 Fil., Filosophi
 Inst., Institut
 Ist., Istorii
 Izvest., Izvestia
 Lit., Literaturi
 Orient., Orientalni
 Ser., Seriya
 Sov., Sovetskoye
 Uchon., Uchoniye
 Vostok., Vostokovedeniya
 Yaz., Yazika
 Zap., Zapiski

Turkish

Fak., Fakülte
 Univ., Üniversite

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